People v. McDaniel, H029860.

Citation159 Cal.App.4th 736,71 Cal.Rptr.3d 845
Decision Date31 January 2008
Docket NumberNo. H029860.,H029860.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Greg McDANIEL, Defendant and Appellant.

Edward Mahler under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Appellant, for Defendant and Appellant Greg McDaniel.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Dorian Jung, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sharon R. Wooden, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent The People.

RUSHING, P.J.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A jury found defendant Greg McDaniel guilty of assault by a prisoner and aggravated assault, and the court later found that he had a prior strike conviction. (Pen.Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 4501, 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)1

On appeal from the judgment, defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault. He also claims he was not properly convicted of both aggravated assault and assault by a prisoner. Last, he claims he was denied due process because he was shackled during trial without a finding of cause.

We agree that defendant was denied due process and reverse the judgment.2

THE OFFENSES

Around 10:12 a.m. on August 4, 2003, Correctional Officer Aaron Anderson was in a guard tower at Soledad prison when he observed a fight in progress in Bravo yard down below. He testified that he saw defendant and another inmate, Augustine Holguin, punching and kicking a third inmate, Michael Odom.3 Officer Anderson immediately reported the fight over the radio. Sergeant Hancock and Officer Barba were first to respond. As they approached, they saw defendant punching Odom with closed fists. They did not see any kicking. Officer James Daw followed. He testified that he saw Odom being punched and kicked. However, he did not mention the kicking in his written report.

When Sergeant Hancock reached the fighters, he shouted, "Get down. Pepper spray. Get down." Defendant continued to punch Odom, and Sergeant Hancock sprayed him. Even after all three inmates lay down, defendant continued to hit Odom, and Sergeant Hancock sprayed him again.

Odom suffered discoloration, redness, abrasions, contusions, and scratches on his face and body. He also had a bloody nose and two lacerations on his neck. Although the treating physician described the longer laceration as "superficial," it nevertheless required five stitches to close.

Doctor Alan Rosenthal, who did not treat Odom, testified that the longer laceration was serious because it was so close to the jugular vein, the carotid artery, and facial nerves. He opined that it was caused by a sharp instrument, such as a knife, razor, a piece of glass, or a sharpened piece of plastic, and could not have been caused by hands or feet. No weapon was ever found.

Defendant suffered a fractured knuckle during the fight. (RT 343-344, 349)

The Defense

Defendant testified that he was in the yard exercising when Odom punched him in the back of the head, knocking him down. As defendant got up, Odom moved to his side, and defendant grabbed and lifted him up by the leg, and they both fell on a bench. They got up and started fighting. Defendant landed some punches, trying to defend himself, but did not kick him. Odom was unable to hit defendant cleanly but kept coming at defendant. At one point other inmates surrounded them, and Holguin, whom defendant did not know, joined the fight, hitting Odom. Odom kept fighting.

Defendant testified that he did not have a weapon or see one. He acknowledged that he and Odom had had an unfriendly exchange at a party in Modesto sometime before they were incarcerated.

SHACKLING

Defendant contends that he was denied due process because he was visibly shackled at trial.

The record reveals that outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel asked that at least one of defendant's hands be unshackled to allow him to take notes and assist in his defense.4 The trial court granted the request. Defendant testified at trial, and in later instructing the jury, the court advised jurors to disregard and not consider the fact that defendant was shackled for any purpose.5 (CALJIC No. 1.04.)

In Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (Deck), a majority of the United States Supreme Court held that the use of physical restraints on a criminal defendant visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial, such as courtroom security and the risk of escape, violates a defendant's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at p. 624, 125 S.Ct. 2007.) Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer explained that "the criminal process presumes that the defendant is innocent until proved guilty. [Citation.] Visible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 630, 125 S.Ct. 2007.) He further noted that unjustified shackling can interfere with the defendant's right to counsel and a meaningful defense. (Id. at p. 631, 125 S.Ct. 2007.) Last, he asserted that the routine use of shackles in front of a jury undermines the dignity of the courtroom and the ability of the judicial system to maintain public confidence in its ability and authority to provide justice. (Id. at pp. 626, 630, 125 S.Ct. 2007.)

Given the constitutional rights at stake, the majority held that "where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. The State must prove `beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' [Citation.]" (Deck, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007 quoting Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.)

