People v. Medlyn, Docket No. 177713

• Decision Date: 02 February 1996
• Docket Number: Docket No. 177713
• Citation: 544 N.W.2d 759,215 Mich.App. 338
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arthur MEDLYN, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 759

544 N.W.2d 759

215 Mich.App. 338

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arthur MEDLYN, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 177713.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 6, 1995, at Detroit.

Decided Feb. 2, 1996, at 9:20 a.m.

Released for Publication March 19, 1996.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Brian T. Moody, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the People.

Phillip D. Comorski, Detroit, for defendant.

Before MICHAEL J. KELLY, P.J., and REILLY and SOSNICK, ^* JJ.

MICHAEL J. KELLY, Presiding Judge.

Defendant was convicted by a jury in the 36th District Court on September 24, 1992, of wilful neglect of duty, M.C.L. § 750.478; M.S.A. § 28.746, and was sentenced to ninety days in jail. Defendant appealed as of right to the Detroit Recorder's Court. On June 20, 1994, the Recorder's Court reversed defendant's conviction. The prosecution appeals by leave granted.

On February 12, 1992, at 7:00 a.m., defendant commenced his shift as a Wayne County deputy sheriff on the fifth floor of the old jail. Unknown to defendant, the preceding night, Quentin Brooks, an inmate located in ward 502 on the fifth floor, had apparently been sexually assaulted while taking a shower.

Brooks testified that when he woke the next morning, his breakfast had already been delivered and there were no deputies around. He testified that when defendant came to his ward later that morning to serve lunch, he told defendant, "Officer, I been beaten and sexually abused." According to Brooks, defendant replied, "Ain't nothing wrong with you."

Brooks further testified that, after three days passed, he began to be raped daily by the same two men in his ward, and they threatened to kill him if he told anyone about the assaults. Brooks was transferred to another ward on March 13, 1992, when he was found beaten and raped in his cell. Brooks never told any deputy, other than defendant, about the assaults. He was released on May 6, 1992.

The district court jury convicted defendant of wilful neglect of duty. On appeal to the Recorder's Court, defendant argued that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain a conviction of wilful neglect of duty based on nothing more than an omission to perform a duty. The Recorder's Court agreed and reversed defendant's conviction in a one-page opinion, concluding that the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

The people argue that the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Brooks reported the sexual assault to defendant, and that defendant, under a legal duty to affirmatively act on, investigate, and process that information, wilfully and deliberately did nothing, which was proof enough to satisfy the statute.

Defendant argues that when "wilfulness" is used in a criminal statute, some element of "bad purpose" or "evil intention" must be present to make the conduct subject to criminal sanction--a mere accidental, inadvertent, or negligent violation is insufficient.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 525, 489 N.W.2d 748 (1992). Questions of law are reviewed de novo by this Court. People v. Conner, 209 Mich.App. 419, 423, 531 N.W.2d 734 (1995).

M.C.L. § 750.478; M.S.A. § 28.746 provides:

When any duty is or shall be enjoined by law upon any public officer, or upon any person holding any public trust or employment, every wilful neglect to perform such duty, where no special provision shall have been made for the punishment of such delinquency, shall be deemed a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail.

There is no dispute that defendant was a public officer, that he had a duty to report any allegations made by inmates to him, or that inmate Brooks was in fact sexually assaulted. Rather, the disputed issues are (1) whether Brooks actually said anything to defendant about the assault, and (2) if so, whether defendant "wilfully" failed to report Brooks' statement, or whether the fact that the statement went unreported was merely a nonculpable oversight.

The crux of this case hinges on what "wilful" means in the context of M.C.L. § 750.478; M.S.A. § 28.746. Few appellate cases are annotated under this particular statute; the only case located that discusses this aspect of the statute is People v. Bommarito, 33 Mich.App. 385, 190 N.W.2d 359 (1971). Bommarito does not address the defendant's "mental state" or "culpability"; rather, the case focuses upon the actions of the defendant--did he do what he was obligated to do? The case is not helpful with regard to the parameters of a failure to act.

Both the parties and the district court relied on Detroit v. Pillon, 18 Mich.App. 373, 171 N.W.2d 484 (1969), a prosecution for income tax evasion. In Pillon, the defendant was found guilty of "wilful failure to pay taxes due." On appeal, Pillon asserted that criminal sanctions may not be used to enforce payment of city taxes and that, although he refused to pay his taxes to test the ordinance, his conduct could not be termed "wilful" for penal purposes. This Court said, at p. 376, 171 N.W.2d 484.

We agree that some element of a "bad purpose" must be present to make the conduct subject to criminal sanctions. We conclude, however, that it is a sufficiently "bad purpose" that a taxpayer deliberately not pay the tax due when he knew he ought to pay.

One other relevant case is People v. Harrell, 54 Mich.App. 554, 221 N.W.2d 411 (1974). There, the defendant was convicted of fleeing and eluding a police officer, M.C.L. § 750.479(a); M.S.A. § 28.747(1). The defendant challenged the exclusion of testimony that, two nights before the incident in question, the defendant had been beaten by the police. The Court of Appeals, at p. 561, 221 N.W.2d 411, found no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Whatever may have been the defendant's motive for attempting to elude the police officers, both his own testimony and that of his companion clearly demonstrates that he did so voluntarily, consciously, and intentionally. The mere fact that he did, intentionally and knowingly, what the statute forbids is sufficient to warrant the finding that he acted willfully.

Harrell supports the proposition that actions that are "voluntarily, consciously, and intentionally" undertaken may be sufficient to constitute "wilfulness," even though the actions may have been taken from a "pure" or "good faith" motive. But Harrell does not establish that mere failure totake action is insufficient to support a criminal conviction absent a showing of a "bad purpose."

In People v. McCarty, 303 Mich. 629, 6 N.W.2d 919 (1942), the defendant was convicted of "wilfully, burning his personal property." The Court stated at p. 633, 6 N.W.2d 919 that the statute

required, in order to find the fire was wilfully set by defendant, that he knowingly and stubbornly and for the alleged unlawful purpose set the same. This excludes mere carelessness or accident.

Defendant also cites United States v. Smith, 815 F.2d 24 (C.A.6, 1987), in which the defendant, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, was charged with indirect criminal contempt arising out of his disclosure of investigative reports to a news reporter. The case merely restates that wilfulness requires a bad purpose. Although there are numerous cases discussing "wilfulness" in the context of committing a criminal act, such analysis is not compellingly transferable to an element of "wilfulness" where the crime is a failure to act.

The trial court instructed the jury, in essence, that a "bad purpose" was essential for criminal liability, but that the "bad purpose" element could be met upon a mere showing that defendant failed to do what he was obligated by his job description to do. That job description was supplied by deputy supervisor Jimmy Byrd, Director of Programs for the Wayne County Sheriff's Department. Referring to the people's exhibit I, the Wayne County Sheriff's Department policy manual, and the people's exhibit II, the Wayne County Jail operating manual, Byrd testified that a deputy sheriff in defendant's position had a...