People v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 09 January 1984
• Docket Number: Cr. 43263
• Citation: 150 Cal.App.3d 579,198 Cal.Rptr. 565
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Manuel MARTINEZ and Israel Chavez, Defendants and Appellants.

Page 565

198 Cal.Rptr. 565

150 Cal.App.3d 579

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Manuel MARTINEZ and Israel Chavez, Defendants and Appellants.

Cr. 43263.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Jan. 9, 1984.

Hearing Denied Feb. 29, 1984.

Mary J. Madsen, Camarillo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant Martinez.

Robert S. Gerstein, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant Chavez.

John K. Van De Kamp, Atty. Gen., William R. Weisman and Frederick Grab, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

KINGSLEY, Acting Presiding Justice.

Upon trial by jury, defendants were each convicted of 16 criminal offenses and sentenced to state prison. Defendant Martinez received a sentence of 47 years plus two consecutive life terms; defendant Chavez, 54 years plus two consecutive life terms. Both defendants have appealed, essentially contending that the enormity of these sentences is due to improper conviction under a statute that was not meant to apply to their conduct, and to numerous instances of double conviction and punishment in violation of Penal Code section 654. ¹ Because we agree in part with these contentions, we reverse the judgment in part, as set forth below.

This case arises from crimes committed in the home of Donald and Martha Goodfellow during the hours of 3:00 to 4:00 on the morning of February 28, 1982. At about 3:00, defendant Chavez rang the Goodfellows' doorbell, and when Donald answered, forced his way into the living room by holding a screwdriver to Donald's back. Defendant Martinez then entered and took control of Donald by holding his own screwdriver to Donald's neck. Chavez went into the bedroom and told Martha that if she screamed her husband would be hit or shot by Martinez. Chavez took an alarm clock, a baseball cap, car keys, Donald's driver's license, and some coins from the dresser. He then made Martha submit to three acts of sexual intercourse, pushing the screwdriver against her neck during part of the third act.

Meanwhile, Martinez had tied Donald up with strips from Donald's bathrobe. He came into the bedroom briefly and rubbed Martha's arm, but left when Chavez told him to go back and watch Donald as there was "plenty of time." During the third act of intercourse, Martinez again entered the bedroom to tell Chavez that Donald had escaped. Chavez left the bedroom and Martinez performed a fourth act of intercourse with Martha.

Chavez returned to attempt to disable the telephone and to ask Martha how to open the garage door. He ran back out of the bedroom, however, when Martha heard her husband call her name. At that point Defendants were charged and convicted of: conspiracy to rape and rob (§ 183); burglary with use of a deadly weapon by Chavez (§§ 459, 12022(b)); four forcible rapes in concert, while armed with (Martinez) or using (Chavez) ² a deadly weapon (§§ 261, 264.1, 12022.3); robbery of Donald Goodfellow with use of a deadly weapon (§§ 211, 12022(b)); robbery of Martha Goodfellow, with (Chavez) use of a deadly weapon (§§ 211, 12022(b)); two assaults upon Donald with a deadly weapon (§ 245(a)(2)); assault upon Martha with a deadly weapon (§ 245(a)); two false imprisonments of Donald, with use of a deadly weapon by Chavez in one imprisonment and by Martinez in the other (§§ 236, 12022(b)); and false imprisonment of Martha with (Chavez) use of a deadly weapon (§§ 236, 12022(b)).

Martha told Martinez to get out. Martinez went to the door of the adjoining bathroom and was there pulling his pants on when police officers, who were then in the living room, ordered Chavez to freeze. Chavez, from the hallway, yelled, "We have a hostage" and said something to indicate that the hostage would be hurt if he was not allowed to leave. Martha ran down the hallway into the arms of her husband; as she ran past Chavez, he tried to stop her by grabbing her hair, but was unable to do so. The police then arrested both defendants.

In addition to the foregoing, both defendants were charged and convicted of kidnapping Donald for ransom and extortion under section 209, subdivision (a), and of kidnapping Martha for ransom or extortion under the same section. It is the propriety of these latter convictions that we first address.

