People v. McCasle

• Decision Date: 14 November 1966
• Docket Number: No. 38695,38695
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James McCASLE, (otherwise called James McCastle,) Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 227

221 N.E.2d 227

35 Ill.2d 552

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James McCASLE, (otherwise called James McCastle,) Appellant.

No. 38695.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 14, 1966.

Allen J. Potts, Chicago (Dario A. Garibaldi, Flossmoor, of counsel) appointed by the court, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and Matthew J. Moran, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

James McCastle and Willie Lee Thaddic were convicted of robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon after a joint bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County. Each defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 3--5 years. This review sought by McCastle alone is principally concerned with the argument that the trial court committed reversible error in failing, Sua sponte, to appoint separate counsel to represent him during the trial. Both McCastle and Thaddic were represented by the same court-appointed public defender.

Warner Foster, a taxicab driver for the Abernathy Cab Company, testified that shortly before 12:30 A.M. on May 5, 1963, he stopped his vehicle and counted his money. He possessed nine one-dollar bills and $1.35 in change. He thereafter drove around looking for a fare and was hailed by two men, identified by him at the scene of defendant's arrest and during the trial as McCastle and his co-defendant. The men entered the taxi and informed Foster of their destination. After proceeding for six or seven blocks Thaddic grabbed Foster around the neck, brandished a pistol, and demanded money. McCastle commenced a search through the driver's pockets but was unable to search him thoroughly in the car. The two men then ordered him out and completed the search in an alley, taking all of his money, and then allowing him to leave. He returned to his taxicab and drove directly to the Monroe Street police station.

Officer Charles Younger and Foster returned to the scence of the crime and toured the area, spotting the two defendants crossing a street. When a Chicago Transit Authority bus came between the squad car and the two men, they disappeared from view, but within ten minutes were apprehended a few blocks away by other police officers. The taxi driver identified the two men, McCastle and Thaddic, as the robbers.

Police found a loaded gun, subsequently admitted as evidence during the joint trial, upon the person of Thaddic. Five one-dollar bills were taken from McCastle's sock, and four one-dollar bills and $1.35 in change were recovered from Thaddic who admitted his participation in the robbery at the police station, and repeated this admission in the prsence of McCastle who then admitted that he, too, had participated in the commission of the offense.

McCastle testified that he did not commit the robbery, that he had not known Thaddic prior to the date of their arrest, that police officers beat him upon the stomach and subjected him to a game of 'Russian Roulette', after which he confessed. This claim of police brutality was corroborated by Thaddic. Both defendants testified that the claimed violence occurred in the presence of the taxi driver, but he and two police officers specifically denied the brutality charges.

At his arraignment on June 3 McCastle told the court that his mother had retained the services of an attorney for him, but did not name him. No private attorney ever appeared and the court subsequently appointed the public defender to represent both McCastle and Thaddic, and their joint trial occurred on August 21, 1963. The defendant made no objection to being represented by the public defender, nor was there any suggestion by defendant or his counsel that the two defendants would present antagonistic defenses or that any other grounds for severance existed.

Nevertheless, defendant now contends that the court should have appointed separate counsel for him on its own motion. He predicates this claim upon the proposition that Thaddic might have committed the robbery alone or with an unidentified third party, and that Thaddic should have been vigorously cross-examined by an attorney representing McCastle's interests alone. This contention, however, is completely unsupported by this record which contains no evidence of the theory now relied upon. McCastle's defense was his uncorroborated testimonial alibi and his statement that he had not even known Thaddic prior to their joint arrest. Both defendants denied knowing the other and their alibis were entirely separate. There was no inconsistency in these defenses, and it was not improper for the same public defender to contemporaneously represent both defendants. As a general rule, jointly indicted defendants should be jointly tried unless their defenses are antagonistic, and a severance is neither required nor authorized where their defenses are not inconsistent. (People v. Wilson, 29 Ill.2d 82, 193 N.E.2d 449; People v. Brinn, 32 Ill.2d 232, 245, 204 N.E.2d 724; People v. Aldridge, 19 Ill.2d 176, 166 N.E.2d 563; People v. Grilec, 2 Ill.2d 538, 542, 119 N.E.2d 232.) Additionally, there is no showing that defendant was prejudiced by counsel's representation of both him and his co-defendant, or that a different result might have obtained had separate counsel been appointed, and we ought not disturb a judgment on the basis of conjectural or speculative conflicts between the interests of co-defendants which are envisioned for the first time on appeal. (See People v. Courtney, 307 Ill. 441, 138 N.E. 857.) Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680, heavily relied upon by defendant, is inapposite, for there the accused specifically requested the undivided assistance of counsel of his own choice, and the attorney appointed by the court to represent him pointed out inconsistencies in the defenses of the co-defendants and was reluctant to represent both of them.

Defendant further maintains that his confession should not have been admitted as evidence during the trial. Although no objection was made to its admission, the record indicates that the court considered the question of voluntariness, and the People introduced evidence to rebut the claims of phyical violence made by defendants. The trial in this cause occurred on ...