People v. Mayes

Decision Date17 December 1993
Docket NumberNo. 1-89-3494,1-89-3494
Citation630 N.E.2d 878,257 Ill. App. 3d 137
Parties, 196 Ill.Dec. 713 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reginald MAYES, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Anne Myles-Smith, Public Defender, for appellant.

Michael Pugh, States' Atty., for appellee.

Presiding Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

After a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Reginald Mayes, was convicted of attempted murder, home invasion, and aggravated battery. The trial judge sentenced him to 60 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections for home invasion, 20 years for attempted murder to run consecutively, and 5 years for aggravated battery to run concurrently.

Facts

The charges against defendant arose from events in the early morning hours of April 26, 1988, in the apartment of Thomas Leuders and his fiancee Barbara Carlson. The apartment was on the first floor at 225 West Washington in Oak Park. At trial, Thomas Leuders testified to the following sequence of events. He and Ms. Carlson had retired for the night at approximately 10:30 or 11 p.m. on April 25, 1988. Shortly before 2 a.m., Mr. Leuders awoke and saw defendant holding a shimmering object and crawling on the bed toward Ms. Carlson. Mr. Leuders yelled and began kicking the covers off the bed. Defendant raised up to a kneeling position, looking at Mr. Leuders, at which time Mr. Leuders kicked defendant in the face, knocking him off the bed and against a wall. Leuders then jumped on defendant and the two men wrestled on the floor. During this struggle Mr. Leuders felt what he thought was a cold object being pressed into his back and a sudden weakness. Defendant freed himself and ran from the room. Mr. Leuders followed down the hallway, but did not see defendant. As Mr. Leuders was checking the apartment to make sure defendant had left, he heard a car start in the alley and then he noticed blood and realized that he had been stabbed.

The parties stipulated that if the physician who examined Mr. Leuders at the hospital were to testify, she would state that Mr. Leuders had been stabbed once in the forearm and three times in the back, the back wounds being to both sides of the chest cavity causing both lungs to partially collapse. The doctor's testimony also would have indicated that Mr. Leuders suffered superficial wounds to the left groin area.

The day after the incident, Mr. Leuders identified defendant from a photographic array. He also identified defendant in a lineup about two weeks later, and at trial.

Oak Park police officer, James Leahy testified that he went to the apartment in the early morning hours of April 26, and determined that a screen and window in the dining room had been forced open. He found a latent palm impression on the window sill. A police technician testified that there was no doubt that the latent palm impression was that of defendant.

Defendant lived in the apartment building across the street at 222 West Washington. At trial defendant testified that on the evening of April 25, he had gone to his girl friend's home on the South Side of Chicago to pick up her car which he was to repair. He then went to his brother's house on the West Side to get a tool and to a friend's house on the West Side. He returned home and did not leave his apartment until the following morning.

The jury found defendant guilty of home invasion, aggravated battery, and attempted murder, while finding defendant not guilty of residential burglary and armed violence.

Because one of the issues raised on appeal concerns the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, we also describe the voir dire proceedings. Throughout this opinion, we will use the term "black" rather than African American because that is the term used by defendant in his brief.

The record does not indicate the total number of persons in the venire. Thirty-two persons were questioned during voir dire. The races of seven of those persons cannot be ascertained from the record. It can be inferred from the record that six of the remaining 25 were black and 19 were non-black. A non-black juror was excused during the trial and replaced by the first alternate juror. The jury which deliberated in the case consisted of two blacks and ten non-blacks. The race of the second alternate juror, who did not deliberate, is not in the record.

Defendant exercised six peremptory challenges, four being against non-blacks and two being against persons whose race cannot be ascertained from the record. The prosecutor exercised three peremptory challenges, two against blacks, one against a non-black. The remaining nine prospective jurors were excused for cause by the trial judge. Of those nine, the race of four cannot be determined from the record, while two were definitely black and three were definitely non-black.

Of the first four prospective jurors to be questioned, all of whom were non-black, the defense exercised a peremptory challenge against one and three were accepted for the jury. Anthony Smith, a 38-year-old single black man was questioned next. When the judge asked how long he had lived on the Southwest Side of Chicago, he answered, "Well, it's kind of like been off and on. I kind of like move, you know, so I am like there now, but as far as you know like my mother or whatever, you know, it's like--". Upon further questioning it appeared that Mr. Smith had lived with his mother off and on for twenty years. Many of his answers were much like his answer to the first question, containing several "you knows" and "likes", and taking some time to get around to the answer. When asked if he owned his home or rented, he stated that he rented. Mr. Smith was a nursing assistant at a hospital. He received his training as part of a job training program at Bethany which he said was affiliated with Citywide Colleges. He had one three-year-old child who did not live with him but whom he supported. He had been called to federal jury duty but he did not actually serve on a jury because the case was dismissed before trial.

