People v. Martinez, 1-06-1482.
Citation | 897 N.E.2d 879,386 Ill. App. 3d 153 |
Decision Date | 31 October 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 1-06-1482.,1-06-1482. |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ivan MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Elena B. Penick, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for Appellant.
Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago. (James E. Fitzgerald, Samuel Shim, and Colleen Keough, of Counsel), for Appellee.
Defendant, Ivan Martinez, was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon after a jury trial and was sentenced as a Class X offender to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 12 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. On appeal, he asserts that: (1) the trial court conducted incomplete and insufficient voir dire by failing to adhere to the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 431 (177 Ill.2d R. 431); (2) prosecutors presented improper and inflammatory arguments; (3) entry of judgment on both counts of the charged offenses violated the one-act, one-crime rule; (4) the Violent Crime Victim Assistance fine was improperly imposed; and (5) the Criminal/Traffic Conviction Surcharge fine should be offset by defendant's time in custody. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part and modify the judgment of the circuit court.
The instant prosecution stemmed from the discovery of a loaded handgun in defendant's van following a traffic stop in the City of Chicago on December 3, 2004. Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, which the court denied after an evidentiary hearing. The matter then proceeded to trial on two counts, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in that defendant knowingly carried an uncased, loaded and immediately accessible firearm in a vehicle after having been previously convicted of attempt second degree murder, and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.
The evidence presented before the jury established that on December 3, 2004, Detective Healey was on duty at Area Five headquarters located on the northwest side of the city. He left the facility in an unmarked car around 3:30 a.m. to get coffee. As the detective drove north on Laramie, he noticed a van parked in the alley between Fullerton and Medill. The van was in the middle of the alley with the headlights off, the driver's door open, with nobody in or around it. After circling the block to investigate further, Healey saw the van traveling west in the alley and then turn north onto Laramie. He followed the van, observing that it had no license plate on the bumper, but did exhibit some form of temporary registration in the rear window, which was tinted black. Because he was alone, Healey radioed for assistance in stopping the vehicle. Upon arrival of the assist officers, Bieze and Dortch, both units activated their emergency lights and stopped the van at Cicero and Wabansia.
Healey approached the driver's side of the van, where he observed defendant seated in the driver's seat. He asked defendant for his driver's license and insurance, but defendant was unable to produce either. In turn, Healey asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle, and as defendant complied, the detective observed that he was dressed in camouflage clothing and was wearing a black skullcap with eye holes cut into it. As the door of the van remained open, Healey saw what he recognized as the handle of a gun protruding from beneath the front seat. Healey recovered the gun, a .38-caliber Taurus revolver containing live and spent rounds. Defendant was arrested upon discovery of the weapon. Healey later inventoried the weapon and it was admitted into evidence at defendant's trial.
Detective Healey gave defendant his Miranda rights at the scene and the station and defendant acknowledged his understanding. When asked why he had a gun and was dressed in camouflage, defendant replied that he was from Miami and that he was on a mission. Healey inventoried the black skullcap, but did not inventory the camouflage clothing or boots. Although defendant's booking photograph depicts him in a polo shirt, Healey testified that defendant was wearing it beneath the camouflage shirt or jacket.
Officer Daniel Bieze testified that he and his partner assisted Healey in making the traffic stop. Defendant was the only occupant of the vehicle. When defendant was unable to produce a driver's license or proof of insurance he was placed into custody and put in the backseat of the assist vehicle. Officer Bieze confirmed that defendant was wearing "like a camouflage outfit, like an army jacket like shirt, camouflage pants, military jump boots like black, he had camouflage gloves and a black knit cap." Bieze noted that the jacket was removed during a custodial search before defendant was taken to the lockup. The officer did not see a gun in the van nor did he participate in the inventory of evidence.
The gun and ammunition recovered from defendant's van was sent to the Illinois State Police Forensic Science Center for fingerprint analysis. Julie Wessel, a forensic scientist, examined the revolver, as well as the spent and live cartridges, but found no latent fingerprint impression suitable for comparison.
The parties also stipulated that defendant had been convicted of a felony offense in the state of Florida. However, the specific offense was not identified. After the People rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the court denied. The defense then rested. After arguments, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on each count. Following denial of post-trial motions, defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 12 years of imprisonment. The court also entered an order assessing fines, fees and costs against defendant totaling $639, including a $4 criminal traffic conviction surcharge, a $20 violent crime victim assistance charge, and a $100 trauma fund charge. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the court denied, and this appeal followed.
In his initial assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to sua sponte inquire into the potential bias prospective jurors might harbor against a defendant who declines to testify or present evidence in his own behalf.
Jury selection was conducted by the court and counsel on February 8, 2006. Initially, the trial court informed the venire that:
"The defendant is presumed innocent of the charges" and that "the State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
The court then called 14 prospective jurors into the jury box and made a general inquiry to the group:
The judge next directed specific inquiries to each member of the group dealing with family background, residency, employment, prior jury service, and involvement in criminal and civil proceedings. Additionally, several jurors who had acquaintances in law enforcement were asked if they could judge the testimony of a police officer in the same manner as that of any other witness. The parties were then permitted to supplement the voir dire; the State directed one question to the group, but defense counsel had no questions. Both sides then exercised their peremptory challenges, resulting in the tentative acceptance of 10 jurors.
Following the lunch break, 14 additional jurors were placed in the jury box, and after informing the new group of the State's burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the court further stated:
Defendant maintains that the nature and scope of the court-conducted voir dire deprived him of his right to a fair trial because it failed to adequately question each potential juror as required by Supreme Court Rule 431(b). According to defendant, the court's inquiries were deficient in failing to question each of the prospective jurors regarding his or her understanding of and ability to follow the principles that the defendant is presumed innocent, that he does not have to present any evidence, and that his failure to testify cannot be held against him. Defendant further asserts that because the recent amendment to Rule 431 applies retroactively to the case at bar, he is therefore entitled to a new trial. Because this issue involves the construction of a supreme court rule, we review the claim de novo. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill.2d 324, 332, 266 Ill.Dec. 915, 775 N.E.2d 987, 992 (2002).
As noted, defendant's trial took place in February 2006. At that time, Rule 431 provided:
"(a) The court shall conduct voir dire explanation of prospective jurors by putting to them questions it thinks appropriate, touching upon their qualifications to serve as jurors in the case at trial. The court may permit the parties to submit additional questions to it for further inquiry if it thinks they are appropriate and shall permit the parties to supplement the examination by such direct inquiry as the court deems proper for a reasonable period of time depending upon the length of examination by the court, the complexity of the case, and the nature of the charges. Questions shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of law or instructions. The court shall acquaint prospective jurors with the...
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