People v. Mehall

• Decision Date: 12 September 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. 173820
• Citation: 539 N.W.2d 593,213 Mich.App. 353
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas Dunn MEHALL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 593

539 N.W.2d 593

213 Mich.App. 353

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas Dunn MEHALL, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 173820.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 23, 1995, at Lansing.

Decided Sept. 12, 1995, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication Nov. 17, 1995.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Brian L. Mackie, Prosecuting Attorney, and Allison L. Bates, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the People.

Arthur R. Butler, Plymouth, for defendant.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and JANSEN and O'CONNELL, JJ.

HOLBROOK, Presiding Judge.

Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. § 750.520b(1)(f); M.S.A. § 28.788(2)(1)(f). At trial, defendant unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the people's proofs. Defendant then rested without presenting any testimony. Following approximately five hours of deliberation, the jury informed the court that it was deadlocked, and visiting Washtenaw Circuit Court Judge Thomas Roumell declared a mistrial on grounds of manifest necessity. Defendant immediately renewed his motion for a directed verdict, but Judge Roumell declined to address it. Approximately three weeks later, defendant moved again for a directed verdict of acquittal before Washtenaw Circuit Court Judge Donald Shelton, to whom the case was next assigned. Judge Shelton ruled that the motion must be heard by the judge who presided at trial, and docketed it for a hearing before Judge Roumell. At a hearing, Judge Roumell made findings on the record and granted the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because of the insufficiency of the evidence with regard to both counts. The people appeal as of right.

I

The gravamen of this appeal is whether a trial court is authorized to grant a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal after a mistrial is declared on the basis of a hung jury, and, if so, whether the prosecutor's appeal of such a ruling is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const., Am. V, and the Michigan Constitution, Const. 1963, art. 1, § 15. The prosecutor argues that, because no court rule expressly authorizes a postmistrial motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, Judge Roumell lacked authority to grant such a motion. The prosecutor further argues that, even if Judge Roumell was authorized to grant the motion, this Court should vacate defendant's "acquittal" and remand for a retrial because Judge Roumell erred in granting the motion on the basis that the complainant's testimony was not credible. Defendant argues that Judge Roumell had authority under the staff comments to MCR 6.419(B) to grant the motion and that his acquittal is not reviewable under the Double Jeopardy Clause. We conclude that MCR 6.419 authorizes such a motion, and that under these facts the people's appeal must be dismissed.

A

In Michigan, MCR 6.419 sets forth the procedure for motions for a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case:

(A) Before Submission to Jury. After the prosecutor has rested the prosecution's case in chief and before the defendant presents proofs, the court on its own initiative may, or on the defendant's motion must, direct a verdict of acquittal on any charged offense as to which the evidence is insufficient to support conviction. The court may not reserve decision on the defendant's motion. If the defendant's motion is made after the defendant presents proofs, the court may reserve decision on the motion, submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion before or after the jury has completed its deliberations.

(B) After Jury Verdict. After a jury verdict, the defendant may file an original or renewed motion for directed verdict of acquittal in the same manner as provided by MCR 6.431(A) for filing a motion for a new trial.

(C) Conditional New Trial Ruling. If the court grants a directed verdict of acquittal after the jury has returned a guilty verdict, it must also conditionally rule on any motion for a new trial by determining whether it would grant the motion if the directed verdict of acquittal is vacated or reversed.

(D) Explanation of Rulings on Record. The court must state orally on the record or in a written ruling made a part of the record its reasons for granting or denying a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and for conditionally granting or denying a motion for a new trial.

The staff comment to MCR 6.419 provides:

MCR 6.419 is a new rule.

Subrule (A) is based on 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 15-3.5(b) and is consistent with existing practice except for the provision prohibiting the court from reserving decision on a defense motion for directed verdict made at the close of the prosecution's proofs. This rule does not state the standard of proof that the court must apply in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. The standard is constitutional and it is therefore left to case law. See People v. Hampton, 407 Mich 354 [285 NW2d 284 (1979), cert den 449 US 885, 101 S.Ct. 239, 66 L.Ed.2d 110 (1980) ].

Subrule (B) pertains to motions for directed verdict of acquittal made after the jury verdict. It incorporates by reference the same postconviction procedures that a defendant may use to move for a new trial. This rule does not impose any time limits on a motion for directed verdict of acquittal in the event that the jury does not reach a verdict and is discharged.

Subrule (C) is derived from MCR 2.610(C), which requires the court to rule conditionally on any motion for new trial in the event that it grants a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Subrule (D) is derived from the provisions in MCR 2.610(B)(3) and (C)(1) requiring the court to place on the record the reasons for its rulings.

Contrary to defendant's claim, we find subrule B to be inapplicable where a mistrial based on a hung jury has been declared. Subrule B, by its own terms, governs where a jury verdict has been returned; obviously, no verdict has been returned where a mistrial is declared because of jury deadlock. Moreover, while the staff comments to subrule B appear to support defendant's interpretation, the comments cannot be deemed authoritative where they appear to contradict the plain language of the subrule that they are meant to clarify. See MCR 1.101.

Instead, our reading of MCR 6.419 leads us to conclude that subrule A provides authority to trial courts to direct a verdict of acquittal after a mistrial based on a hung jury has been declared. The second sentence of subrule A expressly provides that the court may reserve decision regarding such a motion made at the close of all evidence, submit the case to the jury, and then "decide the motion before or after the jury has completed its deliberations." (Emphasis added.) Because it is not patently clear that this language incorporates the circumstance where a mistrial is declared on the basis of a hung jury, we must attempt to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Michigan Supreme Court in drafting the rule. See People v. McCoy, 189 Mich.App. 201, 204, 471 N.W.2d 648 (1991).

The staff comment to subrule A states that it is primarily based on 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 15-3.5(b), which provides:

(b) If the defendant's motion [for judgment of acquittal] is made at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution, the court may not reserve decision on the motion. If the defendant's motion is made at the close of all the evidence, the court may reserve decision on the motion, submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. [Emphasis added.]

The commentary explains the rationale for Standard 15-3.5(b):

The first sentence of paragraph (b) rests upon the notion that a defendant who moves for acquittal at the end of the government's case should have the benefit of a ruling on that motion prior to electing whether or not to present evidence on his or her own behalf....

The second sentence of this paragraph permits a court to reserve decision on a motion made at the end of all the evidence. The objection stated above is not present in this situation, and it is better to expressly recognize the power of a judge to render a decision on the motion even after the jury has returned a guilty verdict or has been discharged without having returned a verdict. This portion of the standard, based on rule 29(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, expressly recognizes the propriety of what often is referred to as a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This practice is currently recognized in some but not all jurisdictions. The arguments against the practice--that there is a possibility of abuse by the courts and that it is unfair to confront the prosecution with an unappealable acquittal after a jury conviction--are not persuasive. On the contrary, it is desirable that a court not lose its power to direct a verdict once the jury retires and that it not be thereafter confined to granting a new trial. [3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 15-3.5(b), Commentary, pp. 15-92--15-97.]

Thus, Standard 15-3.5(b) clearly authorizes a trial court to consider a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal after a mistrial based on a hung jury is declared, notwithstanding certain policy arguments to the contrary.

Notably, the commentary to Standard 15-3.5 states that it is patterned after F.R.Crim.P. 29. Michigan rules of procedure and evidence are generally modeled after the federal rules, Shields v. Reddo, 432 Mich. 761, 784, 443 N.W.2d 145 (1989), and, in the absence of state authority, this Court may properly look to comparable federal rules (and cases interpreting those rules) to ascertain the intent of a given state rule, ...