Mr. Smith's brother had been the victim of a homicide and armed robbery in 1980. The defendant in that case had been acquitted. Mr. Smith indicated that this would not affect his ability to be fair. During questioning by the defense attorney, Mr. Smith volunteered that he could be fair although the case might be depressing because it brought back memories of his brother's situation.

The prosecutor asked Mr. Smith whether getting off work would be a problem since he had only been at his current job a short time. Mr. Smith indicated it was not a problem. The prosecutor also ascertained that Mr. Smith had ten brothers and sisters. He then asked some questions about Mr. Smith's federal jury service. At that point, the prosecutor exercised his first peremptory challenge against Mr. Smith.

Defense counsel then asked that the judge request a reason for the prosecutor's exclusion of Mr. Smith, in accordance with Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. Defense counsel stated for the record that Mr. Smith was black and that defendant was also black. The judge stated:

"Well, first of all, the Batson case shows a systematic exclusion of blacks from a jury. He is the first black who appeared on this jury. Why do--I don't see a definition where I can find they systematically excluded blacks and I can't look to the future that they will exclude anymore (sic) blacks on there.

At this point I don't think there is any reason to question why they removed that party * * * I see no systematic exclusion of blacks at this point. This if (sic) the first black that's been excused."

The defense attorney then stated that Mr. Smith was the first black person to be questioned and he saw no reason to have excluded him other than the fact of his race. At this point, the prosecutor stated, "Other than he can't even give us a straight answer to the simple questions of where do you live, where do you work." The following exchange then took place:

"THE COURT: You are willing to give a reason?

MS. KELLY [Prosecutor]: No, I don't feel I have to.

THE COURT: You have already done that.

MS. KELLY: That's fine. It's on the record so--

THE COURT: You have already done that. That must be--are you saying that's part--

MS. KELLY: Those are certainly part of my reasons, certainly.

THE COURT: I believe they don't have to.

MR. MASH [Defense Counsel]: I think she is clouding up the record in terms of you're either going to ask her to give you the reasons--

THE COURT: I didn't ask her anything. I don't believe she has to.

MR. MASH: I would object to her volunteering things that she knows may cloud up the record enough to avoid the issue if it's raised in another tribunal.

THE COURT: I don't believe at this point there is a showing of systematic exclusion of Afro Americans, and I say that seriously. There has only been one Afro American called. At this point you have made your record and I have listened to it and I have made my ruling. I made my ruling. I don't believe there is."

Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial. After some discussion, the judge denied the motion stating:

"I believe that at this point, I would not ask for a reason from the State. There has been one black person, Afro American person, who was excused. I don't believe that sets a pattern. * * * There may come a time later in this where I will have to ask the State to explain even the first one if there is more of this, but this in itself is just a peremptory challenge * * * At this point I don't believe the Court says expressly that this is tainted or grounds for a mistrial."

Of the next sixteen prospective jurors to be questioned, it can be inferred from the record that three were black and 13 were not black. The court excused four of these sixteen for cause, one of whom was black. Defense counsel exercised...

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8 cases
  • State v. McGilton
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 19 de junho de 2012
    ...of the victim five times within brief period of time constituted separate and distinct acts); People v. Mayes, 257 Ill.App.3d 137, 196 Ill.Dec. 713, 630 N.E.2d 878, 889–890 (1993) (affirming the defendant's multiple convictions finding that the stabbing of the victim three times in the back......
  • People v. Little
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    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
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    ...Americans on the venire (32%) and on the jury (23%) was only "slight evidence of discriminat[ion]" and People v. Mayes , 257 Ill. App. 3d 137, 148, 196 Ill.Dec. 713, 630 N.E.2d 878 (1993), where the court found that a one-point difference was "too slight to raise an inference of discriminat......
  • People v. Primm
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 29 de dezembro de 2000
    ...and judicial experience as a guide in distinguishing a true case of discrimination from a false one. People v. Mayes, 257 Ill.App.3d 137, 152, 196 Ill.Dec. 713, 630 N.E.2d 878 (1993). Therefore, their determinations in such matters are entitled to substantial deference. Mayes, 257 Ill.App.3......
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    ...106 S.Ct. 1712 ; People v. Edwards, 144 Ill.2d 108, 152–53, 161 Ill.Dec. 788, 579 N.E.2d 336 (1991) ; People v. Mayes, 257 Ill.App.3d 137, 143, 196 Ill.Dec. 713, 630 N.E.2d 878 (1993). Among the circumstances deemed “relevant” in establishing a prima facie case are: (1) racial identity betw......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Chapter IX Merger (the One Act, One Crime Rule)
    • United States
    • Guide to Sentencing and Bond Hearings in Illinois (2018 Ed.) Part I Sentencing Guide
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    ...See People v. Pulgar, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1001 (1st Dist. 2001); People v. Green, 339 Ill. App. 3d 443 (1st Dist. 2003); People v. Mayes, 257 Ill. App. 3d 137 (1st Dist. 1993) (holding that multiple stab wounds inflicted at about the same time supported conviction on Attempt Murder and Aggrava......

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