People v. Marvin

• Decision Date: 13 December 1934
• Docket Number: No. 22509.,22509.
• Citation: 193 N.E. 202,358 Ill. 426
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. MARVIN.

358 Ill. 426

193 N.E. 202

PEOPLE

v.MARVIN.

No. 22509.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1934.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 13, 1934.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Thomas J. Lynch, Judge.

Margaret Marvin was convicted of grand larceny, and she brings error.

Affirmed.James M. Burke and George M. Crane, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and J. J. Neiger, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson, J. Albert Woll, and Henry E. Seyfarth, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

SHAW, Justice.

On April 4, 1933, after 11 o'clock p. m., Chief of Police Jones of the village of La Grange Park, in Cook county, saw an automobile parked without lights about one hundred feet off of Mannheim road. A man and a woman were sitting in it, and because of its having no lights and the officer recognizing that it was a strange car in town, he circled the block and came back to have another look at it. At that time it moved off, and because of his suspicions the policeman wrote down the license number. A few minutes later he received a report that a burglary had been committed within a short distance of where this car had been parked. He thereupon investigated the license number and discovered that it had been issued to Agnes Bagley, 1539 Fifty-Ninth court, Cicero, Ill. Inquiry at that address disclosed that no one by that name lived there, and he thereupon posted a lookout message for the car. A month later, May 4, 1933, while cruising with another officer, he saw the same automobile with the same license plate. The car, which was then being driven by the defendant herein, was stopped by the officers and inquiry made of the driver as to its ownership. She informed them that she owned it and that she lived in Downers Grove. On looking in the car Officer Jones noticed that it contained a considerable quantity of merchandise in the rear and also two or more coats and some other merchandise piled upon the front seat. He thereupon arrested the defendant and took her to the police station, where a further investigation of the automobile revealed a large quantity of what were afterwards proved to be goods stolen from the Sears-Roebuck & Co. store at 1900 Lawrence avenue, Chicago. The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted on a charge of grand larceny for the theft of some of these goods, and it is to review that conviction that this writ of error is sued out.

Before the commencement of the trial, a motion, supported by affidavit, was made by the defendant to suppress that part of the evidence which consisted of the articles found in her automobile; it being contended that her arrest was illegal and that the search of her car was in violation of her constitutional rights. The overruling of this motion is assigned as error. The ruling of the trial court on this point was right and is clearly sustainable on a number of grounds. In the first place, we must again point out, as we have repeatedly held, that the constitutional prohibition does not extend to all searches and seizures but only as a guard or shield against unreasonable ones. People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632, 173 N. E. 754;People v. Patterson, 354 Ill. 313, 188 N. E. 417. Here the officer in the regular performance of his duty had become informed that this particular automobile was carrying a license plate issued in the name of Agnes Bagley at a certain address and that no such person was known or lived there. It was not unreasonable—in fact, it was in line with a conscientious performance of his duty—for him to stop this car and inquire as to its ownership. In the second place, there was no search involved in the transaction. A search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed, and it is not a search to observe that which is open to view. A search implies an invasion and quest with some sort of force, either actual or constructive. Combest v. State, 32 Okl. Cr. 47, 239 P. 936;State v. Hilton, 119 Or. 441, 249 P. 1103. While the constitutional limitation on searches must necessarily apply to all persons alike, whether guilty or innocent, it is incumbent upon us to remember that it was primarily intended as a shield to the innocent rather than as a refuge for the guilty. In this particular case it would be a distortion of that salutary purpose to so far extend the meaning of the provisions of section 6 of article 2 of the Constitution as to defeatthe ends of justice. The trial court did not err in overruling the motion to suppress this evidence.

The other errors which are argued by the defendant concern the evidence, and hence a short statement of the facts becomes necessary. A special officer for Sears-Roebuck & Co. identified the lace curtains and woman's coat which had been found in defendant's car as the property of Sears-Roebuck & Co. and coming from that company's store at 1900 Lawrence avenue. He also testified that a coat and some curtains were missing from the store on their check-up on the night of May 4, 1933, the date of defendant's arrest. Grace Nagel testified for the people that she was a house detective for Sears-Roebuck & Co. at the store at 1900 Lawrence avenue and was so employed on May 4, 1933; that she was familiar with the merchandise in those departments; that she had seen...