People v. Meier

Citation209 N.W.2d 311,47 Mich.App. 179
Decision Date22 May 1973
Docket NumberDocket No. 12945,No. 3,3
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Joseph MEIER, Defendant-Appellant
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan (US)

R. Wayne Miller, Bay City, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Eugene C. Penzien, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before DANHOF, P.J., and HOLBROOK and BASHARA, JJ.

HOLBROOK, Judge.

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder in the homicide of one Robert J. Ryers, contrary to M.C.L.A. § 75.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. The homicide was the result of a shooting that took place in a bar in Bay City on April 11, 1971. The jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal defendant raises ten assignments of error, some of which we have consolidated for brevity's sake.

I

Did the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder based on the claim that no evidence of premeditation was presented, violate defendant's due process rights by denying him a fair trial?

Defendant claimed below and asserts again on appeal that there was inadequate evidence of premeditation, which is an essential element in a charge of first-degree murder, and therefore he could not be tried for first-degree murder. M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548; People v. Morrin, 31 Mich.App. 301, 324, 187 N.W.2d 434, footnote 29 (1971); People v. De Ruyscher, 29 Mich.App. 515, 516, 185 N.W.2d 561 (1971); People v. Marshall, 366 Mich. 498, 501, 115 N.W.2d 309 (1962). If the defendant's claim is correct the fact that he was convicted of second-degree murder is irrelevant, since the jury might have compromised between a choice of first-degree murder and second-degree murder when it returned the latter verdict. People v. Hansen, 368 Mich. 344, 353, 118 N.W.2d 422 (1962).

Whether the defendant premeditated the shooting of the decedent is generally, of course, a question of fact for the jury. 96 A.L.R.2d 1435. If there was No evidence from which the jury could draw a reasonable inference of premeditation, then the question should not properly have been placed before the jury. Morrin, supra. These principles are not easily applied because premeditation, as an element of first-degree murder, is a subjective mental state or condition or, more properly, a thought process, and therefore may only be established by deduction or inference from the circumstances under which the killing was committed. The mere Act of killing alone, without proof of more, will not support a finding of premeditation. People v. Potter, 5 Mich. 1, 7 (1858); 86 A.L.R.2d 656. On the other hand, what circumstances, if shown, will constitute proof of premeditation is a question without a consistent answer, simply because no two murders, or murderers, are alike. Moreover, premeditation does not render itself to so lucid a definition that the trier of fact has a simple premise upon which to apply the facts to reach a logical conclusion.

This Court's most recent and studied attempt to bring some clarity to the confusing issue of premeditation is contained in People v. Morrin, 31 Mich.App. 301, 329--330, 187 N.W.2d 434, 449 (1971). There Judge Levin 1 extensively analyzed the varied elements that compose a violation of M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. As for premeditation and deliberation he said:

'To premeditate is to think about beforehand; to deliberate is to measure and evaluate the major facets of a choice or problem. As a number of courts have pointed out, premeditation and deliberation characterize a thought process undisturbed by hot blood. While the minimum time necessary to exercise this process is incapable of exact determination, the interval between initial thought and ultimate action should be long enough to afford a reasonable man time to subject the nature of his response to a 'second look'.'

In Morrin the Court found that the prosecution did not meet its burden to show premeditation where the defendant was the only witness to the killing, and he had alleged that he struck the decedent several times with tongs he used in his work after the decedent threatened to cut Morrin's throat if he did not perform an oral sexual act upon him. The Court felt it significant that there was no prior relationship between the parties that would tend to show motive, that the murder weapon was not acquired or positioned in preparation for homicide, that there was nothing in the record proving that defendant had taken the decedent to the secluded location for an illicit purpose, that the circumstances of the killing and the events preceding it were equivocal, and that Morrin's conduct subsequent to the assault was neither coherent nor organized enough to suggest it occupied a place in a scheme or plan deliberated and premeditated upon before the murder. Judges Fitzgerald and T. M. Burns concurred with Judge Levin in the disposition of the case. Leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was denied. People v. Morrin, 385 Mich. 775 (1971).

