People v. Mauricio

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: Justice HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court
• Citation: People v. Mauricio, 2014 IL App (2d) 121340, 7 N.E.3d 883, 380 Ill.Dec. 20 (Ill. App. 2014)
• Decision Date: 17 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2–12–1340.,2–12–1340.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Hector M. MAURICIO, Defendant–Appellant.

2014 IL App (2d) 121340

7 N.E.3d 883

380 Ill.Dec. 20

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Hector M. MAURICIO, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2–12–1340.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

March 17, 2014.

Thomas A. Lilien, Vicki P. Kouros, State Appellate Defender's Office, Elgin, for appellant.

Joseph H. McMahon, State's Attorney, St. Charles (Lawrence M. Bauer, Kathryn E. Kohls, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Hector M. Mauricio, appeals, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed on him a 60–year sentence for the first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1) (West 2006)) of Roscoe Ebey. He argues, among other things, that the trial court based the sentence in part on an improper aggravating factor, Ebey's personal traits. We agree that this is an improper factor. We further hold that the record does not demonstrate that the trial court's consideration of this improper factor did not lead to a greater sentence. We therefore must vacate the 60–year sentence and remand the matter for resentencing. This being the case, we need not address defendant's other claim of error, that the trial court failed to give sufficient weight to certain mitigating factors; on remand, the court will necessarily weigh all proper factors anew.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant entered a blind guilty plea to a charge of first-degree murder; the charge stemmed from the May 29, 2007, stabbing death of Ebey. At sentencing, the trial court heard testimony from a neighbor who arrived at the crime scene, sheriff's deputies who were dispatched to the scene, and expert witnesses, including the coroner's physician, who presented forensic evidence.

¶ 4 According to the trial court's summary, the autopsy showed “79 total injuries, stab wounds, incised wounds, puncture wounds, abrasions, two stab wounds being fatal, 36 total stab wounds, 38 incised wounds, two puncture wounds, three abrasion wounds, and a burn[ ] wound.”

¶ 5 The trial court stated that it had initially considered all the factors relating to death-penalty eligibility and had concluded that defendant was death-penalty eligible. It took notice of defendant's criminal history: he had a history of battery convictions followed by poor probation compliance. It noted that he had been in a fight while incarcerated and had spat on a deputy. He had been sent to the Department of Corrections twice and had been a street gang member and a long-term drug user.

¶ 6 On the mitigating side, the trial court noted that defendant's father had murdered defendant's brother and that another brother was imprisoned. It also noted a psychologist's report that described defendant's upbringing as having been in a kind of “urban war zone.” Defendant's mother was an alcoholic and his living situation growing up was highly unstable. Defendant's murdered brother had been the main source of family stability. After the brother's murder, defendant's grandparents took his sister to Arizona, but he stayed behind. The trial court noted his respectful demeanor in court, that he had mostly been a model detainee, that he had “accepted Christianity” and become a “faithful follower” while incarcerated, “which is also a plus on his part,” and that he had gotten a GED and tried “to better his life” while incarcerated.

¶ 7 The trial court noted that it had considered the financial impact of incarceration and agreed that the following applied in aggravation: “factor 3 [‘the defendant has a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity’;] factor 7 [‘the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime’;] * * * and also factor 8, the victim was over 60.” See 730 ILCS 5/5–5–3.2(a)(3), (a)(7), (a)(8) (West 2006).

¶ 8 In its summary, the trial court began:

“The court has considered Mr. Ebey, the victim in this case. He was a member of the greatest generation, a World War II veteran. The court has the utmost respect for him, for his service to this country. He was a very good man, there is no question about that.”

It then noted that it had previously found the crime to be exceptionally brutal and heinous. It specifically stated that it was treating defendant's age (20 at the time of the murder) as mitigating. Further, he admitted his guilt and “his youth was in an urban war zone.” Finally, it stated:

“He's a respectful young man. He's a faithful young man. And because of that, because of those reasons, I will not go into extended term or go to natural life.

But I will, under the circumstances, in considering a very, very fine man, who was a great value to his family and society, his life was cut short * * *.

