People v. McGuire

• Decision Date: 21 December 1891
• Citation: 89 Mich. 64,50 N.W. 786
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. MCGUIRE.

50 N.W. 786

89 Mich. 64

PEOPLE v. MCGUIRE.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 21, 1891

Error to recorder's court of Detroit; F. H. CHAMBERS, Judge.

James McGuire was convicted of burglary, and assigns error. Reversed, and a new trial granted.

A A. Ellis, Atty. Gen., and S.W. Burroughs, Pros. Atty., for the People. A. H. McDermott, (J Logan Chipman, of counsel,) for defendant.

MORSE J.

The respondent was convicted in the recorder's court of the city of Detroit of the crime of burglary. The case is brought here upon exceptions before sentence. All the exceptions save one relate to the conduct of the prosecuting attorney upon the trial. There are 12 assignments in all. None of them have any importance except the eleventh and twelfth. In the course of his argument the prosecuting attorney said: "The defendant is entitled to the reasonableness of every doubt. I admit that; but, gentlemen of the jury, if I had any belief of any doubt that was reasonable in the face of this testimony, as your prosecutor I would tell you so." The respondent's counsel requested the court to charge the jury that they must not consider the belief of the prosecuting attorney, or his impression of the testimony. The circuit judge did not give this instruction, and made no reference to the matter in his charge. The expressions of a public prosecutor touching upon his belief in the guilt of an accused person have been passed upon by this court in People v. Quick, 58 Mich. 322 25 N.W. 302; People v. Dane, 59 Mich. 550, 26 N.W. 781; People v. Welch, 80 Mich. 616, 45 N.W. 482; People v. Hess, 85 Mich. 128, 48 N.W. 181. The remarks in this case come the nearest to those of Mr. Casgrain in People v. Hess, supra, than to any other that have been called to our attention for review. We held in that case that the prosecuting officer has the right to argue to the jury that the defendant is guilty from the testimony, and to state to them what evidence before them convinces him and should convince them of such guilt. In People v. Quick, 58 Mich. 322, 25 N.W. 302, the prosecutor said to the jury that, as a man and a citizen, and under the solemnity of his judicial oath, he believed the witnesses for the defendant not only lied, but that they had committed willful and deliberate perjury, and that the accused stole the watch and hid it. This belief was not given as a deduction from the testimony. Held to be reversible error. In People v. Dane, 59 Mich. 550, 26 N.W. 781, the prosecuting attorney said that he knew the accused was the man who took the money. This was held to be a statement to the jury of a fact, as of the prosecutor's own knowledge, which had not been introduced in evidence, under the sanction of an oath, relating to the material issues in the case. In People v. Welch, 80 Mich. 616, 45 N.W. 482, the two cases last above mentioned were commented upon, and the distinction, which is obvious, made between the language used in them and the remarks of Mr. Conely, which were made in explanation of the prosecutor's action in not asking a verdict for willful murder. In the Hess Case Mr. Casgrain said that, if he thought the evidence introduced was not sufficient to warrrant a conviction, it would be his duty to so state to the jury, and that if, when a complaint came in, he thought there was sufficient evidence to warrant the taking of the complaint, he would be derelict in his duty under his oath of office if he did not prosecute. This was also explanatory of his official action and his official duty, and held not error. It may be that Mr. Burroughs, the prosecuting officer in the present case, went further than it was necessary in explanation of his action, although it is a fact that he had been severely criticised without much warrant by opposing counsel in regard to his conduct during the trial of the case. If he intended to impress his belief upon the jury to have weight with them in their determination, the language was improper, but if it was in explanation of his motive in the conduct of the case, and so understood by the jury, it would come within the holding of this court in the Welch and Hess Cases. As said in the Hess Case, the prosecuting attorney has the right to say that certain testimony in the case impresses him that the respondent is guilty, and to state why it makes this impression upon him. This is simply the right to place before the jury the logic of the testimony, which leads him to the conclusion of guilt, and which he has the right to presume will lead them to the same conclusion. He also has the right to state to the jury that he stands unbiased between the people and the respondent. If he goes no further than this, he commits no error, because, if he believes that the testimony is inadequate for conviction, it is his...