People v. Mass
| Citation | 464 Mich. 615,628 N.W.2d 540 |
| Decision Date | 05 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 115820, Calendar No. 6. |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmy MASS, a/k/a Kool Aid, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Edward F. Swinkey, Prosecuting Attorney, and Cheryl E. Werner, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Monroe, MI, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by C. Joseph Booker and Valerie Newman), Detroit, MI, for the defendant.
Jeffrey L. Sauter, President, PAAM, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Oakland County, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and John S. Pallas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Pontiac, MI, amicus curiae, for the people.
Defendant was convicted, on an aider and abettor theory, of (1) delivery of 225 grams or more but less than 650 grams of a mixture containing cocaine1 and with (2) conspiracy to commit that offense.2
As explained below, we conclude that the amount of a controlled substance is an element of a delivery offense, but that knowledge of the amount is not an element of a delivery charge. However, consistent with People v. Justice, 454 Mich. 334, 562 N.W.2d 652 (1997), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), we also hold that knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is an element of a conspiracy to deliver charge.
An undercover state police officer testified that in early 1996 he purchased crack cocaine six times from Monolito Blackstone. As detailed below, the officer told the jury that defendant assisted Blackstone in completing a seventh sale.
On March 19, 1996, the officer visited Blackstone's apartment and advised that he wished to purchase ten ounces4 of cocaine. Blackstone began making phone calls. Jimmy Mass, who lived across the hall, then arrived. Blackstone told Mass he needed "ten ounces" and asked if he knew anyone who they "could get ten ounces from." Mass said "you should have told me earlier" and began making telephone calls from Blackstone's bedroom. He then returned and advised Blackstone that "his man was not there."
On March 25, 1996, the officer again phoned Blackstone and indicated that he still wanted to purchase ten ounces of cocaine. Blackstone told the officer to meet him the next morning at his apartment. At that meeting, Blackstone made a phone call and advised he would have to travel to Detroit to get the cocaine. Before the meeting ended the officer gave Blackstone $3,700, one half of the agreed upon price as a down payment, and they agreed to meet in the afternoon. At 2:00 that afternoon the officer was told by Mass that Blackstone was not coming back, but that he would direct the officer to a meeting place with Blackstone. The officer responded by expressing some hesitation about that arrangement, and indicated he wanted to speak with Blackstone. To facilitate this, Mass took the officer to his own apartment where he telephoned Blackstone and handed the phone to the officer. In that conversation, Blackstone told the officer that the police had followed him to Detroit and that defendant would bring him to a place where the sale could be completed. Mass and the officer then got into the officer's car, and, under Mass' direction, they drove to a house in Monroe. As they proceeded, Mass gave the directive to the officer to pull over because he believed a car had been following them. Moreover, when the officer for his part indicated that things did not seem right, Mass reassured him that Blackstone had the officer's "stuff" and that "that part of it was straight." Mass also confided to the officer that if Blackstone had taken him with him to Detroit that he would have made sure the police did not follow.
Upon arrival at the house, Mass got out of the car and began looking up and down the street in the manner of a lookout. Meanwhile Blackstone came out from behind the house, got in the car, and handed the officer a package and said "here is your ten ounces."5 The officer then paid Blackstone the balance of the purchase price, and drove off alone leaving Mass and Blackstone together in front of the residence.
At the close of the prosecution's case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict with regard to the delivery and conspiracy charges. The trial court denied the motion stating that a question of fact existed for the jury. Defendant did not testify or present any evidence. In his closing argument defense counsel argued that Mass was a "sad sack, who should pick better friends" but that he had only been present [when Blackstone had delivered the drugs] and was not part of any conspiracy. Following jury instructions,6 the jury convicted Mass as charged on both counts.7
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions in a divided opinion.8 The majority rejected defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient because the prosecution had presented no evidence that he had knowledge of the quantity of cocaine to be delivered. It concluded that knowledge of the amount of cocaine was not an element of either the delivery charge or the conspiracy charge. The Court also rejected defendant's assertion that People v. Justice, supra,
required proof of knowledge of the quantity of controlled substances for a conspiracy conviction. Alternatively, the majority said that, even if Justice required the prosecutor to prove that defendant knew the quantity of cocaine involved to support the conspiracy conviction, the evidence was sufficient to show that Mass knew the quantity of cocaine to be delivered.
The Court also indicated there was no flaw in the jury instructions, even though the instructions did not appraise the jury that the prosecution had to prove that defendant knew the quantity of cocaine involved in the transaction. It concluded that, because knowledge of the quantity of drugs is not an element of the crimes charged, the jury instructions did not constitute error. Alternatively, the majority indicated that if knowledge was an element, any error had been forfeited where there had been no objection to the instructions and the alleged error was not outcome determinative.
Judge Hoekstra dissented with respect to the conspiracy conviction because he believed Justice required the prosecution to prove defendant had the specific intent to deliver the statutory amount of at least 225 grams. He opined that conspiracy was a different offense than delivery and that, while knowledge of the quantity of drugs involved is not an element of a possession charge, it is an element of a conspiracy charge. Judge Hoekstra concluded that defendant was entitled to a new trial regarding his conspiracy conviction because the jury instructions regarding this offense neglected to include one of its elements.
Whether knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is a necessary element of a crime is a legal question and we review legal questions de novo. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 329-330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999).
The test for determining whether evidence was sufficient to establish an element of a crime is found in People v. Hampton, 407 Mich. 354, 365-368, 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979). The test requires us to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the element of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.9
We review forfeited error, such as the failure to instruct a jury regarding one element of an offense, to determine whether "the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 774, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). We reverse if it did.
In Justice the defendant had been charged with conspiring with another to possess with the intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine and was also charged with conspiring with yet another person to possess with the intent to deliver more than 225 grams but less than 650 grams of cocaine. The prosecution had presented evidence at the preliminary examination of several deliveries of cocaine that were aggregated to reach the charged amounts.
In the course of determining that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to justify binding over the defendant for trial, this Court stated: (1) there had to be probable cause to believe that the defendant and the coconspirator shared the specific intent to accomplish the substantive offenses charged and (2) that the evidence showed that the defendant and the coconspirator had a specific intent to deliver the statutory amount as charged. Justice, supra, at 337, 562 N.W.2d 652.
MCL 333.7401(1) provides:
Except as authorized by this article, a person shall not...
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