People v. McIntire, Docket No. 113403.

• Decision Date: 14 September 1999
• Docket Number: Docket No. 113403.
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles R. McINTIRE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

599 N.W.2d 102

461 Mich. 147

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles R. McINTIRE, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 113403.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

September 14, 1999.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Benjamin Bolser, Prosecuting Attorney, Atlanta, MI, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by C. Joseph Booker), Detroit, MI for the defendant-appellant.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In exchange for testimony before a grand jury, the defendant was granted immunity in 1983 from prosecution for a then-unsolved 1982 homicide. When the prosecuting attorney later concluded that the defendant was the killer, he charged that the defendant was guilty of murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The prosecutor argued that the immunity order was void because the defendant's testimony before the grand jury was untruthful, but the circuit court disagreed and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed, and directed that the murder prosecution go forward. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.

A

On December 21, 1982, the body of Nolan Fritz was discovered at his home in Atlanta, Michigan, by his daughter. He had been shot to death.

The early investigation led the police to suspect that Charles R. McIntire (the defendant in the present case) and Thomas Fleck were involved in the homicide. A sheriff's deputy interviewed Mr. McIntire within a week after Mr. Fritz' body was found, and he vaguely admitted that he had been involved in an unspecified way. On the basis of the information gathered to that point, the police believed that Mr. Fleck had been the shooter, but they did not have enough evidence to prove his guilt.

The Montmorency Circuit Court ordered the formation of a one-man grand jury.¹ Mr. McIntire (but not Mr. Fleck) was summoned to testify on January 26, 1983. When Mr. McIntire invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself, the prosecutor requested that Mr. McIntire be given "complete immunity from any charges which would arise from the homicide of Nolan Fritz" in exchange for his testimony. The court granted the request.²

Mr. McIntire provided an account of his own activities and his contact with Mr. Fleck on the night of the homicide, but his testimony did not clearly implicate either of them in the homicide. The investigation thus appeared blocked, and the case remained unsolved for more than ten years. Mr. McIntire moved with his family to South Carolina in 1984.

In January 1993, the investigation of Nolan Fritz' death was turned over to the Michigan State Police. In 1994, a State Police trooper obtained a statement from Mr. Fleck, who implicated himself and Mr. McIntire in the shooting. Mr. Fleck essentially stated that, on the night of the homicide, he and Mr. McIntire drank until they ran out of money. Mr. McIntire suggested they visit an acquaintance named Nolan Fritz and ask for a loan. Soon after they entered Mr. Fritz' house, Mr. Fleck went into the bathroom. While in the bathroom, he heard two gunshots. Opening the door, he saw Mr. McIntire standing near Mr. Fritz with a pistol. Mr. McIntire directed Mr. Fleck to shoot Mr. Fritz, presumably as insurance that Mr. Fleck would tell no one about the killing. Mr. Fleck complied, believing that Mr. Fritz was already dead. Mr. McIntire stole Mr. Fritz' wallet, which contained approximately sixty dollars, and the men left. They later burned the wallet and threw the gun into a river from a bridge.

Mr. McIntire was arrested and charged with open murder and felony-firearm and, in a separate file, perjury. MCL 750.316, 750.227b, 750.422; MSA 28.548, 28.424(2), 28.664. He brought a motion to dismiss the murder and felony-firearm charges, on the basis of the 1983 order of immunity, but the circuit court deferred its decision, pending the outcome of the perjury trial.

On the basis of testimony from Mr. Fleck, a jury found Mr. McIntire guilty of four counts of perjury. The court sentenced him to serve concurrent terms of ten to fifteen years in prison. The defendant's appeal resulted in an affirmance of those convictions.³

Mr. McIntire then renewed his motion to dismiss the charges of open murder and felony-firearm on the ground of immunity. The prosecuting attorney opposed the motion, arguing that the immunity order was void or voidable because the defendant had perjured himself and had not provided incriminating answers in his grand jury testimony. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the defendant had been granted complete immunity that could not be voided on the basis of the perjured testimony.

The prosecuting attorney appealed. In October 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal order, and remanded the case for reinstatement of the murder and felony-firearm charges.⁴ 232 Mich.App. 71, 591 N.W.2d 231 (1998).

