People v. Mays
| Decision Date | 23 January 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 35943,35943 |
| Citation | 23 Ill.2d 520,179 N.E.2d 654 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Robert MAYS, Plaintiff in Error, |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Richard J. Flando, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John T. Gallagher and James R. Thompson, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for defendant in error.
Defendant Robert Mays was indicted on a charge of rape, was found guilty by a jury in the criminal court of Cook County, and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 25 years. He brings this writ of error contending that he was twice put in jeopardy for the same offense in violation of his constitutional rights, and also that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant was first placed on trial on this indictment before a jury on June 25, 1958 in the courtroom of Judge Walker Butler. After the evidence and arguments had been heard, and after the jury had been instructed and had retired to consider their verdict, Judge Butler found it necessary, for reasons of other business, to absent himself from the courtroom, and he requested Judge Henry C. Dieringer, a judge of the same court, to receive the verdict of the jury in his absence. The jury had deliberated four hours without reaching a verdict, whereupon Judge Dieringer called the jury to the courtroom and asked the foreman: 'Without telling me how you stand, will you give me your opinion as to whether or not you can arrive at a verdict in this case?' The foreman replied: 'No sir, I don't believe we can.' Judge Dieringer then asked: 'Is it your opinion that the jury is hopelessly deadlocked?' to which the foreman replied, 'I honestly believe it is, yes, sir.' Judge Dieringer then stated: 'In that event the court will declare a mistrial,' and he directed the clerk to withdraw a juror, and dismissed the jury.
The common-law record of the second trial recites, with reference to the proceedings in the first trial when the jury had failed to agree on a verdict: 'And by agreement between the State's Attorney, counsel for the people, and the said defendant and his counsel, now here given in open court, it is ordered that the aforesaid jury be discharged from the further consideration of this cause.'
In the supplemental record, which consists of stenographic transcript of so much of the first trial as pertains to the discharge of the jury, there appears a colloquy between Judge Dieringer, the Assistant State's Attorney, and the defense counsel, as follows:
'Mr. Winn (Assistant State's Attorney): Your Honor, can I ask the court to hold this case on the call until tomorrow morning?
'The Court: Yes, please hold it until tomorrow morning.
'Mr. Marks (Defense counsel):
'Mr. Winn: Any day you want.
'Mr. Marks: Tomorrow morning is bad for me.
'The Court: Pick your own date.
'Mr. Marks: Let's hold it on the call until next Monday or Tuesday, will you, please.
'The Clerk: That is by agreement, continued to July 1st.'
The case did not go to trial on July 1, 1958, but instead the defense counsel presented a motion to discharge the defendant on the ground that Judge Dieringer did not have authority to pose the question whether the jury could agree and that he did not have authority to declare a mistrial. This motion was supported by an affidavit of Marshall Patner, one of the lawyers who represented the defendant in the first trial. This affidavit recites, inter alia, that when Judge Dieringer stated that he was going to call the jury to ask the foreman whether the jury was dead-locked the attorneys for the defendant stated that they were not in favor of such action. The motion to discharge the defendant was argued and was denied by the court.
On August 11, 1958, defense counsel presented an amended motion to discharge the defendant supported by a similar affidavit of Marshall Patner. This motion was also denied. The case was then set for trial and tried on October 6, 1958, before Judge Harold P. O'Connell, and at the conclusion the defendant was convicted by the jury.
The defendant now contends that the first jury was improperly discharged because a reasonable time had not elapsed during which the jury could reach a verdict, and because Judge Dieringer had no discretion or authority to discharge the jury and that consequently the second trial placed the defendant in jeopardy a second time for the same offense.
We do not think a court errs in discharging a jury when it is apparent it is hopelessly deadlocked. In the case of People v. DeFrates, 395 Ill. 439, 70 N.E.2d 591, cited by the defendant, a jury was dismissed after three days of trial when it had deliberated only 45 minutes. In the DeFrates case we held that the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict whenever, in the court's opinion, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. Courts are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere. We are of the opinion that such a discharge constitutes no bar to further proceedings and gives no right of exemption to the prisoner from being again put upon trial. This principle had previously been stated in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165, and Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 23 S.Ct. 28, 47 L.Ed. 79. From an examination of the entire record in this case, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in discharging the jury.
Additionally, counsel for defendant argues that receiving the verdict of the jury or, failing a verdict, dismissing the jury is a nondelegable duty and that because Judge Butler assigned this task to Judge Dieringer, error was committed. Defendant cites Durden v. People, 192 Ill. 493, 61 N.E. 317, 55 L.R.A. 240, and Meredeth v. People, 84 Ill. 479, as authority for his contention that only the particular trial judge who heard the case may...
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People v. Campbell
...jury retires to consider its verdict (People v. Moon (1982), 107 Ill.App.3d 568, 574, 63 Ill.Dec. 174, 437 N.E.2d 823; People v. Mays (1962), 23 Ill.2d 520, 179 N.E.2d 654), the substitution of two alternates for regular jurors was not a motion or matter that required any personal knowledge......
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People v. Escobar
...occur without objection, and afterward seek to reverse his conviction by reason of those same irregularities." People v. Mays (1962), 23 Ill.2d 520, 525-26, 179 N.E.2d 654, 656. Defendant also erroneously contends that his silence, before the trial judge declared the mistrial, did not const......
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People v. Howard
...When in the court's opinion a jury is hopelessly deadlocked, it is clearly proper to discharge the jury. (See People v. Mays (1962), 23 Ill.2d 520, 524, 179 N.E.2d 654.) There is no fixed minimum time that a jury must be allowed to deliberate before a mistrial is declared and the court must......
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People v. Wills
... ... In Durden v. People (1901), 192 Ill. 493, 61 N.E. 317, the supreme court held that the substitution of judges during closing arguments was reversible error where the defendant objected to the substitution. In People v. Mays (1962), 23 Ill.2d 520, 179 N.E.2d 654, the substitution occurred after the jury retired for deliberations. The court upheld the substitution on grounds that no prejudice was shown and the defendant had failed to object to the substitution ... Although not specifically addressed ... ...