People v. Maston

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: KINGSLEY; FILES, P. J., and JEFFERSON
• Citation: People v. Maston, 238 Cal.App.2d 877, 48 Cal.Rptr. 439 (Cal. App. 1965)
• Decision Date: 20 December 1965
• Docket Number: 10602,Cr. 10550
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mike MASTON, Defendant and Appellant. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Millard Vernon DEDMON, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 439

48 Cal.Rptr. 439

238 Cal.App.2d 877

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mike MASTON, Defendant and Appellant.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Millard Vernon DEDMON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 10550, 10602.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Dec. 20, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 1966.

Hearing Denied Feb. 16, 1966.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 21, 1966.

See 86 S.Ct. 917.

Mike Maston in pro. per.

Millard Vernon Dedmon in pro. per.

David A. Binder, Los Angeles, under appointment by the District Court of Appeal, for defendants and appellants Mike Maston and Millard Vernon Dedmon.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., and William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent in No. 10550.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert P. Samoian, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent in No. 10602.

KINGSLEY, Justice.

These are appeals from orders denying defendants' petitions for writs of error coram nobis.

On December 19, 1960, the Grand Jury of the County of Santa Barbara returned indictments charging these two appellants, as well as another defendant, in five counts with kidnapping in violation of Penal Code, section 207 (Count One), kidnapping for the purpose of robbery in violation of Penal Code, section 209 (Count Two), robbery in violation of Penal Code, section 211 (Count Three), rape in violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivisions 3 and 4 (Count Four), and theft of an automobile in violation of Penal Code, section 487, subdivision 3 (Count Five). As to each count, it was alleged that defendants were armed with a deadly weapon, to wit, a shotgun.

The Reporters' Transcripts of the proceedings on January 31, 1961, reveal that on that date, the appellants herein, while represented by counsel, moved to withdraw their pleas of not guilty previously made to Count Two of the indictment (violation of Pen.Code § 209), and that the appellants personally made a request to enter a plea of guilty to that count, with the stipulation that at the time of the commission of the offense they were armed with a deadly weapon, a shotgun, and that bodily harm resulted to the victim from the commission of the offense, the understanding being that the death penalty, one of the two alternative punishments for the offense, would not be imposed. ¹ Appellants were asked by both courts if they understood what their counsel said as to changing pleas and as to whether the changes were at appellants' request, and the appellants replied in the affirmative. Such pleas of guilty as to Count Two were accepted as to each appellant. Appellant Dedmon also pled guilty to Count Four. The court read the transcripts of the Grand Jury proceedings and accepted the pleas. Judgments were pronounced and both appellants were sentenced to state prison for the term of life without possibility of parole. As to Count Four, appellant Dedmon was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law. The remaining counts of the indictments were dismissed.

No appeals were taken from these judgments and more than three and one-half years later these appellants, in propria persona, filed with the superior court what they each denominated as a petition for writ of error coram nobis on the grounds of fraud, duress and mistake in the entry of the plea of guilty, in which petitions the appellants made the claim that trial counsel had 'intentionally misled' them to believe that no valid defenses existed for them and that their respective counsel wrongfully persuaded them to plead guilty to avoid the death penalty. Appellants claim the trial court did not properly advise them of their rights or of the consequences of their pleas.

Counsel was appointed for appellants, and hearings were held on October 19, 1964, in the Maston case and on October 2, 1964, in the Dedmon case. Judge Butcher, who had previously been the counsel for Mike Maston, and Robert James Westwick, who had previously been counsel for Millard Vernon Dedmon, filed separate affidavits stating that they had used due diligence in protecting their respective clients and that they had advised guilty pleas on condition that the death penalty not be imposed in the honest belief that this arrangement was in the best interests of the appellants.

Millard Vernon Dedmon's petition and affidavit, and the affidavit of Robert Westwick, were considered by Judge C. Douglas Smith, and Judge Percy C. Heckendorf considered the affidavits and petition of Mike Maston and of Judge Butcher. Orders denying the petitions for writs of error coram nobis were issued for both defendants, and both defendants here appeal. Since both appeals arise from a single prosecution, and invoke the same legal issues, we deal with them in a single opinion.

The contentions of the appellants are without merit. A petition for a writ of error coram nobis is a remedy of narrow scope. The function of such a writ is to secure relief, where no other remedy exists, from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of judgment. (People v. Mendez (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 500, 301 P.2d 295; People v. Gennaitte (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 544, 274 P.2d 169.)

Coram nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. The court is not required to accept at face value the allegations of the petition. (People v. Adamson (1949) 34 Cal.2d 320, 210 P.2d 13; People v. Shorts (1948) 32 Cal.2d 502, 197 P.2d 330; People v. Goodspeed (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 146, 35 Cal.Rptr. 743.)

Due diligence is required in making an application for relief, and, in absence of a valid excuse for delay, the petition will be denied. The cases of People v. Crawford (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 564, 1 Cal.Rptr. 811, and People v. Johnson (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 290, 345 P.2d 952, held that a two-year delay precluded use of the writ. In the cases before the bench there was a three and one-half year delay, and this delay is not sufficiently excused by petitioners' claims of limited education and once a week use of the prison law library.

Petitioners allege that their rights to equal protection of the law were denied. The mere naked allegation that a constitutional right has been invaded will not suffice. (People v. Tarin (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 399, 301 P.2d 16.) The application should make a full disclosure of specific facts relied upon and not merely state conclusions as to the nature of such facts. (People v. Stapleton (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 512, 293 P.2d 793.) To make broad and vague assertions of violations of constitutional rights is insufficient grounds for issuing a writ of error coram nobis. (People v. Gennaitte, supra (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 544, at p. 548, 274 P.2d 169.) In the instant case the court has been provided with no concrete evidence to prove the accusations of the appellants. Being 'poor' and 'ignorant' is not sufficient excuse for failure to provide proof in support of claims of violation of constitutional rights. (People v. Adamson, supra (1949) 34 Cal.2d 320, 332, 210 P.2d 13.)

Appellants claim their attorneys committed fraud against them in inducing their guilty pleas. Petitioners' allegations need not be accepted at face value. Appellants must have convincing proof of fraud and there is a strong presumption in favor of the trial court. (People v. Tarin, supra (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 399, 301 P.2d 16.) Also, the judge need not accept as true any statements in the affidavits. (People v. Mendez, supra (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 500, 301 P.2d 295.) The court in the case of People v. Flores (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 243, 305 P.2d 90, held that the questions of fraud, duress...