People v. McKimmy

Decision Date27 October 2014
Docket NumberSupreme Court Case No. 13SC702
Citation338 P.3d 333,2014 CO 76
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Michael Joseph MCKIMMY, Respondent.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

338 P.3d 333
2014 CO 76

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner
v.
Michael Joseph MCKIMMY, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 13SC702

Supreme Court of Colorado.

October 27, 2014
Rehearing Denied November 17, 2014


Attorneys for Petitioner: John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Christine C. Brady, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: MS & M Law Office, Nicole M. Mooney, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

Opinion

CHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 This case requires us to clarify the process for invoking one's rights under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (“the UMDDA” or “the Act”), §§ 16–14–101 to –108, C.R.S. (2014). When prisoners strictly comply with the UMDDA's procedural requirements, the Act mandates that they be brought to trial on pending charges within 182 days of their request. §§ 16–14–102(1), 16–14–104(1), C.R.S. (2014). Even when prisoners do not strictly comply with the UMDDA's requirements, we have previously determined that they nevertheless invoke their rights under the Act if (1) their request substantially complies with the Act's requirements, and (2) the prosecution receives “actual notice” of their request. See People v. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d 101, 106 (Colo.1983). In this case, the defendant did not strictly comply with the Act; rather, he attempted to invoke his UMDDA rights by mailing multiple letters to the prosecution and the trial court. But, while the prosecution received the defendant's initial requests, it failed to actually become aware of them until well later in the proceedings. We therefore must resolve, as an issue of first impression, whether the prosecution's receipt of such a letter constitutes “actual notice” sufficient to invoke a prisoner's rights under the UMDDA.1

¶ 2 We conclude that it does not. Rather, we hold that, for purposes of substantial compliance under the UMDDA, “actual notice” means “actual knowledge.” In this case, because the record is unclear as to precisely when the prosecution gained actual

338 P.3d 335

knowledge of the defendant's various UMDDA requests, we cannot determine whether any UMDDA violations occurred. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand with instructions to return the case to the trial court for further fact-finding. Specifically, the trial court should determine: (1) when the prosecution gained actual knowledge of the defendant's UMDDA requests in each of his cases, at which point the defendant would have effectively invoked his rights under the Act; and (2) whether any UMDDA violations subsequently occurred.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 In September 2007, Respondent Michael Joseph McKimmy was arrested for new offenses while on parole and was incarcerated in the Jefferson County Jail. The People charged McKimmy, in two separate cases, with second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, and a habitual burglary offender count; these cases are numbered 07CR2686 and 07CR3264. In 2008, the People filed complaints against McKimmy in two new cases, including charges for second-degree burglary, theft, identity theft, aggravated motor vehicle theft, and criminal mischief; these cases are numbered 08CR543 and 08CR552.

¶ 4 On November 20, 2007, unbeknownst to his public defender, McKimmy sent a pro-se letter in case 07CR2686 to the Chief Judge of the Jefferson County Court, in which he “formally request[ed] protection under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act.” In the letter's footer, McKimmy wrote, “CC: Deputy District Attorney [Prosecutor Name].” Seven days later, McKimmy sent a similar pro-se letter in case 07CR3264. As for the 2008 cases, on March 5, 2008, McKimmy sent a similar letter in 08CR552; he did the same two days later in 08CR543. Thus, in all four cases, McKimmy sent pro-se letters without his attorney's knowledge to Jefferson County's Chief Judge formally requesting the protections of the UMDDA, and all four letters included a footer purporting to copy the letter to the prosecutor of that particular case.

¶ 5 Neither the trial court nor the prosecution, however, initially became aware of McKimmy's requests in the 2007 cases. The trial court ignored the letters without reading them pursuant to its policy of refusing to acknowledge pro-se letters sent by represented parties, while the prosecution received the 2007 letters but inadvertently misfiled them. Crucially, the record is inconclusive whether the prosecution became immediately aware of the 2008 letters when McKimmy sent them in March 2008.

