People v. Medrano

• Docket Number: 2d Crim. B324567
• Decision Date: 22 January 2024
• Citation: People v. Medrano, 2d Crim. B324567 (Cal. App. Jan 22, 2024)
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VINCENT MEDRANO, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VINCENT MEDRANO, Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B324567

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

January 22, 2024

Superior Court County No. CR28216 of Ventura Michele M Castillo, Judge

Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, William Quest, Snr. Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION ON REHEARING

YEGAN, J.

Vincent Medrano again appeals an order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.^[1] The order was made at the prima facie stage of the proceedings. This is his second petition for resentencing.

In 1991 appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder with a multiple-death special-circumstances finding (§§ 187, 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), two counts of attempted first degree murder (§§ 664/187, 189), and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder (§ 182). The jury found true allegations that a principal in the commission of the offenses had been armed with a firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) Appellant was sentenced to prison for 50 years to life plus one year for a firearm enhancement. In 1994 we affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion, People v. Medrano (Jul. 26, 1994, B065832).

In 2019 appellant filed his first section 1172.6 petition. After issuing an order to show cause, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d). The trial court denied the petition, and we affirmed in People v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, hereafter referred to as "Medrano" or "our 2021 opinion." We held "that section [1172.6] relief is unavailable to a petitioner [such as appellant] concurrently convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder where both convictions involve the same victim" because the "[c]onviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder shows, as a matter of law, that the 'target offense' is murder . . . ." (Id. at p. 179.)

In the present appeal we conclude that the above holding is the law of the case and conclusively establishes at the prima facie stage that appellant is not entitled to resentencing based on his second 1172.6 petition. Accordingly, we again affirm.

Our conclusion may be at variance with the holding of People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 (Harden): "[P]rior to [an evidentiary] hearing under section [1172.6], subdivision (d)(3), the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot conclusively establish disentitlement [to relief under section 1172.6]." We explain below why the holding of Harden is inapplicable here. We also explain why our conclusion is consistent with People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel).)

Facts

The following facts are taken from Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 179: Appellant and Carlos Vargas purchased a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle. Appellant "scored" the "tip" of the rifle's bullets in the belief that "the scoring would make the bullets more explosive." As overt act No. 7 underlying the conspiracy charge, the jury found that appellant, Vargas, Edward Throop, and Joseph Scholle had "discussed among themselves committing a drive-by shooting."^[2] Vargas drove them to Cabrillo Village in Ventura County. "Throop held the rifle and sat in the back seat next to appellant." Throop pointed the rifle out the window and fired multiple shots at a group of people attending a baptism party. As Vargas drove away, Scholle shouted the names of rival gangs. Two men attending the baptism party died of gunshot wounds. Two other men were shot but survived.

Senate Bill No. 1437 Eliminated the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine as a Basis for Murder Liability

Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437) became effective on January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) It "imposed a new requirement that, except in cases of felony murder, 'a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought' to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) 'Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.' [Citation.] One effect of this requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [Citation.] '[U]nder the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an accomplice is guilty not only of the offense he or she directly aided or abetted (i.e., the target offense), but also of any other offense committed by the direct perpetrator that was the "natural and probable consequence" of the crime the accomplice aided and abetted (i.e., the nontarget offense). [Citation.] A nontarget offense is the natural and probable consequence of a target offense "if, judged objectively, the [nontarget] offense was reasonably foreseeable." [Citation.] . . .' . . . Thus, under prior law, a defendant who aided and abetted an intended assault could be liable for murder, if the murder was the natural and probable consequence of the intended assault. [Citation.] The defendant need not have intended the murder or even subjectively appreciated the natural and probable consequences of the intended crime. [Citation.] [S.B.] 1437 ended this form of liability for murder." (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)

Section 1172.6 and Its Legislative History

Section 1172.6 was added to the Penal Code by S.B. 1437. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) originally provided, "A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when" certain conditions apply.

Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6 was amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (S.B. 775). (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) S.B. 775 added the following ground for relief to section 1172.6, subdivision (a): the petitioner's murder conviction was pursuant to a "theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in a crime." S.B. 775 also amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to expand eligibility for resentencing to persons convicted of "attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine." One of the conditions for relief under amended section 1172.6 is that "[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." (Id., subd. (a)(3).)

After a section 1172.6 petition is filed, "the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause." (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) "At the prima facie stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner's allegation that he or she could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, unless the allegation is refuted by the record. [Citation.] And this allegation is not refuted by the record unless the record conclusively establishes every element of the offense. If only one element of the offense is established by the record, the petitioner could still be correct that he or she could not currently be convicted of the relevant offense based on the absence of other elements." (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)

If an order to show cause is issued, the court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the petitioner's eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the evidentiary hearing the burden is on the People "to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder . . . ." (Id., subd. (d)(3).)

Our 2021 Medrano Opinion

In our 2021 opinion we noted that "[t]he jury [at appellant's trial] was instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine." (Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 182.) Despite this instruction, we concluded: "The prosecutor met his burden [at the evidentiary hearing] of proving, 'beyond a reasonable doubt, that [appellant] is ineligible for resentencing.' (§ [1172.6], subd. (d)(3).) Appellant's conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder rendered him ineligible as a matter of law. The conviction established that he had not been 'convicted of . . . [first degree] murder under a natural and probable consequences theory.' (§ [1172.6], subd. (a).) He was convicted of first degree murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory, i.e., he knew and shared the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator, Throop." (Id., at p. 186.)

The Second Section 1172.6 Petition

Appellant filed a second section 1172.6 petition (the petition at issue in this appeal) after the effective date of the amendment of that section by S.B. 775. In the trial court he asserted "This petition is based on S.B. 775, which amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to include [as grounds for relief], in addition to felony-murder or murder under the [natural and probable consequences] doctrine, any 'other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in a crime.'" Appellant argued that he had made a prima facie showing that he was convicted of murder pursuant to a theory under which malice had been imputed to him based solely on his participation in the drive-by shootings. In addition, he argued that he had...