People v. Mathews, 339079

Decision Date22 May 2018
Docket NumberNo. 339079,339079
Parties PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Laricca Seminta MATHEWS, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Jessica R. Cooper, Prosecuting Attorney, Thomas R. Grden, Appellate Division Chief, and Matthew A. Fillmore, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Law Offices of Joseph A. Lavigne (by Joseph A. Lavigne ) for defendant.

Before: O'Connell, P.J., and Hoekstra and K. F. Kelly, JJ.

Hoekstra, J.Defendant has been charged with open murder, MCL 750.316, discharge of a firearm in a building, MCL 750.234b, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements she made to police based on the contention that the police failed to adequately advise her of her rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The trial court granted defendant's motion. The prosecution filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal in this Court, which we denied.1 The prosecution then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, and in lieu of granting leave, the Supreme Court remanded to this Court for consideration as on leave granted, specifically instructing this Court "to consider whether either of the bases for suppression advanced by the defendant in the trial court rendered the warnings in this case deficient" under Miranda . People v. Mathews , 501 Mich. 950, 950, 904 N.W.2d 865 (2018). On remand, we find no merit to defendant's assertion that the police were required to inform her that she could cut off questioning at any time during the interrogation. However, because generally advising defendant that she had "a right to a lawyer" did not sufficiently convey her right to consult with an attorney and to have an attorney present during the interrogation, we conclude that the Miranda warnings in this case were defective and affirm the trial court's suppression of defendant's statement.

This case arises from the shooting death of defendant's boyfriend, Gabriel Dumas, who was killed in defendant's apartment on August 12, 2016. After the shooting, defendant called 911 and told the dispatcher that she had shot Dumas. Police responded to the scene, and defendant was taken into custody and transported to the Wixom Police Department. At the police station, defendant was interviewed twice. Detective Brian Stowinsky conducted the first interview. During the first interview, Stowinsky presented defendant with a written advice-of-rights form, which stated:

Before any questions are asked of you, you should know: (1) you have a right to remain silent; (2) anything you say may be used against you; (3) you have a right to a lawyer, and (4) if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided free.
I understand what my rights are and am willing to talk.

Stowinsky also orally reviewed the statements on the advice-of-rights form with defendant. Specifically, the following exchange took place:

[Detective Stowinsky]: Ok, um, I'm going to review these, ok?
[Defendant]: Uh hmm.
[Detective Stowinsky]: I'm going to read these to you.
[Defendant]: Uh hmm.
[Detective Stowinsky]: Um, before I question, start asking you, you should know that you have a right to remain silent.
[Defendant]: Uh hmm.
[Detective Stowinsky]: Anything you say maybe [sic] used against you. You have a right to a lawyer, if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided for free. Do you understand your rights?
[Defendant]: Yes.

Defendant agreed to talk with Stowinsky, and she signed the advice-of-rights form. During the questioning that followed, defendant told Stowinsky that she quarreled with Dumas, that Dumas attacked her, and that she shot him.

Later the same day, defendant was interviewed a second time by Sergeant Michael DesRosiers. At the beginning of that second interview, the following exchange took place between defendant and DesRosiers:

[Sergeant DesRosiers]: Alright, so um, Detective Stowinsky, remember he talked about your rights and everything?
[Defendant]: Uh hmm.
[Sergeant DesRosiers]: Same thing applies. Um, you don't, you don't have to even talk to me if you don't want to. You can get an attorney um, if you can't afford one, we'll make sure you get one.
[Defendant]: Ok.
[Sergeant DesRosiers]: So, um, we're just continuing the interview that you started with him.

DesRosiers then proceeded to question defendant about inconsistencies between her previous statements and the physical evidence, including the location of Dumas's fatal bullet wound

. Defendant again admitted shooting Dumas, and she attempted to explain the location of the bullet wound by suggesting that the bullet may have ricocheted. She also suggested that the shooting may have been an accident insofar as her finger may have "slipped" while on the trigger because it was "so hot and muggy."