While Morrin provided a scholarly exposition of the elements of first-degree murder, it did not halt disagreements on this Court when new factual circumstances in other murder cases came before us for review. In People v. Watkins, 36 Mich.App. 380, 193 N.W.2d 914 (1971), this writer with the concurrence of Judge R. B. Burns affirmed a second-degree murder conviction over the objection that the jury was improperly allowed to consider a first-degree murder charge, because allegedly there was no evidence of premeditation. In Watkins the defendant and decedent were at a jovial gathering in defendant's apartment, and both apparently in a friendly mood with each other throughout most of the evening. At some point defendant opened a bedroom door and told a couple of the guests in the bedroom that 'you better come and get this mother * * * before I kill him'. Defendant thereupon left the door open. One of the people in the bedroom testified at one point in the trial that defendant returned minutes later, and then at a later point in the trial said defendant returned seconds later, to report that he had cut the decedent. We found at pp. 388--389, 193 N.W.2d at p. 917.

'(T)hat the testimony produced at trial would justify a finding by the jury that defendant deliberately formed in his mind beforehand the intent to kill the deceased. As a result of this determination, we are constrained to rule, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the people, that the jury could also have determined that sufficient time had elapsed between the time defendant deliberately formed in his mind the intent to kill the deceased and the act of stabbing the deceased which caused his death, to justify a finding of premeditation.'

Judge Levin dissented, citing his opinion in Morrin, supra, and supporting authority therein. His main objection with this writer's opinion was that he thought that the testimony showed that defendant had appeared at the doorway twice with an interval of only a few seconds in between, which he thought was an insufficient time during which there could be premeditation of murder under M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. Our difference of opinion with Judge Levin in Watkins, then, was primarily a disagreement over whether or not the jury could reasonably conclude from the testimony, admittedly not altogether consistent, that sufficient time had elapsed for the defendant to premeditate and deliberate the murder of the decedent. This writer does not believe there was a wide divergence of opinion about the appropriate standard to test premeditation upon in Watkins as it was before us then, but rather that the disagreement arose over the credibility, weight, and substance of the testimony that described the circumstances to which the standard would be applied. This view is supported by the fact that Watkins was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, three Justices believing there was No evidence of premeditation, and three Justices believing that not only was there at least some evidence of premeditation, but that it was of sufficient character to allow the jury to consider the first-degree murder charge. People v. Watkins, 388 Mich. 717, 202 N.W.2d 780 (1972). Unfortunately, the division of the Supreme Court in Watkins in essence echoed the disagreement existent in our own Court, so that no definite guidelines against which to weigh evidence to establish premeditation can be discerned from the Supreme Court opinions. Both sides in the Supreme Court did, at least, reaffirm the principle that premeditation can be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances.

Subsequent to Watkins a different panel of this Court consisting of Judges McGregor, Fitzgerald and Quinn decided People v. Banks, 37 Mich.App. 280, 281, 194 N.W.2d 488 (1971). There defendant's conviction for first-degree murder was reversed on the grounds that the prosecutor had introduced no evidence to 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was premeditation and deliberation and such a lapse of time as would give the mind time to calculate the purpose and intent of the killing'. The rule as briefly enunciated is fully consistent with that of prior cases.

In People v. Horn, 41 Mich.App. 755, 201 N.W.2d 107 (1972) Judges R. B. Burns and Gillis affirmed the first-degree murder conviction of a defendant over the contention that there was no evidence of premeditation. Defendant there was observed beating the victim with a pipe across the back when asked to surrender the pipe by a witness. The witness left to hide the pipe and on returning discovered defendant stabbing the victim with a screwdriver. On request the defendant surrendered the screwdriver to the witness who then left to hide it. The defendant was thereafter seen striking the victim with a chair. When the chair...

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