People v. McCoy, 94CA1941
| Citation | 944 P.2d 584 |
| Decision Date | 27 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94CA1941,94CA1941 |
| Parties | 20 Colorado Journal 1913 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew T. McCOY, Defendant-Appellant. . III |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Paul Koehler, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrew C. Heher, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge JONES.
Defendant, Andrew McCoy, appeals the judgments entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree assault, first degree motor vehicle theft, attempted reckless manslaughter and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. We affirm.
Defendant, the sixteen-year-old stepson of the victim, lived at home with his father and the victim. Approximately three weeks prior to the criminal episode here, the father and his wife took a homeless boy, Michael Breaux, into their home to live with them. They treated Breaux as a second son, and were unaware that he may have had certain psychological problems.
On the evening of June 27, 1993, defendant, Breaux, and a mutual friend were together at defendant's residence. After the McCoys had gone to bed, Breaux told the others that he wanted to do "something big," which, in his mind, was the commission of a major crime such as the killing of a large number of people. Defendant suggested the possibility of killing his father and his step-mother, and the boys then started planning how to shoot the victim.
After defendant's father left for work in the morning, the three boys went to the storage room and retrieved a crossbow that was kept there. Defendant showed Breaux how to use the bow. Breaux then entered the bedroom, and shot the victim in the back with the crossbow, causing injuries that resulted in a debilitating paralysis. Neither the friend nor defendant had entered the bedroom. Subsequently, the three left the scene in defendant's father's car.
Defendant contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to present a defense, to a theory of defense, and to compulsory process, and created an impermissible presumption of guilt on the issue of mens rea when it refused to admit expert testimony pertaining to the mental health of the principal actor, Michael Breaux. We find no error.
Prior to trial, defendant moved for discovery of records of the prior assaultive behavior of Michael Breaux and that expert testimony pertaining to Breaux's mental health be admitted at trial. The trial court ordered discovery of the records, but reserved ruling on the admissibility of such records until trial. Twice thereafter, defendant filed addenda to his motion concerning Breaux's mental health in the form of further offers of proof. After two hearings held in regard to defendant's motions, the trial court again reserved its ruling on admissibility until trial.
In August 1994, defendant petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the district court to admit evidence of Breaux's mental history. According to the defendant's brief, the Supreme Court denied the petition.
During the trial, at the close of the prosecution's case, defendant renewed his motion to admit expert testimony regarding Breaux's mental health. The trial court ruled that the testimony was inadmissible, stating that the mental health of Breaux was not relevant to a determination of defendant's actions and mental state before and during the shooting.
Under CRE 402, only relevant evidence is admissible:
'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Furthermore, CRE 403 provides that, although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. A trial court abuses its discretion in excluding relevant evidence, only if it makes a decision that is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Gibbens, 905 P.2d 604 (Colo.1995).
An accused in a criminal proceeding has the right to present a complete defense including the presentation of evidence in his or her own behalf. People v. Pronovost, 773 P.2d 555 (Colo.1989). Additionally, a defendant is entitled to all reasonable opportunities to present evidence which might tend to create a doubt as to his guilt. People v. McGrath, 793 P.2d 664 (Colo.App.1989). Thus, for example, if some supporting evidence is presented, then an accused is entitled to a theory of the case instruction, no matter how probable, unreasonable, or unbelievable that theory may be. People v. Marquez, 692 P.2d 1089 (Colo.1984).
Defendant argues that the excluded expert testimony was relevant, primarily in that it related to his mens rea. He also argues that the excluded testimony related to the mens rea of Breaux and that, since one of the crimes at issue was conspiracy, the mens rea of Breaux was a relevant issue.
Although we agree with defendant that first degree assault and conspiracy to commit first degree murder are specific intent crimes and, thus, defendant's intent is a material issue, we also concur with the trial court's determination that expert testimony concerning Breaux's mental health is not relevant to these issues of defendant's intent.
Under the complicity theory as to which defendant was convicted, the only relevant issue is the knowledge of the complicitor that the principal is engaging in or about to engage in criminal conduct. People v. Moore, 877 P.2d 840 (Colo.1994). Likewise, the crime of conspiracy requires that defendant must have had the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the substantive crime and must have agreed to aid in the planning or commission of that offense. People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230 (Colo.1996). Hence, it is only defendant's mental state that is relevant.
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the excluded expert testimony concerning the state of Breaux' mental health was not relevant to defendant's intent. Under the circumstances here, it is no defense to the crime charged under a complicity theory or to the crime of conspiracy that the person with whom the defendant acted is legally not responsible for the crime.
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that expert testimony concerning Breaux's mental health was relevant to defendant's intent, we would conclude that, pursuant to CRE 403, its probative value was, nevertheless substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and possible misleading of the jury.
Defendant's additional arguments that the exclusion of expert testimony of Breaux's mental health violates his constitutional right to present a defense and to a theory of defense are without merit. Defendant tendered a theory of defense instruction which was given to the jury. People v. Marquez, supra.
Thus, the trial court did not err in excluding the expert testimony, and did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence, even if relevant, since its decision was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair. People v. Gibbens, supra.
Defendant next contends that his conviction for first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft must be vacated because the People failed to prove that either he or the other boys used a motor vehicle in the commission of a crime. We disagree.
A reviewing court will not reverse a conviction on a sufficiency of the evidence challenge if the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in a light most favorable to the prosecution is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable person that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the prosecution must be given every reasonable inference which can be fairly drawn from the evidence. People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123 (Colo.1983); People v. Johnson, 923 P.2d 342 (Colo.App.1996).
A conviction for aggravated motor vehicle theft will be upheld when the evidence shows that a motor vehicle was used in the commission of a crime, including the use of such to flee the scene of the crime. See People v. Simien, 656 P.2d 698 (Colo.1983). See also In re Gaspar D., 22 Cal.App.4th 166, 170, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 152, 154 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1994)("use of the vehicle for transportation ... away from the chosen crime scene" constitutes use of "a vehicle in the commission of a felony"); Langfield v. Department of Public Safety, 449 N.W.2d 738 (Minn.App.1990); City of Worthington Police Department v. One 1988 Chevrolet Berreta, 516 N.W.2d 581, 584 (Minn.App.1994)("A vehicle used to provide transportation ... from the crime scene has been used to commit ... the crime.").
Defendant argues that there was no evidence that he used the motor vehicle in the commission of a crime in that the motor vehicle was taken after the crime of first degree assault had been committed, and that the motor vehicle was not used to commit any other crime. However, since evidence indicated that the motor vehicle was used to flee the scene of the crime of first degree assault, the trial court did not err in entering judgment on the aggravated motor vehicle theft conviction.
Defendant also contends that the trial court committed error in entering judgment on inconsistent verdicts. We find no reversible error.
Defendant argues that his convictions for first degree assault and conspiracy to commit first degree murder are inconsistent as a matter of law with his...
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