People v. Medina

• Decision Date: 15 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. 2-92-0372,2-92-0372
• Citation: 607 N.E.2d 619,239 Ill.App.3d 871,180 Ill.Dec. 550
• Parties: , 180 Ill.Dec. 550 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Luis A. MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 619

607 N.E.2d 619

239 Ill.App.3d 871, 180 Ill.Dec. 550

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Luis A. MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-92-0372.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

Jan. 15, 1993.

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender; Kathleen T. Zellner, Kathleen T. Zellner and Associates, Naperville; Douglas H. Johnson; and Leonard J. Wojtecki, Trial Counsel, Aurora, for Luis A. Medina.

Gary V. Johnson, Kane County State's Atty., William L. Browers, John X. Breslin, Deputy Directors, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutors, Ottawa and Robert J. Morrow, Early, Collison, Tousey, Regan, Wlodek & Morrow, Elgin, for the People.

Presiding Justice INGLIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Luis Medina, was convicted after a bench trial of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1401), unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1402), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance without a controlled substance tax stamp (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 120, par. 2160). The tax stamp count was dismissed after trial, and judgment on the possession count was merged into the judgment and sentence on the possession with intent to deliver count. Defendant was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, and he filed a timely appeal.

In this court, defendant contends (1) that the trial court's denial of his request for a continuance denied him a fair trial where the State divulged the identity of a confidential informant only four days prior to trial; (2) that the trial court should not have limited his cross-examination of three law enforcement officers; (3) that the trial court should not have denied his second motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial; and (4) that the introduction of other crimes and prior bad acts evidence denied him a fair trial. We affirm.

The charges in this case were instituted after approximately nine kilograms of cocaine, along with drug paraphernalia, were found in a detached garage on defendant's property. The police were told on Friday, March 1, 1991, by a confidential informant Ronnie White, that a kilogram of cocaine was present in defendant's garage. White told the officers that more cocaine would be in the garage in the near future. On Sunday, March 3, 1991, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the garage and recovered approximately nine kilograms of cocaine. While the search was in progress, White met with an officer near the searched premises and gave the officer another kilogram of cocaine that White said he got from defendant's garage.

CONTINUANCE

Prior to trial, the State moved to prohibit the introduction of, or testimony concerning, the kilogram of cocaine delivered to law enforcement officers by White. Ten days later, and four days prior to the start of trial, the court denied the motion, and the State immediately thereafter moved to add White's name to the witness list as a possible rebuttal witness. On the morning of the first day of trial, defendant moved for a continuance based on the alleged late disclosure of White's identity as the confidential informant. The trial judge denied the motion, but gave defense counsel time to talk with White and stated that he would continue the trial if White revealed information warranting an investigation. White refused to talk with defense counsel, and the trial went forward as scheduled.

Defendant claims that the denial of his motion for a continuance denied him a fair trial because he was not given enough of an opportunity to "investigate the circumstances surrounding the informant's activities." Defendant goes on to characterize White as a crucial witness for the State and claims that the State purposefully delayed disclosure of White's identity. The State counters that defendant was not prejudiced by the denial and is thus not entitled to reversal.

Whether to grant a motion for a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, and the party contesting the denial of its motion must establish that the denial resulted in prejudice at trial. (People v. Dalzotto (1977), 55 Ill.App.3d 995, 999, 13 Ill.Dec. 767, 371 N.E.2d 859.) The particular facts and circumstances of the case are to be considered when deciding a motion for a continuance. (People v. Edwards (1988), 167 Ill.App.3d 324, 332, 118 Ill.Dec. 117, 521 N.E.2d 185.) "A continuance for the purpose of allowing defense counsel further time to prepare is not erroneously denied unless the denial serves to prejudice defendant in some way." Edwards, 167 Ill.App.3d at 332, 118 Ill.Dec. 117, 521 N.E.2d 185.

Here, defendant was not prejudiced by the denial of his motion for a continuance. A number of factors leads us to this conclusion.

