People v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 02 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2-17-0793,2-17-0793
• Citation: 128 N.E.3d 1178,432 Ill.Dec. 14,2019 IL App (2d) 170793
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elena K. MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (2d) 170793

128 N.E.3d 1178

432 Ill.Dec. 14

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Elena K. MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-17-0793

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Opinion filed May 2, 2019

Jacqueline M. Aldrich, of Aldrich & Siedlarz Law, P.C., of Lombard, for appellant.

Robert B. Berlin, State’s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne Hoffman and Edward R. Psenicka, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

PRESIDING JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 A jury convicted defendant, Elena K. Martinez, of battery ( 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2016) ). She appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence that the victim, Donald Amirante, was convicted of felony aggravated battery in 1962, (2) the jury's guilty verdict on count II of the information was logically inconsistent with its not-guilty verdicts on counts I and III, (3) she was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on count II, and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her to conditional discharge rather than supervision. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 A. Pretrial Rulings

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with three counts of battery, arising from a September 28, 2016, physical altercation with Amirante in the parking lot of Advocate Good Samaritan Hospital (Good Samaritan) in Downers Grove. Counts I and II alleged the same underlying conduct, namely that defendant struck Amirante in the head and face with her fist and also scratched him on the forehead with a pen. Count I alleged that this conduct caused bodily harm (id. § 12-3(a)(1) ) to Amirante, while count II alleged that the conduct was of an insulting or provoking nature (id. § 12-3(a)(2) ). Count III charged that defendant made further physical contact with Amirante of an insulting or provoking nature, namely by spitting on him.

¶ 5 Prior to trial, defendant gave the State notice that she intended to present self-defense as an affirmative defense at trial. Defendant also filed several motions in limine . The first was a motion to exclude evidence that, sometime after the altercation, Amirante's car was vandalized where it was parked in the Good Samaritan lot. The State did not contest this motion.

¶ 6 The second motion in limine sought to exclude evidence of defendant's agitated state when she was arrested, two hours after the incident. The trial court granted this motion, agreeing with defendant that the "intervening event of an arrest" diminished the relevance of defendant's state of mind as it existed two hours after the incident.

¶ 7 The third motion sought to introduce evidence that Amirante was convicted of felony aggravated battery 55 years earlier, in 1962. For this motion, defendant relied on the holding in People v. Lynch , 104 Ill. 2d 194, 200, 83 Ill.Dec. 598, 470 N.E.2d 1018 (1984), that evidence of the victim's violent character is admissible to support a theory of self-defense. Defendant explained that she did not have a copy of Amirante's conviction or know the facts surrounding the offense; the State had simply noted the conviction in a supplemental disclosure. Defendant intended to proceed by simply asking Amirante whether he was convicted of the offense.

¶ 8 The State argued that evidence of the conviction would be more prejudicial than probative. The State emphasized that the conviction was remote in time and that Amirante had no subsequent criminal history.

¶ 9 In ruling on the motion, the trial court observed that the Lynch rule is codified in Illinois Rule of Evidence 405(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), which states: "In criminal homicide or battery cases when the accused raises the theory of self-defense and there is conflicting evidence as to whether the alleged victim was the aggressor, proof may also be made of specific instances of the alleged victim's prior violent conduct." The court determined that evidence offered under Rule 405(b)(2) is also governed by Illinois Rule of Evidence 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), which provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

¶ 10 The court ruled that the 1962 conviction was inadmissible. The court explained:

"In employing [an] analysis [under Rule 403 ], the Court looks to the nature of this evidence, which is merely the indication of a conviction for aggravated battery from 1962, some 55 years ago. There's no other factual context. There's no other indication of any acts of violence or convictions for acts of violence in the past 55 years other than this one case.

The Court does understand and considered the fact that it is an aggravated battery in the nature of the offense. But the Court does find that the probative value of that conviction is substantially diminished by the passage of time and the fact that the time period in which that occurred is so remote to the current incident.