A majority of the Court of Appeals panel agreed that an obligation to provide truthful answers is an implicit condition of an immunity agreement under M.C.L. § 767.6; MSA 28.946.⁵ Thus, reasoned the Court of Appeals, a grant of immunity is void where a witness has testified falsely. 232 Mich.App. at 81-93, 591 N.W.2d 231. In dissent, Justice ROBERT P. YOUNG JR. said that the unambiguous language of the statute contained no requirement of truthful testimony, and that the defendant's perjury was therefore not a proper basis for disregarding the immunity agreement and charging him with murder.⁶ 232 Mich.App. at 118-127, 591 N.W.2d 231.

The defendant has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.

B

In the opening paragraph of his dissenting opinion, Justice YOUNG summarized his view of this matter:

Because I do not believe that the statute regarding the granting of immunity to a witness compelled to testify before a one-man grand jury, M.C.L. § 767.6; MSA 28.946, conditions its grant of transactional immunity on "truthful" testimony, I would affirm the trial court's order dismissing the charges of first-degree murder and felony-firearm. [232 Mich.App. at 118-119, 591 N.W.2d 231.]

Our review of this matter persuades us of the correctness of Justice YOUNG'S dissenting opinion. We reproduce that opinion here, and adopt it as our own. * * *

I. Application of Traditional Principles of Statutory Construction

Because our judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the Legislature, our obligation is, by examining the statutory language, to discern the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute. White v. Ann Arbor, 406 Mich. 554, 562, 281 N.W.2d 283 (1979). A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that "a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation." Coleman v. Gurwin, 443 Mich. 59, 65, 503 N.W.2d 435 (1993). When a legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent in a statute, the statute speaks for itself and there is no need for judicial construction; the proper role of a court is simply to apply the terms of the statute to the circumstances in a particular case. Turner v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 448 Mich. 22, 27, 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995); Lake Angelus v. Oakland Co. Rd. Comm., 194 Mich.App. 220, 224, 486 N.W.2d 64 (1992). Finally, in construing a statute, we must give the words used by the Legislature their common, ordinary meaning. MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1).

These traditional principles of statutory construction thus force courts to respect the constitutional role of the Legislature as a policy-making branch of government and constrain the judiciary from encroaching on this dedicated sphere of constitutional responsibility. Any other nontextual approach to statutory construction will necessarily invite judicial speculation regarding the probable, but unstated, intent of the Legislature with the likely consequence that a court will impermissibly substitute its own policy preferences. See Cady v. Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 509, 286 N.W. 805 (1939) ("Courts cannot substitute their opinions for that of the legislative body on questions of policy"). Unfortunately, the [Court of Appeals] majority has abandoned these traditional rules of construction, ignored the plain text of the statute before us, and substituted its own policy preferences for those of our Legislature by finding an unexpressed legislative intent that a witness who lies in a one-man grand jury proceeding forfeits statutory immunity granted under M.C.L. § 767.6; MSA 28.946. While [we] do not question the sincerity of [the Court of Appeals majority's] effort, [we] view the [Court of Appeals] opinion as a herculean, yet ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to create an ambiguity where none exists in order to reach a desired result, albeit one with which [we] might wholeheartedly agree [if we were legislators] authorized to enact policy.

The immunity statute, M.C.L. § 767.6; MSA 28.946, provides, in relevant part:

"No witness shall upon such inquiry be required to answer any questions, or shall be convicted for contempt upon refusal to do so, when the answers might tend to incriminate him. A written order granting to such witness immunity from such incrimination may be entered by said judge pursuant to a written motion by the prosecuting attorney..., which order shall set forth verbatim the questions which such witness refused to answer.... No person required to answer such questions shall thereafter be prosecuted for any offense concerning which such answers may have tended to incriminate him. [Emphasis added.]"

The text of the statute is clear and unambiguous. It simply does not condition transactional immunity on truthful testimony.⁷ As [we] read the immunity statute, there is but one condition that the Legislature has imposed on a grant of transactional immunity: that the witness give answers that "may have tended to incriminate him." Id. The...