People v. Maynard

• Decision Date: 25 May 1867
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: The People v. Matthew H. Maynard

15 Mich. 463

The People v. Matthew H. Maynard

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 25, 1867

Heard May 16, 1867. [Syllabus Material]

Quo warranto.

The information in this case was filed by William L. Stoughton the attorney-general, against the defendant, for intruding into and usurping the office of county treasurer of Marquette county.

The defendant pleaded that by the organization of Washington county the residence of the treasurer of Marquette county was thrown into the new county, thereby creating a vacancy in the office, to fill which the board of supervisors of Marquette county appointed him treasurer. One of the pleas relied on the "Act to organize the county of Washington," and the other on that act, and also an additional "Act to organize the township of Negaunee, in the county of Washington." The replication to the first plea alleges that the county of Marquette consisted of but three townships, viz.: Marquette, Negaunee and Chocolay, and that only parts of the former two were embraced in the new county and that such parts contain 3,500 inhabitants and 700 electors. The replication to the second plea alleges the same facts as replied to the first, and also sets forth the portions of the parts of the two townships, which portions were included in the new township, and avers the number of inhabitants and electors of the portions of those parts, which portions were not included in the new township, and also sets forth the part of Negaunee remaining in Marquette county, and left, by the new township act, without any township organization, and avers the number of inhabitants and electors of that part. To these replications a demurrer was interposed, and the principal questions in the case relate to the validity of the acts aforesaid.

Judgment of ouster entered against respondent.

A. W. Buel, A. Pond, C. I. Walker and G. V. N. Lothrop, for the people:

1. The act of 1867 substantially violates the constitution in its letter and spirit, on the following grounds:

a. It undertakes to make the new county a corporation without giving it any corporate power to act, or accomplish any end or purpose whatever: Const., art. 10, § 1.

b. It makes no provision for the election of county officers, nor for a judiciary, nor could a board of supervisors exist under its provisions.

c. The constitutional right of suffrage and voting in all elections, with power and means for exercising such right, is taken from the electors.

The position that the county act is unconstitutional is fully sustained by the following cases: 2 Gray 84; 20 N. Y., 447; 30 Barb. 349; 11 Mich. 63.

d. It makes no provision for organized townships, and without which the new county can never act, or exercise or assert the smallest right or power.

2. The county act, if not unconstitutional, is, at least, inoperative and void.

3. The township act does not aid the county act, to render it constitutional or operative.

Levi Bishop, for respondent:

1. The act of February 15, 1867, is not void, because it did not provide all the details for holding elections in the county of Washington.

It is a general rule in this country that there are no limits upon the legislative power of a state, except such as are created by the federal or the state constitution. The legislative body represents the sovereign power of the people: 20 Wend. 381; 27 Barb. 593; Smith's Com., 236-309; 1 Mich. 295, 306, 307; 5 Id. 251; 13 Id. 127, 481.

A statute can not be declared void on the ground that it violates the fundamental principles of republican government, unless it comes clearly in conflict with some express constitutional provisions: 4 Mich. 244; 13 Id. 481.

The act does not take away the elective franchise, or change the qualifications of voters. It simply creates or re-arranges the boundaries of certain municipal corporations. It does not violate any principles of free government, and it would not be void if it did: 4 Mich. 244; 13 Id. 481.

A township which has not all the full details of an ordinary town organization may be still a body corporate in law. Such seems to be the opinion of this court: 10 Mich. 250.

2. The act of February 15, 1867, which created the new county of Washington, was not null and void on the ground of unconstitutionality.

a. The act by its terms creates a new county of part of the territory of another. By its terms it creates a municipal corporation, "with all the powers, privileges and immunities to which by law the other organized counties of the state are entitled."

b. If Washington county was created as such, then the office of treasurer of Marquette county became vacant, because the treasurer thereof did not reside therein: Const., art. 10, § 4; 1 C. L., §§ 390, 475. And the board of supervisors of Marquette county had power to appoint the defendant to that office, as they did do: 1 C. L., § 380.

No given form, power, duty or property is essential to the existence of a corporation. If an act of the legislature creates it as a corporate body, no given form, power or property is essential to its vitality.

We claim, then, that this act created a new county by the name of Washington, and though imperfect, it was still a legal corporation.

3. The two acts, of February 15 and February 27, must have had the effect to create a county, even if the first did not. If the existence of a township was essential to the existence of a county corporation, we have it in the second act. This, too, in addition to the fact that a large part of the old town of Negaunee, and a still larger part of the old town of Marquette, were in the new county, and may be claimed to be the main bodies of those towns.

Campbell, J. Martin, Ch. J. and Christiancy, J., Cooley, J. concurred.

OPINION

Campbell J.:

Defendant, being called upon to show by what warrant he exercises the functions of treasurer of Marquette county, pleaded that by the organization of Washington county the residence of the treasurer of Marquette was thrown into the new county, thereby creating a vacancy, which defendant was appointed to fill by the supervisors. One of the pleas relied on the "Act to organize the county of Washington," approved February 15, 1867; and the other relied on the same act, and a further "Act to organize the township of Negaunee, in the county of Washington," approved February 27, 1867. Both acts were directed to take effect immediately.

The replication to the first plea sets up that the county of Marquette consisted of but three townships, to wit: Marquette, Negaunee and Chocolay, and that only parts of the former two were embraced in the new county, and that such parts contain 3,500 inhabitants and 700 electors.

The replication to the second plea sets up the same facts as to the division of territory, and contains averments of the number of electors and inhabitants in the part of Negaunee left in Marquette county, and in the part of Marquette township of Washington county.

To these replications defendant demurred. And the principal legal questions refer to the validity of the statutes purporting to create and organize the county of Washington and town of Negaunee, and cut them off from Marquette, without making provision for the proper transaction of business, and the protection of the rights of the inhabitants.

The first statute declares that the territory described in it "is hereby organized into a separate county by the name of the county of Washington, with all the powers, privileges and immunities to which, by law, the other organized counties of this state are entitled." The second section fixes the county seat. The third provides that at the annual township meeting in April thereafter, county officers should be elected, who should go into office on the first Monday of May thereafter. The fourth section names several persons as county canvassers. The fifth provides that certain buildings in Negaunee may be used for county purposes, and makes the county a part of certain senatorial and representative districts.

The second statute undertakes to make the part of Negaunee contained in the new county successor to the entire town of that name, and to keep the old officers in office until superseded by new ones; and provides for a settlement of property and accounts between the two parts.

An organized county, under our constitution, signifies a county having within itself the necessary means for performing its functions independently of any other county; with its lawful officers and machinery for carrying out the powers and performing the duties belonging to that class of corporate bodies.

Among the necessary incidents to a county are subdivisions in which electors can lawfully vote, and townships whose supervisors conjointly may exercise the legislative and administrative powers of the corporation. The county officers are all elective, and the supervisors are necessary for taxation and for various other matters of business. Under the constitution, no one can vote except in the township or ward where he resides: Art. 8, § 1. The same section gives the right of voting to all white male citizens who have resided here a sufficient length of time. And the townships in which elections are held must be organized townships: Art. 11, §§ 1, 2.

Inasmuch, then, as a county can not become organized without the existence of townships, where elections may be held, and whose supervisors may constitute a county board, we must see whether this is provided for. The provisions requiring this board can not be construed as directory, or as compatible with its indefinite postponement. No county can subsist without it. The whole financial concerns of the county depend upon it.

The first statute does not undertake to create or organize townships....