People v. Meadows

• Decision Date: 30 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-359,80-359
• Citation: 48 Ill.Dec. 373,92 Ill.App.3d 1028,416 N.E.2d 404
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: , 48 Ill.Dec. 373 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hosea MEADOWS, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 404

416 N.E.2d 404

92 Ill.App.3d 1028, 48 Ill.Dec. 373

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hosea MEADOWS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80-359.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Jan. 30, 1981.

Thomas A. Lilien, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Robert J. Agostinelli, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for defendant-appellant.

Edward F. Petka, State's Atty., Joliet, Gerry R. Arnold, John X. Breslin, State's Attys. Appellate Service Commission, Ottawa, for plaintiff-appellee.

SCOTT, Justice:

The defendant, Hosea Meadows, appeals from his conviction for the offense of armed robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 18-2) following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Will County. At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing he was sentenced to the minimum six year term of imprisonment. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(3).) The defendant asks this court to reduce the degree of the offense from armed robbery to robbery, contending that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon was employed in the commission of the offense.

The defendant and an unknown male were charged by way of indictment with taking currency from Ruth Eubanks, while armed with a shotgun. At trial, Eubanks testified that she was the sole employee on duty at a Joliet gasoline station between 7:30 and 8:30 p. m. when the defendant approached the door to the station. He asked Eubanks for a quart of motor oil. After she led the defendant to a service island where the oil was located, he told her that there was going to be a "stick-up" and pulled his hat down to cover his face. The defendant summoned an accomplice, who vaulted a fence located adjacent to the station. The accomplice was a masked male and he stood approximately twenty-five to thirty feet from Eubanks. The defendant then ordered his accomplice to "show her that we're not kidding." The accomplice responded by removing from beneath his raincoat an object which, according to Eubanks' testimony, resembled a "shotgun or something." The accomplice raised the object with two hands and pointed its barrel at Eubanks. She then heard a sound similar to the cocking of a gun's firing mechanism. Although the accomplice remained twenty-five to thirty feet from Eubanks, he was clearly visible to her because the station service area was well lighted. She testified that the object had a metal barrel about eighteen inches long with wood attached to it. She stated at the trial that although she could not ascertain whether the object was in fact a shotgun or a toy gun, she was frightened by it and obeyed the defendant's orders accordingly. While the defendant and Eubanks returned to the station in order for him to remove the money from the station's cash register, the accomplice remained outside with the gun-like object visible. In the process of gaining a key to a locked strong box, the defendant struck Eubanks in the face with his fist.

At that same time the station manager arrived, whereupon he charged the defendant and, after a struggle, subdued him. The accomplice fled from the scene. Neither he nor the gun-like object were discovered. The station manager corroborated Eubanks' testimony concerning the occurrence after the manager arrived, but no one other than Eubanks witnessed the accomplice or the purported gun.

The trial judge found Eubanks' testimony clear and convincing and indicated that the weapon was proved to be dangerous. The judge also noted that even if the object held by the accomplice were a pipe instead of a shotgun, it could have been used against the victim as a bludgeon. The defendant was found guilty of armed robbery. The court, after considering the defendant's youthful age, his lack of past criminality, his willingness to cooperate with the police, and his dependence on alcohol, sentenced the defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence of six years imprisonment.

On appeal the defendant contends that an essential element of the offense of armed robbery that the offense was committed with a dangerous weapon was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt because of the equivocal and uncorroborated testimony by Eubanks which consisted entirely of circumstantial evidence; hence, we should reduce the degree of the offense to robbery. He further contends that the court based its finding that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission of the robbery solely upon Eubanks' subjective impressions, which are an insufficient basis for proving armed robbery according to the recent supreme court decision of People v. Skelton (1980), --- Ill.2d ---, 46 Ill.Dec. 571, 414 N.E.2d 455.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3) authorizes a reviewing court to reduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant was convicted. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110A, par. 615(b)(3).) We will not, however, reduce the degree of the offense out of merciful benevolence; there must be an evidentiary weakness for a reviewing court to act. People v. Mau (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 924, 44 Ill.Dec. 354, 411 N.E.2d 323; People v. Coleman (1980), 78 Ill.App.3d 989, 34 Ill.Dec. 510, 398 N.E.2d 185.

The State, as one element of the offense of armed robbery, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a robbery was committed while the defendant carried or was otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 18-2(a); People v. DeLeon (1976), 40 Ill.App.3d 308, 352 N.E.2d 234.) The use of a dangerous weapon can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. (People v. Dupree (1979), 69 Ill.App.3d 260, 25 Ill.Dec. 735, 387 N.E.2d 391.) The parameters of what constitutes a dangerous weapon have been left primarily to judicial construction, however, our supreme court in Skelton rejected a purely subjective test for proving the use of a dangerous weapon, noting that:

" * * * many objects, including guns, can be dangerous and cause serious injury, even when used in a fashion for which they were not intended. Most, if not all, unloaded real guns and many toy guns, because of their size and weight, could be used in deadly fashion as bludgeons. Since the robbery victim could be quite badly hurt or even killed by such weapons if used in that fashion, it seems to us they can properly be classified as dangerous weapons although they were not in fact used in that manner during the commission of the particular offense. It suffices that the potential for such use is present; the victim need not provoke its actual use in such manner.

In the great majority of cases it becomes a question for the fact finder whether the particular object was sufficiently susceptible to use in a manner likely to cause serious injury to qualify as a dangerous weapon."

(People v. Skelton (1980, at ---), --- Ill.2d ---, ---, 46 Ill.Dec. 571, 574, 414 N.E.2d 455, 458.)

The defendant seems to argue that after Skelton the State may no longer prove the existence of a dangerous weapon circumstantially. We disagree, since Skelton only barred evidence of the victim's beliefs...