People v. Medina

Citation501 P.3d 834,2021 COA 124
Decision Date23 September 2021
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals No. 19CA1196
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Delano Marco MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Colorado

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Krista A. Schelhaas, Alternate Defense Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON

¶ 1 Plea bargains "are an accepted part of our jurisprudence" to resolve criminal cases in Colorado. People v. Schneider , 25 P.3d 755, 759 (Colo. 2001). Given their ubiquity, a situation that likely will occur again is an issue of first impression here: Are a defendant's due process rights violated if he or she enters into a plea agreement by waiving a factual basis to the offense but does so in conjunction with an Alford plea?

¶ 2 In North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), the issue was whether a defendant could knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently plead guilty while simultaneously professing his or her innocence. The United States Supreme Court held that such a circumstance is permitted so long as "a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt." Id. at 37, 91 S.Ct. 160.

¶ 3 Not addressed in Alford , however, is whether a defendant may waive the requirement that a judge find "strong evidence of actual guilt" under applicable state criminal procedural rules. Id. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and some state criminal rules, for example, do not authorize waivers of a factual basis to facilitate entry of a plea agreement. But our Crim. P. 11 does.

¶ 4 Although Colorado cases exist involving Alford pleas, there are no cases specifically addressing a district court's authority under Crim. P. 11 to permit a defendant to waive a factual basis when presented with a defendant's protestation of innocence. We conclude that as long as the district court strictly adheres to the provisions of Crim. P. 11, a defendant's due process rights are not violated if he or she waives the requirement of a finding of a "strong" factual basis under Alford when entering a plea accompanied with a plea agreement. We do so because Alford did not intend to create a separate constitutional due process right when it observed that a plea of guilty is permissible when there exists a "strong" factual basis of actual guilt contained in the record.

¶ 5 In this case, because the record supports a finding that the district court strictly complied with the provisions of Crim. P. 11, defendant Delano Marco Medina (Medina) knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived a factual basis for his Alford plea to felony menacing, which was part of a global plea agreement involving six criminal cases. Consequently, we affirm the postconviction court's order upholding Medina's judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a plea agreement.

I. Background

¶ 6 In August 2013, Medina's wife called 911 and "reported that her husband had held a knife to her throat and threatened her." Medina's wife met with a police officer at the Lake County Sheriff's Department and told him that she and Medina had been arguing when the incident occurred. Police arrested Medina and located a small knife in his pocket. Medina was arrested and charged with felony menacing – real/simulated weapon.

¶ 7 Medina pled guilty to the menacing charge with a stipulated one-year sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) in exchange for dismissal of the charges in five other cases.1 Medina's sentence ran consecutively to a sentence he anticipated he would receive in a Boulder County case.2 Medina waived a factual basis, even though he maintained his innocence to the menacing offense. In other words, Medina contends, and the district court acknowledged, that he entered an Alford plea.

¶ 8 The court set the matter over for sentencing, but Medina posted bond and absconded for almost a year until he was apprehended.

¶ 9 At an initial appearance after his arrest, Medina's new counsel (plea counsel) — a different public defender than trial counsel who had represented him until the plea hearing — stated that she intended to file a motion to withdraw his plea because new evidence had emerged. The prosecutor indicated that the district court should proceed with sentencing because Medina had "two active felonies" when Medina pled to a "very generous one-year stipulated sentence" in the custody of the DOC.

¶ 10 At sentencing, Medina's counsel made another request to withdraw his plea. Medina claimed that he thought an Alford plea left open the possibility that he could withdraw his plea based on new evidence. Medina also claimed he wanted to withdraw his plea because the new evidence would show he did not actually use a knife during the menacing incident. The district court denied Medina's motion and sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement.

¶ 11 Medina then filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c). He claimed that he was innocent of the menacing charge and that he had received ineffective assistance from plea counsel. He also claimed that he did not fully understand the implications of his guilty plea. The district court appointed counsel for Medina ( Rule 35 counsel).

