People v. McMahan
| Decision Date | 21 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 9,Docket No. 98505,9 |
| Citation | 548 N.W.2d 199,451 Mich. 543 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff, v. James McMAHAN, Defendant. Calender |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder under M.C.L. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction on the ground that the criminal-agency component of the corpus delicti of the crime was not established independent of defendant's confession. Unpublished opinion per curiam, entered December 14, 1993 (Docket No. 144657). We agree and affirm.
On August 13, 1985, Carolyn Kenyon left her apartment and was never seen or heard from again. She left in bare feet, wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts, and did not take her purse, her medication, 1 or any identification with her. She left in defendant's company, saying she was going to his house and would be back by midnight.
An extensive search for her ensued, but was unsuccessful. At trial, the rather exhaustive efforts to find any trace of her were related by over forty-four witnesses. 2 Testimony revealed that there is no reasonable explanation for her disappearance, that she had not been seen since August 13, 1985, and that she had not been in contact with any of the governmental agencies 3 with which she had frequent contact in the past. She was not discovered in any hospital or morgue. Nor did any other physician contact her physician for her records.
On March 19, 1990, almost five years after Carolyn Kenyon's disappearance, defendant was investigated in connection with the murder of a ten-year-old girl. In connection with this investigation, defendant gave three separate statements to Detroit police officers in which he confessed not only to killing the child, but also Carolyn Kenyon, and his wife, Cheryl Burwell. 4 In statements with respect to Carolyn Kenyon's disappearance, defendant indicated that he and Carolyn Kenyon were at his house drinking and smoking marijuana. 5 Defendant stated that Ms. Kenyon said something that angered him, and that he suddenly stabbed her in the chest. 6 According to the defendant, he buried Carolyn Kenyon's body in the basement of the house for a couple of days. Subsequently, he reburied the body at another nearby location before he finally placed it in trash bags and then in a city dumpster. Police investigations conducted in an attempt to substantiate the defendant's story were unsuccessful. See part III.
The trial judge admitted into evidence defendant's extrajudicial confessions made to the police officers. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating, "While we believe that the evidence presented establishes the death of Carolyn Kenyon, the evidence is almost nonexistent to show some criminal agency as the cause of death independently of defendant's confession." Slip op. at 3. We agree.
We are asked by the prosecution to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and to find that the defendant's extrajudicial confessions were properly admitted. To achieve such a result, the prosecution requests this Court to examine the continued viability of the common-law corpus delicti requirement in light of its federal counterpart, the trustworthiness doctrine. We decline the invitation to replace our common-law corpus delicti standard with the trustworthiness doctrine adopted by the federal judiciary. 7 Rather, we reaffirm in this opinion that the common-law corpus delicti requirement remains the rule of law in this state. 8
In Michigan, it has long been the rule that proof of the corpus delicti is required before the prosecution is allowed to introduce the inculpatory statements of an accused. People v. Williams, 422 Mich. 381, 388, 373 N.W.2d 567 (1985); People v. Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973). The underlying purposes of the corpus delicti requirement are (1) "to guard against, indeed to preclude, conviction for a criminal homicide when none was committed," Williams at 388, 373 N.W.2d 567, and (2) "to minimize the weight of a confession and require collateral evidence to support a conviction." Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed), ch. VII, p. 226.
In Michigan, the corpus delicti of murder requires proof both of a death and of some criminal agency that caused that death. Williams, supra. We emphasize that such proof must consist of evidence that is independent of the accused's confessions. People v. Konrad, 449 Mich. 263, 269-270, 536 N.W.2d 517 (1995) (). 9 Once the corpus delicti of the crime is established, appropriate extrajudicial confessions of the accused are admissible. 10
We continue to believe that criminal agency is an essential component of the corpus delicti requirement. 11 Absent some showing of criminal agency, there are any number of possible explanations for an individual's disappearance, including death by accidental means. People v. Kirby, 223 Mich. 440, 194 N.W. 142 (1923). In particular, this Court has underscored the importance of the criminal-agency requirement in cases where, as here, the victim's body is not found.
The confession of a defendant charged with homicide cannot be taken as evidence of the fact of the death of a human being by criminal means. In cases of homicide the corpus delicti may or may not be established by evidence disclosed by a dead body. If a body discloses death occasioned by criminal means then the corpus delicti is made out. If a dead body does not furnish such proof then death by criminal means must be shown to establish the corpus delicti. If the body, or remains thereof, cannot be produced, death by criminal means must be shown in order to establish the corpus delicti. [Id. at 451, 194 N.W. 142 (Wiest, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).]
The facts in the case sub judice are analogous to the situation presented to the Court in Kirby. In Kirby, this Court found that the disappearance of an infant, by itself, was insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of murder. Id. at 449, 194 N.W. 142. Aside from the extrajudicial statements of the grandmother that the infant died because of "her neglect," there was no evidence of criminal agency. 12 Absent independent evidence to support a finding of death by criminal means, this Court held that the corpus delicti of murder was not established. Id.
In the instant case, there was no motive presented at trial, aside from the defendant's confessions. No murder weapon was recovered. Furthermore, the body was not recovered; therefore, no autopsy could be performed. 13 We realize that part of the evidence-collection problem was because defendant's confessions were given to police almost five years after the alleged killing. Nevertheless, the prosecution failed to present evidence, apart from defendant's confession, that Carolyn Kenyon's disappearance and presumed demise were the result of some criminal agency. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
[T]here is no evidence of her death being caused by a criminal agency. The knife defendant allegedly used to stab her was never recovered, although at least three witnesses testified that defendant carried knives in a pouch on his belt. No human bloodstains were ever found in defendant's house and there were no other articles found with bloodstains on them. The human scents found by the dog in the crawl space and outside the house near the alley do not conclusively prove whose scents the dog was tracking and we note that this occurred approximately 4-1/2 years after Carolyn's disappearance. A police officer did find an area in the basement where it appeared that a hole had been dug and filled back in, but there was no way to determine when this occurred. Further, there was no evidence that defendant ever hit or acted violently toward Carolyn during their relationship. No evidence of a possible motive was ever established at trial. There was no witness to any part of the killing or disposal of the body. [Slip op. at 3.]
Consequently, we agree that death by criminal agency was not established.
The Court of Appeals rejected the prosecution's claim that People v. Brasic, 171 Mich.App. 222, 429 N.W.2d 860 (1988), and People v. Modelski, 164 Mich.App. 337, 416 N.W.2d 708 (1987), support the conclusion that criminal agency was established in the case sub judice.
In Brasic and Modelski, this Court found that the corpus delicti of the homicides had been established and that the confessions were therefore properly admitted. In Brasic, however, there was evidence that a witness saw the victim and the defendant enter a van where the witness believed they had sex. The witness also heard the defendant say that he wanted to perform anal sex on the victim to which she responded that she would not. The defendant then proceeded to hit the victim for ten to fifteen minutes. The victim was last seen with the defendant. Thus in Brasic, there was evidence that the defendant had acted violently toward the victim just prior to her disappearance.
In Modelski, there was evidence that the marriage between the defendant and his wife (who disappeared) was deteriorating and that the defendant accused his wife of infidelity. There was evidence that the defendant and his wife argued and fought a great deal. After her disappearance, the defendant directed a co-worker to...
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