People v. McQuillan, 11

• Decision Date: 06 September 1974
• Docket Number: No. 11,11
• Citation: 392 Mich. 511,221 N.W.2d 569
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Chester McQUILLAN, Defendant-Appellee. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 569

221 N.W.2d 569

The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Chester McQUILLAN, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11.

392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 6, 1974.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellant Dept., Patricia J. Boyle, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

State Appellate Defender Office by Steven L. Schwartz, Asst. Defendant, Detroit, Jessica Cooper and Larry R. Farmer, Research Assts., for defendant-appellee.

American Civil Liberties Union of Mich. by Peter M. Alter, Cooperating Atty., Detroit, amicus curiae.

Before the Entire Bench.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

The major issue in this case is whether the automatic commitment statute, M.C.L.A. § 767.27b; M.S.A. § 28.966(12) ¹ is unconstitutional in that automatic commitment deprives one found not guilty by reason of insanity of (1) due process by lack of a hearing on present sanity before commitment or within a reasonable time thereafter and/or (2) equal protection of the laws by not providing similar commitment and release procedures found in other (e.g. civil) commitment proceedings. ²

Specifically this opinion considers the following issues in order:

(1) Does a circuit court, upon motion, have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of its commitment almost two years earlier of a defendant it found not guilty by reason of insanity?

(2) Does the automatic commitment statute deny equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to provide notice and hearing prior to temporary detention?

(3) Does the automatic commitment statute permit detention without notice and hearing within a reasonable time after commitment and thereby deny due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment?

(4) Does the automatic commitment statute fail to provide equal protection of the laws in failing to provide the same type of release procedure for those committed under its act as for those otherwise (e.g. civilly) committed?

(5) Was there a proper commitment hearing?

I--FACTS

Defendant James McQuillan was charged with assault with intent to rape and indecent liberties in connection with a sexual attack on a minor female. The matter was assigned to the Honorable Horace Gilmore, Wayne County Circuit Judge who ordered defendant committed to the Forensic Center for a competency determination. After evaluation, at a hearing on February 19, 1970, defendant was held competent to stand trial. Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity in a trial by the court on March 17, 1970. Pursuant to M.C.L.A. § 767.27b; M.S.A. § 28.966(12) defendant was automatically committed for an indeterminate period to the Department of Mental Health by order of Judge Gilmore on March 24, 1970.

Defendant was subsequently confined in the Ionia State Hospital and there remained for nearly two years without evaluation or recommendation for release by the Forensic Center, the conditions precedent to either his release on convalescent care or complete discharge.

In March 1972, while defendant was yet in custody of the Department of Mental Health, pursuant to Judge Gilmore's order of commitment, defendant, by the office of State Appellate Defender, filed before Judge Gilmore a pleading entitled 'Delayed Motion to Vacate Commitment Order.' Oral argument was had, the matter was taken under advisement, and on June 27, 1972, Judge Gilmore vacated the order of defendant's commitment. In the opinion published by the trial court supporting its decision, Judge Gilmore found that the automatic commitment statute (M.C.L.A. § 767.27b; M.S.A. § 28.966(12)) was constitutionally deficient in failing to provide substantially equal treatment in terms of commitment and release procedures to those committed 'criminally' as accorded to those committed 'civilly.' As to due process Judge Gilmore found:

'The commitment is further constitutionally deficient because of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specht controls here. Due process requires a full hearing on the crucial issue--was the defendant so mentally ill at that time as to require commitment to a mental institution? No hearing is held on that issue under M.C.L.A. 767.27(b).' (Appellee's Appendix, pp. 17b--18b.)

Having found the procedure under which defendant was committed lacking in constitutional protections, the trial court sought to fashion a proceeding according such protections to defendant and held a sanity hearing on December 18, 1972. Defendant was adjudicated sane and permanently discharged from custody of the Department of Mental Health on or about December 21, 1972.

