People v. Medina

• Decision Date: 02 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 100437.,100437.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Poncho MEDINA, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

851 N.E.2d 1220

221 Ill.2d 394

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Poncho MEDINA, Appellant.

No. 100437.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 2, 2006.

Michael J. Pelletier and Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defenders, Jay Wiegman Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, and Sarah Lorraine Simpson, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

The defendant, Poncho Medina, was charged in the circuit court of Cook County with the offense of possession with intent to deliver more than 400 grams, but less than 900 grams, of a controlled substance (cocaine), in violation of section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Act) (720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2002)). Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty and was subsequently sentenced to 13 years' incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that (1) his conviction should be reversed because the record failed to demonstrate that he, personally, made the decision not to tender a lesser-included offense instruction; (2) the trial court failed to properly admonish him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (eff. October 1, 2001); and (3) his 13-year sentence of imprisonment — one year over the mandatory minimum authorized sentence — was excessive. The appellate court rejected those contentions and affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. No. 1-03-1704 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted the plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315), and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

On appeal, defendant contends that (1) his conviction must be reversed because the record fails to disclose that he, personally, made the ultimate decision not to tender a lesser-included offense instruction, and (2) this cause should be remanded to the circuit court for proper admonishments pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(a), because inadequate admonishments deprived him of his right to file a motion to reconsider his sentence. The following facts are pertinent to our disposition.

BACKGROUND

At defendant's jury trial, Chicago Police Officer Chris Moyer testified that he and his partner, Officer Jim Kubic, were on routine patrol at approximately 10 p.m. on July 29, 2002, when they observed defendant stop his car and hand a case of Corona beer to "kids" in an alley. Shortly thereafter, the officers effected a traffic stop. Although defendant had not been asked to do so, he immediately exited his car and walked back toward the officers, meeting them about two feet behind his car. Officer Moyer asked defendant if he had a driver's license, and defendant admitted he did not. He was placed under arrest, and subsequently admitted that he did not have insurance either. Officer Kubic spoke with the kids at the scene and determined that some were old enough to drink, while others were not.

After Officer Moyer placed defendant in Officer Kubic's custody, Moyer returned to defendant's vehicle to secure it for towing. While he was standing at the passenger-side window of the car, Moyer observed a "big brick object wrapped in tape." The object was in plain view on the front passenger-side floorboard of the vehicle. Moyer described the package as "about 12 inches long, about eight inches wide, * * * about two inches thick, * * * wrapped with a brown shipping tape." Based on his experience as a police officer, Moyer believed the package contained narcotics. He removed the package, cut it open, and discovered that it contained a compressed white powder, which he believed to be cocaine.

Moyer showed the package to his partner and then proceeded to the driver's side of defendant's vehicle. Upon opening the driver's door, Moyer discovered a beer bottle jammed between the driver's seat and the center console of the car. Under the driver's seat, he found a "big wad of money." Moyer stated: "It was all small bills, and it was as if somebody would take a handful of money and shove it under, grab more money, shove it under, it wasn't there in any order." The money under defendant's seat totaled $6,261.

Arthur Weathers, a forensic scientist employed by the Illinois State Police Crime Lab, testified that he received the package inventoried by Officer Moyer for analysis. After testing, he determined that the package and its contents weighed 557.9 grams, and the white substance therein was 40% pure cocaine.

Chicago Police Officer Romanda Ramirez was qualified and testified as a street drug expert. Ramirez stated that a typical user of cocaine would purchase approximately 0.2 grams, at a cost of $20. Cocaine sold on the street at the time of defendant's arrest was "anywhere between 15 and 25 percent pure." In his opinion, because of the large amount involved, and the high level of purity, the cocaine in this case was not for personal use. Ramirez testified that the cocaine in question had a street value of $139,475, and would have supplied between 5,579 and 11,000 persons, depending upon the extent to which the substance was further diluted prior to sale.

Following Ramirez's testimony, and a stipulation as to chain of custody, the State rested. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied. Defense counsel informed the court that counsel would not call defendant as a witness. The court then admonished defendant regarding his right to testify. Defendant indicated that he understood he had the right to testify, and he stated he did not wish to do so. The defense rested without presenting any evidence.

During the instruction conference, defense counsel was adamant that he did not want a lesser-included offense instruction submitted to the jury, and none was given. The record does not indicate whether defendant was present during the instruction conference.

In his closing argument to the jury, defense counsel revisited the theme he had pursued in his opening statement, arguing that the evidence did not show defendant knowingly possessed the drugs. The jury found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

At defendant's sentencing hearing, the trial court first denied defendant's motion for a new trial. Proceeding to sentencing, the parties agreed that the mandatory minimum sentence was 12 years' incarceration in the Department of Corrections. In aggravation, the State pointed out that defendant, an illegal alien, had on two occasions violated statutory provisions prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In mitigation, defense counsel suggested that defendant came to this country "to find a better life." Conceding that defendant was "in the country illegally," defense counsel speculated that defendant would "be deported to Mexico" as soon as he finished his sentence. Counsel asked for the minimum sentence. As noted, the trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years' imprisonment. After sentencing the defendant, the court advised the defendant that he had the right to appeal, and to do so, he had to file notice of appeal within 30 days. Defendant was not apprised of the necessity of filing a motion to reconsider sentence.

On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that his conviction should be reversed because (1) the record failed to demonstrate that he, personally, made the decision not to tender a lesser-included offense instruction; (2) the trial court failed to properly admonish him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(a); and (3) his sentence was excessive. The appellate court considered defendant's first issue, though the court believed it had not been properly preserved for review, and concluded that "the circuit court is not required to advise a defendant of the right to tender a lesser-included-offense instruction, to inquire whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived that decision, or to ensure that the defendant's decision on the matter is in the record." No. 1-03-1704 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Next, the appellate court rejected defendant's contention that his case should be remanded for proper Rule 605(a) admonishments. The court implicitly held that defendant was not prejudiced by inadequate admonishments because the court determined that it would consider defendant's excessive-sentence argument, notwithstanding defendant's failure to properly preserve the issue by filing a motion to reconsider sentence in the circuit court. The appellate court considered defendant's excessive-sentence issue, and found it to be without merit. No. 1-03-1704 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

ANALYSIS

We first consider defendant's contention that the record must disclose that he, personally, made the ultimate decision not to tender a lesser-included offense instruction. Initially, we note that defendant failed to raise this issue in a posttrial motion, and thus it is at least arguable that the defendant has forfeited the issue for purposes of appeal. See People v. Patterson, 217 Ill.2d 407, 443, 299 Ill.Dec. 157, 841 N.E.2d 889 (2005) (failure to include an issue in a posttrial motion results in forfeiture). Assuming, arguendo, that principles of procedural default apply in this context, this court has stated, on numerous occasions, that "[w]aiver is a limitation on the parties and not on the jurisdiction of this court." Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill.2d 141, 152, 290 Ill.Dec. 155, 821 N.E.2d 206 (2004), citing People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill.2d 319, 323, 228 Ill.Dec. 189, 688 N.E.2d 1166 (1997) (addressing defendant's argument that the circuit court erroneously refused his instruction on a...