People v. McFadden
| Decision Date | 21 January 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 38492,38492 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Albert McFADDEN, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender, Chicago (James J. Doherty, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago , for defendant in error.
Albert McFadden was convicted of the crime of unlawful possession of narcotic drugs in a bench trial in the criminal court of Cook County and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 2 years to 2 years and 1 day. A constitutional question gives us jurisdiction.
Defendant's sole contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the use of narcotics in evidence. The facts surrounding the search of defendant and the seizure of the narcotics are simple and not disputed.
At 12:20 o'clock P.M. on April 15, 1963, State Narcotic Inspector Mitchell Ware telephoned officer William O'Brien and said that defendant would be getting off a northbound bus at 61st and Halsted about 2:00 P.M. and that he would have narcotics in his possession. He also gave O'Brien a physical description of defendant and described the clothes he would be wearing. O'Brien and officer Kodatt then went to 61st and Halsted. Both of the officers testified that information from Ware had always been reliable, but they also knew that his information was based on a tip from an informant. At 2:05 P.M. defendant got off a northbound bus at that intersection, his description fit that given by Ware, the officers asked if he was McFadden, he said yes, and they arrested him. A search of his person produced the narcotics.
The reasonableness of the search depends, of course, on the lawfulness of the arrest which in turn depends on whether the arresting officers had reasonable grounds for believing defendant was committing a crime when they arrested him. The facts in this case are very similar to those in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327. In that case special employee Hereford of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver told officer Marsh that James Draper had gone to Chicago by train, that he was going to bring back three ounces of hereoin and that he would return to Denver either on the morning of the 8th of September or the morning of the 9th of September also by train. Hereford gave Marsh a detailed physical description of Draper, described his clothing and said he would be carrying a tan zipper bag. Marsh watched all incoming trains from Chicago on September 8 without result. On the morning of the 9th he saw a person fitting the exact physical description and wearing the precise clothing described by Hereford depart from the incoming Chicago train carrying a tan zipper bag. Marsh arrested Draper and a search of his person produced two envelopes of hereoin. The court held the fact that Hereford's past information was reliable and the fact that Marsh's personal observation on the morning of September 9 verified all of Hereford's present information, except possession of narcotics by Draper, gave Marsh reasonable grounds to believe Draper had the narcotics.
The only real difference in this case is that the arresting officers knew Ware's information was acquired from an informer. In Draper it does not appear whether Hereford's information was based on personal knowledge. The basis for Hereford's information seems, however, to have been immaterial because all of it, except whether Draper had the narcotics, was personally verified by Marsh. Here all of the information furnished by Ware, except possession of narcotics by defendant, was personally...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Billings
...previously known to him, about a block and a half away from the place where he was approached by the citizen. (See People v. McFadden (1965), 32 Ill.2d 101, 203 N.E.2d 888, where defendant's presence in the same vicinity as reported by informant was found to be a corroborating factor.) At t......
-
People v. Gant
...182 N.E.2d 662), such a 'tip' when corroborated by other facts and circumstances may constitute such probable cause. (People v. McFadden, 32 Ill.2d 101, 203 N.E.2d 888.) As we stated in People v. Macias, 39 Ill.2d 208, 213, 234 N.E.2d 783, 786: 'We have held that the test of probable cause ......
-
People v. Delk
...suggestive of criminal activity. Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327; People v. McFadden (1965), 32 Ill.2d 101, 103, 203 N.E.2d 888; People v. Faulisi (1st Dist.1977), 51 Ill.App.3d 529, 531, 533, 9 Ill.Dec. 561, 366 N.E.2d Our own research has dis......
-
People v. Helms
...v. Durr (1963), 28 Ill.2d 308, 192 N.E.2d 379, Cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973, 84 S.Ct. 1138, 12 L.Ed.2d 87 (1964); People v. McFadden (1965), 32 Ill.2d 101, 203 N.E.2d 888, Cert. denied, 382 U.S. 871, 86 S.Ct. 94, 15 L.Ed.2d 110 (1965); see also Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 79......