California has long followed similar principles. In People v. Harrington (1871) 42 Cal. 165, 1871 WL 1466 (Harrington), the California Supreme Court stated that that "any order or action of the Court which, without evident necessity, imposes physical burdens, pains and restraints upon a prisoner during the progress of his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his mental faculties, and thereby materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional rights of defense; and especially would such physical bonds and restraints in like manner materially impair and prejudicially affect his statutory privilege' of becoming a competent witness and testifying in his own behalf." (Id. at p. 168, 1871 WL 1466; accord, People v. Ross (1967) 67 Cal.2d 64, 72, 60 Cal.Rptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606 [absent danger of escape, defendant entitled to appear without shackles]; People v. Burnett (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 651, 655, 59 Cal.Rptr. 652 [unnecessary show of restraint of an accused in the presence of the jurors is prejudicial].)6

In People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322 (Duran), the court reaffirmed "the rule that a defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury's presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 290-291, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, fn. omitted.) The court opined that "possible prejudice in the minds of the jurors, the affront to human dignity, the disrespect for the entire judicial system which is incident to unjustifiable use of physical restraints, as well as the effect such restraints have upon a defendant's decision to take the stand, all support our continued adherence to the Harrington rule." (Id. at p. 290, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; accord, People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 841, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) In People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351, the court later explained that manifest need exists "only upon a showing of unruliness, an announced intention to escape, or `[e]vidence of any nonconforming conduct or planned nonconforming conduct, which disrupts or would disrupt the judicial process if unrestrained....'" (Id. at p. 651, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) Thus, the mere fact that the defendant is a prison inmate, standing alone, does not justify the use of physical restraints. "[T]he trial judge must make the decision to use physical restraints on a case-by-case basis. The court cannot adopt a general policy of imposing such restraints upon prison inmates charged with new offenses unless there is a showing of necessity on the record." (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 293, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322)

In Duran, the court further ruled that because the imposition of restraints is a "judicial function," the trial court has a sua sponte duty "to initiate whatever procedures [it] deems sufficient in order that it might make a due process determination of record that restraints are necessary." (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 293, fn. 12, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322.) If the defendant is to be restrained, the court must make a record concerning the justification, and if the restraints are visible to the jury, the trial court must instruct the jury sua sponte that the restraints should have no bearing on the determination of the defendant's guilt. (Id. at pp. 291-292, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; see People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95 [reaffirming principles outlined in Duran].) The Duran court also reaffirmed the rule that a defendant waives appellate claims concerning shackles unless he or she objected below.7 (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 289, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, citing People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 778, 73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106; accord, People v....

To continue reading

Request your trial
235 cases
  • Silva v. Brazelton
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • March 12, 2013
    ...of the impact, the manner in which it was used and the circumstances under which the force was applied. [Citation.]" (People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 748-749.)With respect to counts 8 and 9, the evidence established a violent home-invasion robbery. According to Mechuca, Franc......
  • People v. Cortes
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • January 11, 2011
    ...that the jury saw the shackles. ( People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 845 ( McDaniel ).) He also argues the error was prejudicial. ( McDaniel, at pp. 746-747, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 845.) The Attorney ......
  • People v. Kopp
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • July 31, 2019
    ...restrained during trial, on the record before us, we do not conclude that Hernandez was prejudiced. Relying on People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 845, Hernandez urges us to apply the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard found in Chapman v. California (1967)......
  • Trice v. Biter
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • September 10, 2014
    ...of an instruction that the jury is not to be influenced by the fact of the defendant's arrest (id. at p. 501; cf. People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 746-747).The foregoing cases, however, all deal with situations in which the defendant appeared in jail clothing (or shackles) bef......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Appendices
    • March 30, 2022
    ...County of Alameda, Case No. 5133 2/9/2012), §7:66.1 People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, §10:26.21 People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, §1:21.6.1 People v. McDonald (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 877, §§1:11.2, 9:116.3 People v. McFarland (1989) 47 Cal.3d 798, §§1:21.6, 10:34.2 Peop......
  • Drunk driving offenses
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Volume 1
    • March 30, 2022
    ...v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 749-750. Significant or substantial injury is more than a moderate harm. People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 748; People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873. But see, People v. Washington (2010) 210 Cal.App.4th 104 (“[S]ome physical pain or damage, suc......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT