People v. Mateo

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: Before LAWTON
• Citation: People v. Mateo, 672 N.Y.S.2d 594, 249 A.D.2d 894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
• Decision Date: 29 April 1998
• Parties: , 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 4048 PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Angelo MATEO, Respondent.

Page 594

672 N.Y.S.2d 594

249 A.D.2d 894, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 4048

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Angelo MATEO, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Fourth Department.

April 29, 1998.

Howard R. Relin by Wendy Lehmann, Rochester, for Appellant.

William E. Easton, Rochester, for Respondent.

Before LAWTON, J.P., and HAYES, BOEHM and FALLON, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

We conclude that County Court properly dismissed counts 11 and 12 of the indictment charging defendant with murder in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.27[1][a][xi] ). That section provides in part that a defendant may be charged with murder in the first degree when, "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; and * * * the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more additional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan". In dismissing those counts, the court concluded that the People's evidence before the Grand Jury was insufficient to establish that the murders were committed "in a similar fashion". In reaching that conclusion, the court interpreted "in a similar fashion" to mean serial killings, i.e., unique, ritualistic or signature-like slayings. The People contend that the court should have given the phrase "in a similar fashion" its plain meaning and thus should have concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient.

Even affording the phrase "in a similar...