I

There are three types of kidnapping in California. Simple kidnapping is proscribed by Penal Code section 207 and punishable by a maximum term of seven years. Kidnapping for robbery is proscribed by section 209, subdivision (b) and punishable by life imprisonment with possibility of parole. Kidnapping for ransom or extortion or to exact money or any valuable thing from a person other than the kidnap victim is proscribed by section 209, subdivision (a); it is punishable by life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole if the kidnap victim is not harmed, and with no possibility of parole if the victim suffers bodily harm. ³

In the present case, defendants were convicted of kidnapping Donald Goodfellow for ransom or extortion, the most serious form of kidnapping recognized in this state. The People's theory was, and is, that, by restraining Donald and threatening Martha that he would be harmed if she screamed or interfered in the robbery, the defendants confined Donald to exact Martha's cooperation in the robbery (a "valuable thing") within the meaning of section 209, subdivision (a). The prosecutor acknowledged that this theory of aggravated kidnapping would encompass all robberies in which the robber holds a gun on two persons and says to one of them that he will harm the other if his demand for money is refused.

Defendants now challenge the conviction, arguing that section 209 cannot have been intended to reach conduct that is essentially a multi-victim robbery. In support of Prior to 1933, aggravated kidnapping as defined in section 209 required some movement of the victim; the statute proscribed taking or enticing away any person in order to commit robbery or extortion or to exact any valuable thing. The statute was amended in 1933, as part of a nationwide response to the Lindbergh kidnapping. (See, In re Dennis (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 50, 120 Cal.Rptr. 267.) In the amended statute, movement was no longer required; instead of taking or enticing away, the statute proscribed mere seizure or confinement with the intent to rob, extort, or exact a thing of value. (See People v. Macinnes (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 838, 106 Cal.Rptr. 589.) In People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 217 P.2d 1, our Supreme Court observed that the amended language effectively allowed all robberies involving the slightest detention to be prosecuted as aggravated kidnappings, but held that any doubts as to the wisdom of such a result must be addressed not to the courts but the Legislature. The Legislature responded to Knowles in the following year. In 1951 it amended the statute to require an element of asportation in all kidnaps for robbery. The definition of kidnap for ransom or extortion, however, remained essentially unchanged, still requiring no act beyond seizure or confinement. All aggravated kidnappings, whether done for the purpose of robbery, ransom or extortion, were made punishable by death or life without parole if the victim was harmed, and by life with the possibility of parole if he was not. ⁴

their contention, they trace the history of section 209 [150 Cal.App.3d 588] and point to various anomalies that would result from interpreting subdivision (a) to apply to the facts of this case. We agree with their arguments and find that no kidnapping of Donald occurred.

In accordance with the 1951 bifurcation of aggravated kidnappings into those requiring asportation and those not, two lines of authority arose, one dealing with cases of kidnap for ransom or extortion and the other with kidnap for robbery. The first line is still somewhat rudimentary, and as we shall see, includes no case similar to the one at bar. The line of authority treating the parameters of kidnap for robbery is extensive, and does include several cases with facts similar to the one at bar. Since our resolution of the instant case should be in harmony with both lines to the extent that it should not offend the principles expressed in either, we briefly summarize both lines of authority.

The kidnap for ransom and extortion cases have recognized four fact-situations which show this form of aggravated kidnapping. People v. Dacy (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 216, 85 Cal.Rptr. 57, dealt with the classic kidnap for ransom situation; there, the kidnap victim was abducted from his home and held in seclusion while ransom was demanded of his family. People v. Macinnes, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d 838, 106 Cal.Rptr. 589, treated a different situation, one in which the kidnap victim is not moved, but the recipient of the ransom demand is. There, the defendants entered a home containing three people, held two of them hostage in the home, and took the third to another place where he could obtain money as ransom for the hostages. People v. Anderson (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 419, 158 Cal.Rptr. 727, represents a third situation, in which neither the kidnap victim nor the recipient of the ransom-demand is moved. There the defendants entered a couple's home while the husband was away, held the wife there, and attempted to telephone the husband to demand ransom. A fourth situation was recognized in Magee v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 201, 109 Cal.Rptr. 758. The Magee court held that a kidnap for extortion may be shown by a defendant seizing a person and holding him hostage in order to induce police officers to refrain from resisting and stopping the defendant's criminal acts. To date, no case has held that a kidnap for ransom or extortion is shown by detaining two people during a robbery and threatening The leading kidnap for robbery cases have taken a different route. They have been concerned not so much with describing the types of...