People v. Mauch

• Decision Date: 23 November 1976
• Docket Number: No. 9,9
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard MAUCH, Defendant-Appellee. 397 Mich. 646, 247 N.W.2d 5
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 5

247 N.W.2d 5

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard MAUCH, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 9.

397 Mich. 646, 247 N.W.2d 5

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 23, 1976.

James M. Justin, Asst. Pros. Atty., Jackson, for plaintiff-appellant.

Roger L. Wotila, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

RYAN, Justice.

In this case the defendant, Richard Mauch, challenges the validity of his 1962 plea of guilty to kidnapping two City of Jackson policemen.

We hold that the plea was valid according to the standards existing at the time. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the conviction.

There are three issues to be decided:

1) Whether the guilty plea is fatally defective because the record fails to disclose the defendant's acknowledgment of guilt of the element of asportation of the kidnapping victims;

2) Whether the trial court, in failing to advise the defendant that kidnapping carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, failed to inform him of the 'consequences of his plea' and;

3) Whether, in the event the guilty plea is reinstated, the defendant is entitled to be resentenced because the trial court failed to consider a presentence investigative report pursuant to M.C.L.A. § 771.14; M.S.A. § 28.1144.

I

On the morning of January 23, 1962 the defendant Mauch was arraigned in the Jackson County Circuit Court. As the transcript of that proceeding discloses, he was specifically advised by the court not once but twice, that he was charged with kidnapping and that he had a right to be tried by a jury on each of the charges. The arraignment record also discloses that the court advised that Officer Norman Richmond was one of the victims and the Prosecuting Attorney announced that Officer Frank Miller was the second victim.

Two days later, on January 25, 1962, Mauch withdrew his pleas of not guilty and pleaded guilty to the charges as follows:

'MR. CARROLL (Defense Counsel): If the Court please, I have talked with these defendants. Each of them informs me that he wishes to withdraw the pleas of not guilty entered for them by order of the Court on their arraignments and to enter a plea of guilty in the cases People vs. William Winegar and John Rogers (a/k/a Richard Mauch).

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Mauck (sic), have any promises been made to you to get you to plead guilty?

DEFENDANT MAUCK: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have any threats been made against you?

DEFENDANT MAUCK: No.

THE COURT: Are you entering this plea freely and voluntarily?

DEFENDANT MAUCK: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And did you on the 28th day of October, 1961, confine Frank Miller and Norman Richmond within this state against their will?

DEFENDANT MAUCK: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. The Court will accept the plea of guilty of each of you, and I am aware of the fact that each of you is presently serving a life sentence which was imposed in an adjoining county; so I see no need to delay in passing sentence upon you. I may as well pass sentence this morning.

I am going to give each of you the same sentence in each case, and each of these sentences will run concurrently.

It is the sentence of this Court that you be confined in the State Prison of Southern Michigan for the minimum term of twenty years, the maximum term to be thirty years.

The Court makes no recommendation.

You are remanded to the custody of the warden for execution of the sentence. You may be seated.'

After repeated attempts ¹ the defendant finally succeeded in having the Court of Appeals overturn his convictions. ²

Although the defendant implies in his brief that we should judge his 1962 guilty plea record by current standards, we emphasize that we believe the proper course is to evaluate the record according to the law as it existed at the time the plea was entered.

Just as in People v. Armstrong, 390 Mich. 693, 213 N.W.2d 190 (1973), where this Court declined to apply to a 1963 guilty plea a standard more stringent than the standard then in force, we are not inclined today to charge the trial judge below with anticipating the extensive and confusing developments in Michigan's guilty plea jurisprudence during the fourteen years following the proceedings before him.

In nullifying Mauch's guilty plea, the Court of Appeals rested its judgment on the ground that, since the record below fails to disclose any mention of the asportation ³ of the kidnapping victims, the plea is fatally defective under the rule of People v. Barrows, 358 Mich. 267, 99 N.W.2d 347 (1959).