From Judge Gilmore's consideration and granting of defendant's motion to vacate the commitment order and the judge's subsequent finding of sanity at a special hearing the prosecution appealed. Leave was granted by the Court of Appeals and a stay of proceedings was ordered. Defendant's application for bypass was granted by this Court on April 27, 1973. 389 Mich. 786.

This Court is pleased to note that the appellate presentation of the case by prosecution and defense counsel was of high merit and they are to be commended for it. We were also aided in our decision by the comprehensive, well-reasoned opinion by Circuit Judge Gilmore. Finally we are grateful for the helpful

brief of the amicus curiae. II--JURISDICTION TO REVIEW

CONSTITUTIONALITY ON DELAYED ORDER (ISSUE 1)

The prosecution contended the Wayne Circuit Court which automatically committed defendant had no jurisdiction to consider a Delayed Motion to Vacate. They contended the Motion questioned the legality of defendant's commitment and was therefore in reality an action of habeas corpus, venue for which would be in the county of detention, Ionia. (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 4)

There was, and can be, no contention that the Wayne Circuit Court did not have original jurisdiction in this case.

M.C.L.A. § 600.601; M.S.A. § 27A.601 provides:

'Circuit Courts have the power and jurisdiction

'(3) prescibed by rule of the supreme court . . .'

The Supreme Court by GCR 1963, 528 provides the Circuit Court may modify previous judgments or orders pertinently as follows:

'3. . . . On motion . . ., the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. . . .'

In Attorney General v. Recorder's Judge, 341 Mich. 461, 472, 67 N.W.2d 708 (1954) we held that a trial judge has 'inherent power' to consider a delayed motion for a new trial in a case that was heard before him. It was stated that this 'is an inherent judicial function, the exercise of which rests within the sound judicial discretion of a trial judge to so grant when justice requires. This Court has not, and will not, infringe upon this time-honored and necessary judicial prerogative, except for an abuse of judicial discretion.'

The policy underlying the judicial power, delineated above, to reform erroneous judgments and/or orders is well stated by the ABA Standards For Criminal Justice:

'Little would seem to be served by freezing a decision that later turns out to have been erroneous. Provision that the sentencing court can undo what hindsight has demonstrated to have been a mistake seems the least that is due the victim.' ABA Standards, ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, (Approved Draft, 1968), 280.

For the reasons set forth above we hold that the Wayne Circuit Court properly assumed jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the automatic commitment statute by which defendant had been committed. ^2.5

III--PERTINENT FEDERAL DUE PROCESS & EQUAL PROTECTION

AUTHORITY

The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that commitment to a mental hospital is deprivation of liberty Commitment may not be accomplished without proper notice and hearing to determine mental incompetence.

Equal Protection

The leading case is Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966). Baxstrom, while serving a sentence in a New York prison, was certified insane by a prison psychiatrist and thereupon transferred to the Dannemora State Hospital, a mental institution under the jurisdiction of the New York Department of Correction. At the expiration of his sentence, a civil commitment was sought pursuant to section 384 of the New York Correction Law, and that commitment was ordered by a Surrogate after a sanity hearing. Baxstrom's custody was moved from the Department of Correction to the Department of Mental Hygiene again. He, however, remained at Dannemora State Hospital upon the administrative decision of the Commission of Mental Hygiene, as allowed by section 384. He challenged the above procedure by petitioning for habeas corpus.

In a unanimous opinion the United States Supreme Court held that Baxstrom was denied equal protection of the laws because, solely on the basis that he was nearing the expiration of his prison term, he was not afforded a jury review of his initial commitment hearing as others civilly committed were afforded and, because once committed, he was transferred from an institution under the control of the Department of Mental Hygiene to an institution under the control of the Department of Correction for the criminally insane without any hearing concerning his present dangerousness, while others who were civilly committed could be similarly transferred only after it has been determined at a judicial hearing that they were dangerous.

Due Process

In the leading case of Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967), the petitioner was convicted in a Colorado State Court of a sex offense for which the maximum sentence of ten years could be imposed. The trial judge, acting pursuant to the Colorado Sex...