So the Court does find that there is a substantial diminishment, if that's a word, or diminution of the probative value of that offense based upon the passage of time and the nature of the proof of that offense.

The Court also finds that there is some significant danger of unfair prejudice that the fact finder in this case could place undo [sic ] emphasis on that particular conviction. And the question then is: Is the probative value so diminished that it is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice?

And the Court is also well aware that the Lynch doctrine is based upon the fact that there is—this is a witness, not the defendant; and, therefore, this evidence comes in to show essentially the propensity of the witness. So the Court is aware of that distinct difference between if this were a conviction of a defendant as opposed to a witness.

But still the analysis of Rule 403 informs the Court. And based on the substantial passage of time, the nature of the method of proof, and the fact that it still—in the Court's mind, there is a significant possibility that the fact finder could place undue emphasis on this.

For those reasons, I'll—under Rule 403 I'll deny *** the motion in limine to include that 55-year-old conviction; and I'll find that it is not admissible based on Rule 403 and that the substantially diminished probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."

¶ 11 B. Trial

¶ 12 The State's three witnesses were Amirante; his wife, Ruth Suranovich; and Downers Grove police officer Kevin Chapin.

¶ 13 Amirante testified that he was 74 years old at the time of trial. On September 28, 2016, at about 3 p.m., Amirante and Suranovich arrived at the nonemergency parking lot at Good Samaritan. They were there for Amirante's regular blood draw. On that day, he wore a T-shirt underneath a sweater. Amirante had a pen and a pad of paper in the front pocket of the T-shirt. Carrying these items was a daily habit that he developed while working in the insurance industry.

¶ 14 Amirante had used this same parking lot when he previously visited Good Samaritan for blood draws. Amirante denied that there are signs in the lot directing cars entering the lot to proceed to the right, or counterclockwise, around the lot. Amirante claimed that "people go both ways in the lot" and that, if traffic is supposed to proceed in one direction, it is a "well-kept secret."

¶ 15 When Amirante entered the lot on the afternoon in question, he observed a woman, later identified as Casey Adesugba, walking toward a car parked in the lot. Adesugba was holding a baby in a carrier. Rather than proceed around the lot counterclockwise, Amirante drove directly to Adesugba's car, activated his emergency blinkers, and waited while she secured her child in a car seat. Their cars were facing the same direction. After about five minutes, Amirante noticed behind him a car, whose driver was later identified as defendant. Defendant did not remain behind Amirante but drove back in the opposite direction, proceeded counterclockwise around the lot, and stopped to the right of Adesugba's car. Defendant then deployed her own blinkers. When Adesugba finished securing her child and backed out of the space, Amirante drove into the space past defendant's car, which was on his right. As Amirante passed defendant, her car "rush[ed]" at his. Amirante was "startled" and worried that defendant would strike the right side of his car. Defendant did not make contact, however. Amirante did not hear any honking or yelling when he pulled into the space. Amirante was in the lot about 5 to 10 minutes before he pulled into the space.

¶ 16 Amirante testified that Suranovich remained in the car while he exited and began walking on the sidewalk toward the hospital. Meanwhile, defendant parked her car in the aisle and "jumped out." She left her car door open as she approached Amirante. She yelled profanity and spit at him.

Some of the spit landed on his front. Amirante told defendant to "relax" and said that he was in the parking lot 10 minutes before she was. When defendant reached Amirante, she began striking him in the face with her fists. She knocked off his glasses, which broke in the process. As defendant continued "flailing her arms" and striking him, Amirante "didn't have time to even think." He "just tried to grab on and hang on." He was not able to grab defendant's arms, because she kept swinging. He then grabbed her hair, which was "the only thing [he] could think of." He did this to restrain, not hurt, her. After Amirante took hold of her hair, defendant scratched his face with her "extra long, curved" fingernails. Defendant also reached into the pocket of Amirante's T-shirt, snatched his pen, and stabbed him in the forehead with it. The pen broke in half, but defendant swung at him with the remaining half. When...