I will sentence Mr. Mauricio to 60 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections * * *.”

¶ 9 Defendant filed a timely motion to reconsider the sentence, raising 19 issues, the last of which was that “[t]he court erred in imposing a higher sentence on Defendant due to the Court's finding that the victim was of great value to his family and to society.” At the hearing on the motion, the parties rested on their filings. The trial court denied the motion. It stated that it had considered the sentence carefully. The only specific issue that it commented on was the last one:

“I believe * * * the State adduced testimony from many witnesses as to—was it Mr. Ebey?

[THE STATE]: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Ebey, World War II veteran, father, grandfather, wonderful neighbor. State put on quite a bit of evidence to that effect.

So recognizing the arguments and the issues raised, I would deny the motion to reconsider.”

¶ 10 Defendant appealed and we summarily remanded for the filing of a certificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006) and for related proceedings. People v. Mauricio, 2012 IL App (2d) 110890–U. Defense counsel then filed an amended motion to reconsider the sentence, which in relevant part was identical to the one we have quoted, and a Rule 604(d) certificate. At the hearing, the State argued:

“It certainly was not the State's position that you ever considered the victim's value to his family and society as * * * an aggravating factor.

* * * [I]t was not my view * * * that you took that into consideration when you sentenced the defendant to 60 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.”

¶ 11 The trial court stated that it had considered the arguments and submissions but had been “in a much better position at the time of sentencing several years ago having considered the evidence adduced.” It ruled that its sentence had been appropriate and denied the new motion. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues first that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an improper aggravating factor—Ebey's personal traits—in deciding the sentence. Second, he argues that the court gave insufficient weight to certain mitigating factors, principally defendant's mental illness. The State responds that the improper factor was incidental and that “defendant has not proved that the trial court relied on the improper factor when imposing the sentence.” It further argues that the trial court did adequately consider the mitigating factors.

¶ 14 We agree with defendant that the trial court improperly considered Ebey's personal traits in imposing the sentence. We hold that error to be decisive; we do not address whether the court gave adequate weight to mitigating factors, as defendant will now have a new sentencing hearing at which the trial court will weigh all factors anew.

¶ 15 Although we ordinarily review with great deference a trial court's choice of sentence within the applicable guidelines, the question of whether the court relied on an improper factor in imposing the sentence is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Abdelhadi, 2012 IL App (2d) 111053, ¶ 8, 362 Ill.Dec. 359, 973 N.E.2d 459. When a sentencing error is properly preserved,¹ we cannot affirm a sentence that the trial court based on an improper factor unless we can “determine from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence.” People v. Heider, 231 Ill.2d 1, 21, 324 Ill.Dec. 453, 896 N.E.2d 239 (2008).

¶ 16 The State quotes the proper standard, but it implies too high a burden when it suggests that defendant must prove that the trial court's reliance on the factor was prejudicial; only in a plain-error analysis does a defendant retain such a burden. See People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill.2d 478, 495, 337 Ill.Dec. 221, 922 N.E.2d 344 (2009) (discussing the general difference between preserved-error and plain-error analyses).

¶ 17 The State apparently concedes that Ebey's personal traits constituted an improper factor. That concession is proper. However, we think that some discussion of the factor will prove useful, as, given the sparseness of authority on the subject, one could understand the prohibition to be broader than it is. Consideration of a victim's personal traits is improper as long as those traits as such are what the trial court considers. To the extent that a victim's personal traits are necessary to understand the seriousness of the crime or other proper sentencing factors, consideration of such traits is not inherently error.

¶ 18 The principle at issue has appeared only rarely in Illinois cases. In People v. Walker, 109 Ill.2d 484, 505, 94 Ill.Dec. 530, 488 N.E.2d 529 (1985), our supreme court stated that “[p]ersonal traits of victims are not relevant to the question of guilt or innocence or to the question of the proper sentence to be imposed.” In People v. Joe, 207 Ill.App.3d 1079, 1087, 152 Ill.Dec. 924, 566 N.E.2d 801 (1991), the appellate court extended that principle to the victim's “status” and “community standing”:

“The [trial] court * * *...