Barrows, however does not stand for the proposition that a guilty plea record which fails to disclose mention of each element of the offense to which the plea of guilty is offered mandates setting aside the plea. The rule of the case in Barrows, a pre-GCR 1963, 785 case, was announced in the light of 1959 guilty plea procedures which were governed by a statute, M.C.L.A. § 768.35; M.S.A. § 28.1058 and a court rule, Court Rule No. 35A (1945). The statute provided:

'Whenever any person shall plead guilty to an information filed against him in any court, it shall be the duty of the judge of such court, before pronouncing judgment or sentence upon such plea, to become satisfied after such investigation as he may deem necessary for that purpose respecting the nature of the case, and the circumstances of such plea, that said plea was made freely, with full knowledge of the nature of the accusation, and without undue influence. And whenever said judge shall have reason to doubt the truth of such plea of guilty, it shall be his duty to vacate the same, direct a plea of not guilty to be entered and order a trial of the issue thus formed.'

The court rule provided:

'In every prosecution wherein the accused is charged with a felony the trial court shall conform to the following practice:

Sec. 2. Imposing sentence. If the accused pleads guilty, after such plea and before sentence the court shall inform the accused of the nature of the accusation and the consequence of his plea; and regardless of whether he is represented by counsel, the court shall examine the accused, not necessarily under oath, and as a condition of accepting the plea of guilty and imposing sentence shall ascertain that the plea was freely, understandingly and voluntarily made, without undue influence, compulsion or duress, and without promise of leniency. Unless the court determines that the plea of guilty was so made, it shall not be accepted.

This rule is mandatory but failure to comply therewith shall not be considered jurisdictional.'

Barrows merely supplied an additional dimension to the 1959 procedures in holding that the court-rule-mandated examination of the accused shall be by direct questioning for the purpose of establishing the crime and the defendant's participation therein. The purpose of the rule, the Court reasoned, is to preclude 'involuntary or induced false pleas,' and 'subsequent false claims of innocence.'

Aside from the procedural requirements outlined in the statute, the court rule and Barrows, the form of plea taking in 1962 was left to the trial court.

In People v. Bumpus, 355 Mich. 374, 94 N.W.2d 854 (1959), this Court refused to set aside a guilty plea upon defendant's allegation that the trial court failed to comply with the statute and court rule. The Court stated the general rule:

'Both our statutes and our court rules, quoted above, require that upon a plea of guilty to an information the judge shall satisfy himself that the plea was made freely, with knowledge of its consequences, and without undue influence or promise of leniency. The form and manner of this examination by the judge has not been prescribed but is left to the discretion of the judge, to be exercised by him in the manner best suited to the parties and the offense. The topic is discussed with clarity in People v. Coates, 337 Mich. 56, 59 N.W.2d 83.' 355 Mich. at 379--380, 94 N.W.2d at 857.

Later in the opinion, this Court clearly emphasized that the trial court's finding that the plea was freely and voluntarily entered carried great weight:

'We do not lightly disregard the statement in the opinion of the sentencing judge that he conferred with defendant and assured himself that the defendant's plea was knowingly and freely made, and we find nothing in the record to impeach such statement. Moreover, 'Where it affirmatively appears that the judge made inquiry to satisfy himself that the plea of guilty entered expressed the real desire of the defendant, there can be no assumption that the defendant acted in ignorance or under compulsion.' 8 M.L.P. Criminal Law § 125, p. 155.' 355 Mich. at 381--382, 94 N.W.2d at 858.

In People v. Coates, 337 Mich. 56, 59 N.W.2d 83 (1953) the defendant entered pleas of guilty to armed robbery and rape. The opinion indicates that the trial court elicited a detailed factual basis for the armed robbery charge, but nothing whatever for the rape charge other than the defendant's expressed desire to plead guilty to rape. The defendant challenged the adequacy of the court's investigation, claimed his plea was coerced, and that he was denied the right to counsel, and asserted that the irregularity of the proceedings was contrary to the orderly administration of justice. In noting that the record disclosed that the trial court talked with the accused in chambers for twenty minutes to an hour prior to receiving the guilty pleas, this Court sustained the validity of the pleas, holding that the Court assumed that the trial court complied with its statutory duty relative to the required investigation. The Court also considered the fact that the defendant, although 25 years old, was experienced in crime and was aware of the nature of the proceedings.

The principle announced in Bumpus and Coates is that the trial court must satisfy itself under the circumstances in the case that the plea was accurate the truthful, and freely, understandingly, and...