¶ 6 On February 4, 2008, McKimmy pled not guilty in the 2007 cases, and at a subsequent status conference in March 2008, the trial court discussed potential trial dates with the parties. At this point, McKimmy insisted that he did not wish to waive his “speedy trial rights”; however, he never mentioned the UMDDA specifically. The trial court, under the impression that McKimmy was referring to his rights as defined in section 18–1–405(1), C.R.S. (2014),2 made certain that the trial dates fell within six months from the date of McKimmy's not-guilty pleas, and it set the trials for July 2008. On May 27, 2008, the process repeated itself for the 2008 cases: McKimmy pled not guilty (rejecting the People's global plea offer for all four cases) and requested that “the Court be certain that we set these [trials] within my speedy trial time frame,” at which point the court set the 2008 cases for trial in October 2008. Again, McKimmy made no reference to his UMDDA requests.

¶ 7 Thereafter, McKimmy alleged a conflict of interest with his public defender, and a different trial judge held a conflict hearing in June 2008. During that hearing, McKimmy stated that he had “been trying from day one to assert my speedy trial rights” but that

338 P.3d 336

his public defender had refused to file a “motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.” When the judge pressed him on the particulars of these jurisdictional grounds, McKimmy said that “I don't want to misspeak or misstate anything,” but he reiterated that “it's my belief that my speedy trial rights have been violated already and the time limits [have] expired and there is no jurisdiction.” The judge then explained that “[s]peedy trial runs from the time you enter your plea” and that, because six months had not yet elapsed from the date of McKimmy's not-guilty pleas, no speedy trial violation had occurred. Ultimately, the judge found a conflict for other reasons and appointed alternate defense counsel. At no point during this hearing did McKimmy mention the UMDDA.

¶ 8 During July and August 2008,3 McKimmy appeared before the trial court for numerous status conferences. At one such conference, McKimmy again requested that the trial judge “please help me assert the speedy trial [right] to have [the trials] set in the proper time frame,” and the judge responded, “Absolutely.... I try to guard your rights on that ... carefully.” Notwithstanding his repeated concerns regarding “speedy trial,” McKimmy never mentioned the UMDDA at any of these conferences.

¶ 9 Finally, during a scheduling hearing for all four cases on September 9, 2008, McKimmy invoked the UMDDA by name. Specifically, McKimmy's counsel told the court that McKimmy had recently informed her that he had “a longstanding issue about the propriety of any of these cases going forward due to violation of his speedy trial rights under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act.” McKimmy and the trial judge then engaged in a colloquy, and McKimmy stated that he had previously “filed a formal request for speedy disposition.” The trial judge said that such requests were “not in the court file,” and she asked the prosecutor if he was familiar with them. The prosecutor responded, “I have a lot of handwritten things from Mr. McKimmy, but I don't believe he was in [the Department of Corrections].” The trial judge then told McKimmy that if he wished to file a motion regarding the alleged UMDDA violations, he could do so, but only through counsel, as he could not file pro-se motions as a represented defendant.

¶ 10 Thereafter, McKimmy's attorney filed a motion to dismiss all four cases, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because it had failed to comply with the time limits of the UMDDA. In their response, the People conceded that McKimmy had “substantially complied” with the Act and that they had received “actual notice” of his respective requests, but they argued that McKimmy had impliedly waived his UMDDA rights. On October 15, 2008, the trial court denied the motion from the bench as to the 2008 cases, stating that McKimmy could not “lay traps for the court” and finding that McKimmy's own conduct had pushed the trial dates beyond the UMDDA deadline. The court did not address the 2007 cases in its bench order.

¶ 11 McKimmy then went to trial in the 2008 cases in October 2008, and the jury found him guilty of second-degree burglary, theft, and criminal mischief. In February 2009, the trial judge adopted its ruling from October 2008 and denied McKimmy's motion to dismiss as to the 2007 cases. Trial then proceeded in 07CR2686, and the jury found McKimmy guilty of theft and identity theft. As for 07CR3264, trial was slated to begin on February 18,...

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