Following a preliminary examination, defendant was bound over for trial in the circuit court. In the circuit court, defendant moved to suppress her statements to the police, asserting that the Miranda warnings given before her interviews were inadequate because (1) the police failed to advise her that she could terminate the interrogation at any point and (2) the police did not inform her that she had the right to consult with an attorney before the interview and to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The trial court did not address whether the police were required to inform defendant that she had an ongoing right to cut off questioning at any point. Nevertheless, the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress, reasoning that the Miranda warnings were defective because the police failed to inform defendant that she had the right to have an attorney present before and during the interrogation. The prosecution filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal, and the case is now before us on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court for consideration as on leave granted.

On appeal, the prosecution argues that the warnings given to defendant complied with Miranda and that the trial court erred by suppressing defendant's statements to police. First, with regard to a suspect's right to cut off questioning, the prosecution asserts that Miranda does not require police to give an explicit warning that a suspect may terminate the interrogation at any time. Second, in terms of a suspect's right to the presence of counsel, the prosecution argues that, although the warnings given to defendant did not expressly advise her of her right to the presence of counsel during the interrogation, the warnings given before defendant's interrogations were sufficient because they advised defendant that she had the right to a lawyer. According to the prosecution, Miranda does not require the police to provide a suspect with more specific information regarding the right to the presence of an attorney before and during questioning.

When reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, we review a trial court's factual findings for clear error. People v. Tanner , 496 Mich. 199, 206, 853 N.W.2d 653 (2014). "To the extent that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo." id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "We review de novo a trial court's ultimate decision on a motion to suppress." People v. Beuschlein , 245 Mich. App. 744, 748, 630 N.W.2d 921 (2001).

"Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself." People v. Cortez (On Remand) , 299 Mich. App. 679, 691, 832 N.W.2d 1 (2013)(opinion by METER , J.). To protect this constitutional guarantee against compelled self-incrimination, before any custodial interrogation, the police must give a suspect the now-familiar Miranda warnings. People v. Daoud , 462 Mich. 621, 624 n. 1, 614 N.W.2d 152 (2000). In particular, under Miranda , a suspect must be provided four essential warnings as follows:

"[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning [1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." [ Florida v. Powell , 559 U.S. 50, 59–60, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed. 2d 1009 (2010), quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (alterations by the Powell Court).]

"The four warnings Miranda requires are invariable, but [the United States Supreme Court] has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed." Powell , 559 U.S. at 60, 130 S.Ct. 1195. In other words, "[a] verbatim recital of the words of the Miranda opinion is not required." People v. Hoffman , 205 Mich. App. 1, 14, 518 N.W.2d 817 (1994). "Quite the contrary, Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures." California v. Prysock , 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981). Rather, when the "exact form" set out in Miranda is not used, "a fully effective equivalent" will suffice. Duckworth v. Eagan , 492 U.S. 195, 202, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed. 2d 166 (1989) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). "Reviewing courts therefore need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement." id. at 203, 109 S.Ct. 2875. "The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda .’ " id. , quoting Prysock , 453 U.S. at 361, 101 S.Ct. 2806 (alterations by the Duckworth Court). Ultimately, "[i]f the custodial interrogation is not preceded by an...

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5 cases
  • People v. Mathews
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • June 12, 2020
    ...holding that "a general warning regarding a ‘right to a lawyer’ does not comply with the dictates of Miranda ." People v. Mathews , 324 Mich. App. 416, 429, 922 N.W.2d 371 (2018). Because there was no binding caselaw addressing this issue, the Court of Appeals undertook a lengthy and thorou......
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    ...the state and federal constitutions guarantee that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself." Mathews, 324 Mich.App. at 424-425 (quotation marks and citation omitted). To protect individual's right against self-incrimination, "before any custodial interrogatio......
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