People v. McKay

• Citation: 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 236,27 Cal.4th 601,41 P.3d 59
• Decision Date: 04 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. S091421.,S091421.
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Conrad Richard McKAY, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)

117 Cal.Rptr.2d 236

27 Cal.4th 601

41 P.3d 59

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Conrad Richard McKAY, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S091421.

Supreme Court of California.

March 4, 2002.

Richard L. Fitzer, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Marc E. Turchin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorneys General, Jaime L. Fuster, Steven D. Matthews and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BAXTER, J.

California has, in various statutes, limited the circumstances in which a peace officer may effect a custodial arrest for minor offenses. (E.g., Pen.Code, §§ 818, 827.1, 853.5, 853.6; Pub. Resources Code, § 5786.17; Veh.Code, §§ 40302, 40302.5, 40303, 40303.5, 40304, 40305, 40305.5.) California also has, by the passage of Proposition 8 in 1982, limited the circumstances in which a trial court may exclude relevant evidence as a sanction for the violation of these state statutes. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d).) As we have previously observed, state statutes limiting police discretion are not inconsistent with the state constitutional provision limiting the exclusion of evidence as a sanction for their violation. The "substantive scope" of state statutes governing the ability of peace officers to effect a custodial arrest for minor offenses "remains unaffected by Proposition 8." (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886, 210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744.) "What Proposition 8 does is to eliminate a judicially created remedy for violations of the search and seizure provisions of the federal or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence so obtained, except to the extent that exclusion remains federally compelled." (Id. at pp. 886-887, 210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744.)

In this case, the only remedy defendant Conrad Richard McKay seeks is the exclusion of a baggie of methamphetamine that was found in his sock during a search incident to his arrest for the infraction of riding his bicycle in the wrong direction on a residential street. Defendant argues that a custodial arrest for a fine-only offense, such as a traffic infraction, violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable seizures. He also argues, in the event the Fourth Amendment does not bar such arrests categorically, that his custodial arrest nonetheless violated the federal Constitution by the deputy's failure to comply with Vehicle Code section 40302, subdivision (a) (section 40302(a)), the state statute that governs the arrest procedure for this infraction.

We conclude, in accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, that custodial arrests for fine-only offenses do not violate the Fourth Amendment and that compliance with state arrest procedures is not a component of the federal constitutional inquiry. We also conclude, in the alternative, that the arrest here complied with section 40302(a). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I BACKGROUND

Around 6:00 p.m. on June 19, 1999, Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Valento observed defendant riding a bicycle in the wrong direction on a residential street. Deputy Valento initiated a traffic stop, intending to issue defendant a citation for violating Vehicle Code section 21650.1.¹ The deputy asked defendant for identification. Defendant said he did not have any identification with him and instead told the deputy his name and date of birth. Deputy Valento took defendant into custody, pursuant to section 40302(a), based on his failure "to present his driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of his identity for examination." During a search incident to that arrest, Deputy Valento found, in defendant's left sock, a baggie containing an off-white substance he believed to be methamphetamine.

After placing defendant in the back of the patrol car, Deputy Valento entered the name and date of birth defendant had provided into the patrol car's computer and received an address that matched the address defendant had given him and a general description that was consistent with defendant's appearance.

Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and alleged to have suffered a prior strike conviction. He moved to suppress the evidence, pointing out that he had given his name and date of birth to Deputy Valento, who was subsequently able to "check it out through the computer." After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, relying on People v. Monroe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1174, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 (Monroe), defendant pleaded guilty, admitted the prior, and was sentenced to the doubled term of 32 months. A divided panel of the Court of Appeal, once again relying on Monroe, affirmed his conviction.

II

Defendant was arrested for violating section 21650.1, which requires a bicycle to be operated "in the same direction as vehicles are required to be driven upon the roadway." This infraction is punishable by a fine not to exceed $100. (§§ 40000.1, 42001, subd. (a)(1).) There is no dispute that Deputy Valento was justified in stopping defendant based on this violation. Rather, defendant argues that a custodial arrest for such a minor offense violated the Fourth Amendment. If such arrests are valid, he then argues that once he provided his name and date of birth, the deputy lacked authority to effect a custodial arrest under section 40302(a) and that this asserted violation of state law thereby violated the federal Constitution.

A

Appellant's first contention, he now concedes, is foreclosed by Atwater v. City of Logo Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (Atwater), which upheld a custodial arrest for a violation of Texas's seatbelt law, an offense punishable by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $50. (Id. at p. 323, 121 S.Ct. 1536.) Under Atwater, all that is needed to justify a custodial arrest is a showing of probable cause. "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender." (Id. at p. 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536.) We must therefore conclude that there is nothing inherently unconstitutional about effecting a custodial arrest for a fine-only offense. (United States v. McFadden (2d Cir.2001) 238 F.3d 198, 204 [upholding search incident to arrest for riding a bicycle on the sidewalk].)

B

Although Atwater permits the police to effect custodial arrests for even the most minor of offenses, many states—including California—have sought to limit this broad discretion by statute, local ordinance, or departmental regulation. Defendant relies in particular on section 40302(a), which requires the officer to effect a custodial arrest for nonfelony Vehicle Code offenses when the offender fails to present a driver's license "or other satisfactory evidence of ... identity for examination." Defendant claims that his oral statements to the deputy constituted "satisfactory evidence of ... identity" under section 40302(a), rendering his arrest unauthorized under California law. The Attorney General, on the other hand, contends that the deputy complied with California law in that section 40302(a) requires an officer to accept only a driver's license or its functional equivalent.

Before we resolve the dispute over the construction of section 40302(a), though, we must first determine whether compliance with state arrest procedures affects the validity of an arrest under the federal Constitution. Neither the majority nor the dissent below considered this threshold issue, nor did the majority and dissent in Monroe. The issue, however, cannot be ignored. With the passage of Proposition 8, we are not free to exclude evidence merely because it was obtained in violation of some state statute or state constitutional provision. "`Our state Constitution ... forbids the courts to order the exclusion of evidence at trial as a remedy for an unreasonable search and seizure unless that remedy is required by the federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.'" (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 232, 3 P.3d 878, quoting In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 76, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.)²

Thus, in order to prevail, defendant must show as an initial matter that a Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs compliance with state procedure is pivotal to the validity of an arrest under the federal Constitution. We requested supplemental briefing to determine whether defendant's arrest, notwithstanding its constitutionality under Atwater, became unconstitutional because it assertedly was not authorized by section 40302(a).³

This is a rickety foundation on which to base a federal constitutional argument. It is a well-settled part of "`Our Federalism'" that "the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." (Younger v. Hams (1971) 401 U.S. 37, 44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669.) "[A]nxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests," the federal government "always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." (Ibid.) For this reason, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly resisted efforts to invoke the federal Constitution to force state officials to comply with state law. (See Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies (1997) 107 Yale L.J. 77, 161 ["Such a decision seems inevitable if there is any continuing wish to maintain a federal system"].) Rather, where state officials have been derelict under state law, the high court has reminded us that...