People v. MB, No. 04SA37

Decision Date24 May 2004
Docket Number No. 04SA37, No. 04SA41., No. 04SA40, No. 04SA39, No. 04SA38
Citation90 P.3d 880
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff, v. M.B., Defendant, The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff, v. Tyler Dwayne Edmunds, Defendant, The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff, v. R.P., Defendant, The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff, v. N.A.P., Defendant, The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff, v. T.R., Defendant.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

A.M. Dominguez, Jr., District Attorney, 19th Judicial District, Patryce S. Engel, Christian J. Schulte, Robert J. Frick, Deputy District Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Brian N. Connors, Deputy State

Public Defender, Greeley, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendants.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We issued a rule to show cause why the relief requested should not be granted in the five cases consolidated in this opinion.1 The defendants are all adjudicated juvenile delinquents who were charged with felony escape pursuant to section 18-8-208(2), and their cases all raise the same issue: whether the trial court erred when it concluded that section 18-8-210.1, which allows a sub-set of juvenile offenders to be charged with felony escape, violates article XVIII, § 4 of the Colorado Constitution.2 We hold that section 18-8-210.1 does not violate the Colorado Constitution either facially or as applied to the juvenile defendants in this case, and therefore we make the rule absolute as to all five cases.

Facts and Proceedings Below

The defendants in this case had all been adjudicated juvenile delinquents for offenses, which, if committed by an adult, would have been felonies. The defendants were all subsequently charged with felony escape pursuant to section 18-8-208(2), 6 C.R.S. (2003) after they fled from the Oasis youth correction facility, the Weld County Jail work release program, or other detention facilities. The People relied on section 18-8-210.1 to bring the charges because that provision allows certain felony charges, such as escape, to be brought against a juvenile "who is detained for the commission of an act which would constitute ... a felony ... if committed by an adult."

Defendant M.B. filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of section 18-8-210.1. M.B. argued this provision is facially unconstitutional under article XVIII, section 4 of the Colorado Constitution because it "impermissibly expands the definition of `felony.'"

The trial court agreed and declared section 18-8-210.1 both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to the juvenile defendants in this case. The court first cited the constitutional definition of "felony":

The term felony, wherever it may occur in this constitution, or the laws of the state, shall be construed to mean any criminal offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, and none other.

Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 4. The court reasoned that adjudication as a juvenile does not qualify as a felony under the Colorado Constitution, and therefore a juvenile adjudication cannot provide the basis for a subsequent felony charge under section 18-8-208(2). Accordingly, the trial court granted M.B.'s motion and declared section 18-8-210.1 "violative of the Plain Language of Article XVIII, Section 4 of the Colorado Constitution and Unconstitutional as applied to defendants and others similarly situated."

We granted a rule to show cause and now make that rule absolute.

I.

Our review of the trial court's rulings begins with the basic principle that we presume a statute enacted by the General Assembly to be constitutional. People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019, 1021-22 (Colo.2004). The party challenging the validity of a statute is required to prove it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

A statute is facially unconstitutional only if "no conceivable set of circumstances exists under which it may be applied in a constitutionally permissible manner." Id. at 1021 (quoting Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 266 (Colo.2003).) If a statute can be construed in a manner that adheres to constitutional requirements, we must adopt that construction. People v. Lowrie, 761 P.2d 778, 782 (Colo.1988).

The defendants in this case were charged with escape, a class three felony, pursuant to section 18-8-208(2), which provides:

A person commits a class 3 felony if, while being in custody or confinement following conviction of a felony other than a class 1 or class 2 felony, he knowingly escapes from said custody or confinement.

§ 18-8-208(2), 6 C.R.S. (2003).

This adult crime applies to adjudicated juvenile delinquents by virtue of section 18-8-210.1, which permits adjudicated delinquents who have committed offenses that would have been felonies if committed by an adult to be charged with felony escape:

For the purposes of this part 2, any reference to ... convicted of, a felony ... shall be deemed to include a juvenile who is detained for the commission of an act which would constitute such a felony ... if committed by an adult.

§ 18-8-210.1, 6 C.R.S. (2003).

Under Colorado law, a felony is "any criminal offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, and none other." Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 4. The trial court concluded that section 18-8-210.1 is unconstitutional both facially and as applied because it redefines "felony" in violation of Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 4.

The trial court's ruling assumes that section 18-8-210.1 converts a delinquency adjudication into a felony conviction, which would be impermissible under the Colorado Constitution. However, section 18-8-210.1 does not re-classify adjudicated delinquents as felons. Rather, it authorizes the People to bring felony escape charges against a sub-set of juvenile offenders who committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would be a felony. Section 18-8-210.1 does not deem this sub-set of adjudicated juvenile offenders felons.

Hence, we conclude that section 18-8-210.1 does not conflict...

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4 cases
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    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 9 November 2020
    ...General Assembly has plenary authority to define criminal conduct and to establish the elements of criminal liability. People v. M.B. , 90 P.3d 880, 882 (Colo. 2004). With this in mind, our primary purpose in construing the felony DUI statute "is to ascertain and give effect to the legislat......
  • Danielson v. Dennis, No. 06SA174.
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 31 July 2006
    ...unconstitutional only if no conceivable set of circumstances exists under which it may be applied in a permissible manner. People v. M.B., 90 P.3d 880, 881 (Colo.2004). In giving effect to a constitutional provision, we employ the same set of construction rules applicable to statutes; in gi......
  • People v. Hoskin
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 26 September 2016
    ...create a permissive inference so as to avoid relieving the People of their constitutionally mandated burden of proof. See People v. M.B., 90 P.3d 880, 881 (Colo. 2004) (“If a statute can be construed in a manner that adheres to constitutional requirements, we must adopt that construction.”)......
  • Metro Wastewater v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.
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    ...a statute to be constitutional and we should construe it in a manner avoiding constitutional infirmity, if possible. See People v. M.B., 90 P.3d 880, 881 (Colo.2004) (if statute can be construed in a manner that adheres to constitutional requirements, we must adopt that construction). An ac......

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