People v. Medina
| Decision Date | 06 April 1978 |
| Parties | , 375 N.E.2d 768 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jose MEDINA, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Roger Bennet Adler, New York City, for appellant.
Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty., New York City (Norman Barclay, Peter L. Zimroth and Robert M. Pitler, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
After a trial by jury, Jose Medina was convicted of rape in the first degree (Penal Law, § 130.35) and burglary in the first degree (Penal Law, § 140.30). Dismissing a lesser included count, the Appellate Division affirmed. On this appeal to us, the appellant now asserts that (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the Trial Judge refused to replace his court-appointed lawyer and thus improperly compelled him to defend himself and (2) the evidence was insufficient to meet the corroboration standards then required to support a conviction for rape. On the analysis which follows, we conclude that both contentions are lacking in merit.
We begin by setting forth the operative facts bearing on the commission of the crime itself. The prosecutrix, a young woman of 19, testified without contradiction that on May 23, 1973 the appellant, after putting her in a terrorized state by breaking into her locked Manhattan apartment at 3:00 a. m., compelled her to submit to acts of sexual intercourse and sodomy. After being disturbed by a clawing and rustling sound, she discovered him crouched on the floor with a knife in his hand. Presumably, Medina, a complete stranger, had gained entrance through an iron window gate which, previously in good condition, had been pried apart. The knife he held had been taken from her kitchen.
These additional items of proof bear particularly on the issue of corroboration: While the victim, having been forced to remove all her clothes, was still unclad the appellant opened the apartment door to admit an accomplice who, Medina announced, would also take his turn at raping her. At that juncture, the police, who arrived in response to a radio report that intruders had been seen entering the building, apprehended both men before either could make good his escape; 1 in his haste to depart, Medina apparently had no time to get back into his underwear top and shorts; easily identified by their distinctive colors, both garments were found in the apartment; at the police precinct it was discovered that Medina was clothed only in his street clothes. Findings on medical examination made at a nearby hospital soon after the event were that the prosecuting witness, previously virginal, still possessed an intact hymen, that there were no spermatozoa in her genital organs and that she bore no signs of physical injury; the examining physician explained, however, that it was possible to penetrate her vagina for one inch without rupturing the hymen; for her part, the prosecuting witness described to the jury how Medina, though twice entering her body, encountered too much difficulty to consummate sexual intercourse and had proceeded to engage her in a forced act of cunnilingus.
Before describing the subsequent course of events relevant to the right to counsel issue, we pause to examine appellant's contention that there was a failure to prove the necessary corroboration. In May, 1973, the Penal Law required independent evidence which "tended" to establish both that there had been an attempt to engage the victim in sexual intercourse and that force was used in that endeavor (former Penal Law, § 130.15, L.1972, ch. 373). This evidence could be either direct or circumstantial (People v. Bercume, 38 A.D.2d 356, 358, 329 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864; People v. Dow, 34 A.D.2d 224, 228, 310 N.Y.S.2d 558, 652, affd. 28 N.Y.2d 860, 322 N.Y.S.2d 253, 271 N.E.2d 230).
The statutory standards here were well met. That the appellant's underwear was found in the victim's apartment rather than under the appellant's outer clothes was circumstantial evidence of a most telling nature as to his participation in the sexual encounter which the prosecuting witness described. The distressed state in which the police found the victim at the time of her rescue, the lateness of the hour the role of the knife, the twisted window gate, without more and most certainly in combination, easily took the case to the jury on the question of force (see People v. Yannucci, 283 N.Y. 546, 550, 29 N.E.2d 185, 186; People v. Dow, supra, pp. 228-229, 310 N.Y.S.2d pp. 562-563; People v. Watson, 57 A.D.2d 143, 148, 393 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739).
Turning now to the less graphic, but here not less significant, events relating to the claimed impairment of right to counsel, these appropriately may be said to have begun on May 23, the date of Medina's arrest. From then until the trial itself was begun the following October, appellant was never without a lawyer. Initially, both defendants were provided with counsel by the Legal Aid Society. But, about a month later, to avoid any possible conflict of interest between the two codefendants, the court, pursuant to article 18-B of the County Law and rule 606.1 of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, appointed a private attorney to look to Medina's interests alone. This representation of the appellant continued uneventfully during the ensuing months until the trial was about to get underway.
On September 11, a month before trial, the People proferred a plea bargain. When Medina indicated that he was not then ready to accept it, the likelihood that the case would have to be tried in October became obvious. On October 2, Medina having finalized his rejection of the plea offer, the plan for trial that month became firm and, on October 5, the court again alerted the parties to be prepared to proceed, this time upon the completion of another trial then in progress in the part to which the Medina case had been assigned. On none of these dates indeed, so far as the record reveals, during all the preceding months was there the slightest hint that the appellant was harboring any dissatisfaction with his lawyer. Even on October 9, when the appellant was in court for the call of the case preparatory to commencement of its trial the next day, every indication was that both sides were ready to proceed.
On the morning of October 10, however, Medina's counsel advised the court that on the preceding day his client had informed him that he had no confidence in him as his lawyer. Appellant personally confirmed this statement. All indications from the transcript are that the Trial Judge then took pains to reassure the appellant of the experience and competence of his counsel. 2 The court did not rest on this alone. Its conscientious and persistent efforts to ascertain the cause of Medina's unhappiness continued over the next two days. But they proved fruitless.
Little by little some explanations were eked out, but they seemed almost entirely frivolous or specious. His belaboring of counsel as inadequate was for such things as failure to move to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the District Attorney's name appeared in type rather than script on the copy given to the appellant and for having failed to move to suppress evidence, even though there was no suppressible evidence in the case. He had even expressed similar displeasure because other "motions" whose nature he could not specify had not been made. Encouraged to elaborate, the most he would say was . Other complaints read like semisophisticated and belated second-guessing of his lawyer's professional judgment: for instance, he complained that he had not been put before the Grand Jury and that his attorney had relied on the far more informative preliminary hearing minutes rather than on a bill of particulars. Crystallizing his thinking, in the end Medina stated that what disturbed him basically was that the lawyer was .
After a great deal of colloquy, the Judge painstakingly explained to the appellant that his court-appointed lawyer could not be changed at will and without cause and that, construing the application as one to discharge counsel, the request would be denied. Medina then shifted his ground, stating that he "did not feel ready for trial yet", but never did he satisfactorily indicate how a new attorney or an adjournment would add to his preparation. Despite this, the court offered to delay the daily commencement of trial to allow additional time for him to confer with counsel, promised to lend assistance in the procurement of witnesses, and in fact to "give (you) anything (you) want". All to no avail. From the cold record what comes through is an impression that it would have been perfectly permissible for the trial court to have perceived in appellant's responses an attempt inchoate or deliberate either to put off his day of reckoning or obtain delay for delay's sake alone.
When the appellant would not accept the court's decision that there was no basis for assigning a different counsel, the Judge warned him that, if he persisted in his refusal, he would have to try his case himself. It was also made clear to him that, while it was his right to proceed pro se, such a course would be unwise. To this Medina's ready answer was that he nevertheless would rather do so. As was obvious from the adamancy with which he announced his decision, this waiver was not given perfunctorily. Nor was it cavalierly accepted. Even while respecting and accepting appellant's determination to act contrary to its advice, the court continued to manifest its concern by instructing counsel to sit next to his former client and hold himself available for consultation. These services were not utilized. Instead, after making motions and putting questions to the court, all with considerable articulateness and poise, Medina,...
To continue reading
Request your trial