People v. McKee, Docket No. 4095
| Decision Date | 31 December 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,Docket No. 4095,1 |
| Citation | 15 Mich.App. 382,166 N.W.2d 688 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sherill McKEE, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Irving D. Robinson, Gruenburg, Robinson & Bogus, Center Line, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Lansing, William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Thomas P. Smith, Asst. Pros. Atty., Wayne County, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KAVANAGH, P.J., and LEVIN and NEWBLATT. * JJ.
The defendant Sherill McKee was convicted by a jury of negligent homicide. M.C.L.A. § 750.324 (Stat.Ann.1969 Cum.Supp. § 28.556).
The statute provides that any person who, by operation of a motor vehicle, 'at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly,' causes the death of another may be punished as therein provided.
The information did not charge the defendant with operation of a motor vehicle at an immoderate speed. 1 Rather it charged the defendant with driving in a 'careless, reckless, or negligent manner.' Since the information did not charge the defendant with driving at an immoderate speed, we need not consider whether that portion of the negligent homicide statute is, as claimed by the defendant, void for vagueness.
No claim is made that the terms 'careless' and 'reckless' are void for vagueness.
The defendant contends that the term 'negligence' is too indefinite and does not forewarn as to the kind of conduct which is criminal.
The same claim was considered and rejected by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. McMurchy (1930), 249 Mich. 147, 179, 228 N.W. 723, 734, where the constitutionality of this statute was upheld:
'The term 'negligence' is so well known, the elements so certain, the definition so definitely settled, and the precedents so many, that there is nothing indefinite whatsoever about it.'
The offense of which McKee was convicted was committed November 6, 1965. At that time C.L.1948, § 750.325 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.557) provided that a defendant acquitted of manslaughter in the operation of a vehicle might in the jury's 'discretion' be convicted of negligent homicide. 2
Apart from the fact that the defendant was not charged with manslaughter, on the authority of People v. McMurchy, Supra, p. 160, 228 N.W. 723, we hold that the words 'in its discretion' did not give the jury the right to disregard the instructions of the judge and, thus, the former statutory provision did not infringe upon the rights and obligations of the trial judge.
The negligent homicide statute, as interpreted in People v. McMurchy, Supra, permits the conviction of one accused of causing the death of another by negligent operation of a motor vehicle upon proof of ordinary negligence without proof of gross negligence, criminal intent or culpability. See McMurchy especially at pp. 161, 169, 170, 228 N.W. 723. In this the offense of negligent homicide differs from involuntary manslaughter. A conviction of involuntary manslaughter may not be sustained unless the negligence can properly be described as gross, criminal, culpable or the like. People v. Campbell (1927), 237 Mich. 424, 428, 212 N.W. 97; People v. Barnes (1914), 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400.
The basis of the distinction is that manslaughter in Michigan is a common-law crime, not statutorily defined, 3 and, therefore, as for all common-law crimes, Mens rea, criminal intent, culpability is a necessary element of the offense. 4
The legislature has the power to define a crime without regard to the presence or absence of criminal intent or culpability in its commission. 5
Whether it was the legislative purpose to eliminate the common law ingredient of criminal intent or culpability as to the offense of negligent homicide poses a question of statutory construction. See Morissette v. United States (1952), 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288. As previously mentioned, that issue of statutory construction has already been resolved against the claims of the defendant in People v. McMurchy, Supra, where the Michigan Supreme Court held that the term 'negligence,' as used in this statute, means ordinary negligence, not gross negligence. 6
Michigan is not alone in making it a statutory offense to cause death by ordinary negligent operation of a motor vehicle without proof of gross negligence or the presence of criminal intent or culpability. 7
Conviction affirmed.
* STEWART A. NEWBLATT, Circuit Judge for the County of Genesee, appointed by the Supreme Court for the hearing month of June, 1968, pursuant to § 306 P.A.1964, No. 281.
1 The information did charge that the defendant operated his vehicle 'at an excessive rate of speed for the then existing conditions.' This was merely descriptive of the acts of negligence charged in the information as it was contained in the portion of the information charging that the defendant 'did through carelessness and heedless inattention and lack of ordinary care and diligence, and at an excessive rate of speed for the then existing conditions, failed to see, notice and observe,' etc.
2 P.A.1965, No. 38 amended the section so that in case of acquittal of manslaughter alleged to have been committed in the operation of a vehicle the jury 'may render a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide,' eliminating the words 'in its discretion.'
3 People v. McMurchy (1930), 249 Mich. 147, 154, 228 N.W. 723; People v. Clark (1967), 5 Mich.App. 672, 147 N.W.2d 704.
4 Pond v. People (1860), 8 Mich. 150, 174; 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 81, p. 84; 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 92, p. 387.
As stated in People v. Campbell, Supra, 237 Mich. p. 428, 212 N.W. p. 99:
'If death ensues from negligence which shows a culpable indifference to the safety of others, the negligence is said to be gross or wanton or willful, and is equivalent to criminal intent, a necessary element of every common-law crime.'
5 Morissette v. United States (1952), 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288. This it has frequently done in respect to so-called Malum prohibitum offenses...
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