¶ 12 The postconviction court set an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Medina's plea counsel testified that Medina waived the factual basis for the plea to enter into the plea agreement. Plea counsel also testified that Medina did so because while he may not have believed he was guilty of menacing, he nonetheless wanted to take advantage of the offer because it would result in the dismissal of his other pending cases and reduce his bond. Medina testified that he was innocent of the menacing charge but acknowledged his guilt in some of the other cases.

¶ 13 The postconviction court entered an order denying Medina's motion. The court found that Medina had waived the factual basis of the charge because he wanted to take advantage of the plea offer. The postconviction court alternatively found that, based on the arrest warrant and complaint to felony menacing, sufficient evidence in the record as a whole supported a factual basis.

¶ 14 On appeal, Medina contends that (1) due process requires that an Alford plea be supported by strong evidence in the record, a requirement that is not waivable; (2) the postconviction court erred by independently evaluating whether there was strong evidence for the basis of the plea from the entire record instead of vacating the plea based on what occurred at the providency hearing; and (3) there did not exist in the record strong evidence of his guilt.3 We do not address Medina's latter two contentions because we conclude that, under Colorado law, a defendant who enters an Alford plea accompanied with a plea agreement may waive a judicial finding that there was strong evidence of guilt in the record. Medina knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived such a finding when he entered the guilty plea as part of his plea agreement to the felony menacing charge.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 15 We review whether a guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent as a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Vicente-Sontay , 2014 COA 175, ¶ 52, 361 P.3d 1046. In the context of a Rule 35(c) motion, "we review the [postconviction] court's legal conclusions de novo but defer to the ... court's factual findings if they are supported by the record." People v. Corson , 2016 CO 33, ¶ 25, 379 P.3d 288 ; see also People v. Villanueva , 2016 COA 70, ¶ 28, 374 P.3d 535.

III. Requirement of "Strong" Evidence in the Record

¶ 16 Medina argues that (1) due process requires that the district court ensure that he intelligently concluded that his interests required entry of a guilty plea; and (2) because an Alford plea must be supported by "strong" evidence in the record, the district court erred by allowing Medina to waive this requirement. We disagree because Medina's waiver of a factual basis for the Alford plea when accompanied by a plea agreement does not violate due process of law.

¶ 17 The Due Process Clauses of both the United States and Colorado Constitutions require that a guilty plea be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. U.S. Const. amend. XIV ; Colo. Const. art. II, § XXV; see also Brady v. United States , 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) ; People v. Dist. Ct. , 868 P.2d 400, 403 (Colo. 1994).

¶ 18 In Colorado, a plea may be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent even if counsel enters the plea and waives a factual basis to the underlying offense when the defendant enters into a plea agreement. Crim. P. 11(a) authorizes "[a] defendant personally or by counsel" to plead guilty, not guilty, or, with consent of the court, nolo contendere. That rule also specifically authorizes a defendant to waive a factual basis if certain criteria are met by stating

(b) Pleas of Guilty and Nolo Contendere. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere without first determining that the defendant has been advised of all the rights set forth in Rule 5(a)(2) and also determining:
...
(6) That there is a factual basis for the plea. If the plea is entered as a result of a plea agreement, the court shall explain to the defendant, and satisfy itself that the defendant understands, the basis for the plea agreement, and the defendant may then waive the establishment of a factual basis for the particular charge to which he pleads[.]

Crim. P. 11(b)(6) (emphasis added). If a factual basis is waived, the requirement that such facts "be properly determined by (1) facts admitted to by the defendant, (2) facts or fact-finding stipulated to by the defendant, or (3) facts found by a jury" is inapplicable. People v. Rockwell , 125 P.3d 410, 418 (Colo. 2005).4

¶ 19...

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2 cases
  • People v. Medina
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Colorado
    • 23 Septiembre 2021
  • Medina v. People
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Colorado
    • 11 Septiembre 2023
    ...that under Alford, his plea was invalid because the trial court allowed him to waive proof of a factual basis.[3] People v. Medina, 2021 COA 124, ¶ 14, 501 P.3d 834, 837. A division of the court of appeals first noted that Crim. P. 11(b)(6) expressly permits a defendant to waive proof of a ......

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