First, defendant was given the opportunity to talk with White before trial with the understanding that defendant could obtain a continuance if White disclosed anything that warranted investigation. White refused to talk with defendant. It thus appears that the trial court was not merely attempting to speed the trial along in disregard of defendant's rights.

Second, defendant was able to question White about a number of relevant topics, including White's prior record and his experience as a drug dealer; White's agreement with the State, whereby he would escape punishment on drug charges if he "made" multikilogram drug cases; whether White owned and had given a cocaine press to defendant; and whether White himself planted the cocaine in defendant's garage. White's character and his motive to frame defendant to escape punishment on his own drug charges were laid bare before the trial judge as the finder of fact. Further, defense counsel made no claim at the conclusion of White's testimony that additional time or witnesses were required in order to present the defense properly.

Third and last, White was not called by the State. This was not a case in which the State called a just-disclosed witness and the defendant was ill-prepared to counter damaging testimony. Here, defendant could have avoided what he terms in his brief as Ron White's "attack" by not calling him to the stand.

The case of People v. Connor (1988), 176 Ill.App.3d 900, 126 Ill.Dec. 339, 531 N.E.2d 966, cited by defendant for the proposition that the identity of an informant can be required when the informant is also a participant in the crime, is distinguishable. In Connor, the defendants claimed they were entrapped at their trial on drug charges. The informant whose identity was not revealed had allegedly owed one of the defendants a legitimate business debt and had repeatedly failed to pay the debt, endangering that defendant's legitimate business. The informant had allegedly told the defendants that he could pay the debt if the defendants could obtain some cocaine for him. Connor, 176 Ill.App.3d at 902-05, 126 Ill.Dec. 339, 531 N.E.2d 966.

Here, in contrast to Connor, the informant's identity was revealed to defendant, who was then given wide latitude in exploring the informant's participation in the events giving rise to the charges against defendant. Moreover, the same kind of unique factual scenario present in Connor is not present in this case. Defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Defendant next claims that he was denied a fair trial when he was not allowed to cross-examine three law enforcement officers about their relationship with Ron White, the confidential informant. The State answers that defendant has again failed to show any prejudice from the court's ruling.

At trial, T.J. Strickland, a detective with the Elgin police department, testified as to his participation in the search of the garage on defendant's land and what that search uncovered. He also testified as to his interview with defendant in defendant's house after the search. Defense counsel was prohibited from cross-examining Detective Strickland about the detective's conversations and dealings with Ron White around the time of the procurement and execution of the search warrant. The trial judge ruled such inquiry beyond the scope of direct examination.

Kane County deputy sheriff Victor Fields also testified for the State as to his participation in the search and the questioning of defendant. Again, defendant was barred from asking Mr. Fields on cross-examination about Fields' contacts with Ron White during the investigation of defendant.

John Mann, an agent with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration testified for the State regarding the packaging and sale of cocaine. Defense counsel was allowed on cross-examination to question Mann about his receipt of the one kilogram of cocaine from White during the search.

Agent Mann was subsequently called as a witness for the defense, at which time defense counsel questioned Mann in detail about his contact with White. Mann also admitted knowledge that White had a deal with the State to work off charges against him and that White had been in defendant's garage on the day of the search.

Further, Detective Strickland was also called as a witness by the defense and questioned about Ron White's connection to the investigation. Deputy Fields was not called as a defense witness, although he was apparently available to testify.

Generally, cross-examination is limited to matters brought out on direct examination. (People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill.2d 78, 97, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743.) However, cross-examination may " 'develop all circumstances within the knowledge of the witness which explain, qualify, discredit or destroy his direct testimony although they may incidentally constitute new matter which aids the cross-examiner's case.' " (People v. Williams (1977), 66 Ill.2d 478, 486-87, 6 Ill.Dec. 854, 363 N.E.2d 801, quoting S. Gard, Illinois Evidence Manual ...