People v. Maurice D. (In re Maurice D.)

• Citation: 34 N.E.3d 590
• Decision Date: 29 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 4–13–0323.,4–13–0323.
• Parties: In re MAURICE D., a Minor, The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Maurice D., Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

34 N.E.3d 590

In re MAURICE D., a MinorThe People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee

v.Maurice D., Respondent–Appellant.

No. 4–13–0323.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

May 29, 2015.

Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and Janieen R. Tarrance (argued), all of State Appellate Defender's Office, Springfield, for appellant.

Jason Chambers, State's Attorney, Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Linda Susan McClain (argued), all of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice HARRIS

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a February 2013 bench trial, the trial court adjudicated respondent delinquent, finding the evidence supported a conviction for criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11–1.50(c)

(West 2010)) beyond a reasonable doubt. In April 2013, the court sentenced respondent to 12 months' conditional discharge and ordered him to serve 30 days in the McLean County jail, with credit for 7 days served. As a result of his conviction, respondent must register as a sex offender. 730 ILCS 150/3–5(a) (West 2010).

¶ 2 Respondent appeals, asserting that the prosecution of a minor who engages in “consensual” sexual activity with another close-in-age minor for an imprisonable misdemeanor offense violates (1) the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and (2) substantive due process. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In July 2012, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging that respondent, born in 1994, committed the offense of criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11–1.50(c)

(West 2010)), a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/11–1.50(d) (West 2010)). Specifically, the petition alleged that on or about August 22, 2011, respondent—who was 17 years old at the time—“knowingly committed an act of sexual penetration with D.F. involving the penis of respondent minor and the vagina of D.F.,” and that the act was committed at a time when D.F. was at least 13 years old but under the age of 17 and respondent was less than 5 years older than D.F.

¶ 5 On February 25, 2013, respondent's bench trial commenced. The specific details of the evidence presented are not relevant to the disposition of this appeal. We do note, however, the evidence revealed that D.F. was 15 years old and respondent was 17 years old at the time of the offense and that there was conflicting evidence on whether the female victim voluntarily engaged in the sexual act. At the close of evidence, the trial court adjudicated respondent delinquent, finding the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent committed the offense of criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11–1.50(c)

(West 2010)). The court did not offer an opinion regarding whether the female victim voluntarily engaged in the sexual act.

¶ 6 On April 8, 2013, the trial court sentenced respondent to 12 months' conditional discharge and ordered him to serve 30 days in the McLean County jail, with credit for 7 days served. As a result of his conviction, respondent must register as a sex offender. 730 ILCS 150/3–5(a)

(West 2010).

¶ 7 This appeal followed.

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, respondent argues that the prosecution of a minor who engages in “consensual” sexual activity with another close-in-age minor for an imprisonable misdemeanor offense (1) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII

) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ) and (2) violates substantive due process.

¶ 10 A. State's Challenges to Respondent's Appeal

¶ 11 Before addressing respondent's claims on appeal, we first address the State's contentions that (1) this appeal is moot and (2) respondent lacks standing.

¶ 12 1. Mootness

¶ 13 The State asserts that this appeal is moot because respondent has already served his 12–month conditional-discharge sentence and no exception to the mootness doctrine applies.

¶ 14 “An appeal is moot if no controversy exists or if events have occurred which foreclose the reviewing court from granting effectual relief to the complaining party.” In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 15, 374 Ill.Dec. 493, 995 N.E.2d 990

. “As a general rule, courts in Illinois do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided.” In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d 345, 351, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74, 78 (2009).

¶ 15 In this case, respondent was sentenced to 12 months' conditional discharge on April 8, 2013. As the State correctly points out, respondent has already served his sentence of conditional discharge. The State cites Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 15, 374 Ill.Dec. 493, 995 N.E.2d 990

, for the proposition that, “[w]here * * * [an] appeal involves the validity of a sentence, such appeal is rendered moot if the sentence has been served.” Although respondent did not reply to the State's contention his appeal is moot in his reply brief, we note that respondent is not challenging his conditional-discharge sentence. Rather, respondent is challenging his prosecution and subsequent conviction—a conviction which mandates sex-offender registration—on constitutional grounds. See In re Christopher K., 217 Ill.2d 348, 359, 299 Ill.Dec. 213, 841 N.E.2d 945, 952 (2005) (“the completion of a defendant's sentence renders a challenge to the sentence moot, but not a challenge to the conviction” because “[n]ullification of a conviction may hold important consequences for a defendant”). Here, for example, nullification of respondent's conviction would eliminate the requirement that he register as a sex offender. Because the issues raised by respondent in this appeal concern the validity of his prosecution and conviction for criminal sexual abuse, we conclude his appeal is not moot.

¶ 16 2. Standing

¶ 17 The State further contends that respondent does not have standing to bring the above arguments because the underlying sexual activity at issue here was not “consensual” or “normative.” Respondent counters that the offense for which he was convicted does not require proof of force.

¶ 18 “ ‘The purpose of the doctrine of standing is to ensure that courts are deciding actual, specific controversies, and not abstract questions or moot issues.’ ” In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 32, 370 Ill.Dec. 785, 989 N.E.2d 173

(quoting In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill.2d 273, 279–80, 137 Ill.Dec. 78, 545 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1989) ). “In order to have standing to bring a constitutional challenge, a person must show himself to be within the class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality.” Id.

¶ 19 The statute at issue provides that “[a] person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age and the person is less than 5 years older than the victim.” 720 ILCS 5/11–1.50(c)

(West 2010).

¶ 20 The statute under which respondent was charged and adjudicated delinquent required only that the State prove respondent committed sexual penetration or sexual conduct with D.F. at a time when D.F. was at least 13 years of age but less than 17 years of age and respondent was less than 5 years older than her. See 720 ILCS 5/11–1.50(c)

(West 2010). Whether D.F. voluntarily engaged in the sexual act is not relevant or necessary for an adjudication of delinquency for the charged offense. Thus, respondent is within the class of persons affected by the alleged unconstitutionality and has standing.

¶ 21 B. Standard of Review

¶ 22 A strong presumption exists that statutes are constitutional, and a reviewing court must find a statute constitutional whenever reasonably possible. People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 22, 392 Ill.Dec. 588, 33 N.E.3d 137

. “To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish its invalidity.” Id. “A challenge to the facial validity of a statute is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully because an enactment is invalid on its face only if no set of circumstances exists under which it would be valid.” In re Shermaine S., 2015 IL App (1st) 142421, ¶ 15, 389 Ill.Dec. 78, 25 N.E.3d 723. If a statute can be validly applied in any situation, a facial challenge must fail. Id. (quoting People v. Kitch, 239 Ill.2d 452, 466, 347 Ill.Dec. 655, 942 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (2011) ). The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo.

Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 22, 392 Ill.Dec. 588, 33 N.E.3d 137.

¶ 23 C. Respondent's Eighth Amendment and Proportionate Penalties Challenge

¶ 24 Respondent first asserts that the prosecution of a minor who engages in “consensual” sexual activity with another close-in-age minor for an imprisonable misdemeanor offense constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. According to respondent, “the current range of punishment is unnecessarily harsh and out of proportion to the social harm it causes.”

¶ 25 The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the United States Constitution, which is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const., amends. VIII

, XIV. The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution—which is coextensive with the eighth amendment—provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ; In re Rodney H., 223 Ill.2d 510, 520–21, 308...