People v. Mendoza
| Decision Date | 22 November 1993 |
| Citation | 624 N.E.2d 1017,604 N.Y.S.2d 922,82 N.Y.2d 415 |
| Parties | , 624 N.E.2d 1017 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rafael MENDOZA, Also Known as Raphael Mendoza, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ramon MARTINEZ, Appellant. In the Matter of GEORGE J., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Darius COLEMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Kenneth Finkelman and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for appellant in the first above-entitled action.
Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. of New York County, New York City (Robert C.F. Reuland and Nikki Kowalski, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.
E. Joshua Rosenkranz and Diana L. Fogle, New York City, for appellant in the second above-entitled action.
Robert T. Johnson, Dist. Atty. of Bronx County, New York City (Howard B. Sterinbach, Peter D. Coddington and Billie Manning, of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.
Kenneth Rabb, Lenore Gittis and Lance Dandridge, New York City, for appellant in the third above-entitled proceeding.
O. Peter Sherwood, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Julian L. Kalkstein and Larry A. Sonnenshein, of counsel), for respondent in the third above-entitled proceeding.
Diane Pazar and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for appellant in the fourth above-entitled action.
These appeals center on the statutory requirement that a motion to suppress "contain sworn allegations of fact" (CPL 710.60[1]. In each case, the trial court summarily denied a suppression motion and the Appellate Division affirmed because the motion did not satisfy the statutory requirement, placing before us the legal question of what constitutes factual sufficiency for purposes of a suppression motion.
The issue is best understood by first outlining the governing statute, CPL 710.60. When made before trial, suppression motions must be in writing, state the legal ground of the motion and "contain sworn allegations of fact," made by defendant or "another person." The factual allegations may be based upon personal knowledge or information and belief, so long as the sources of information and grounds for belief are stated. The prosecutor may then file an answer admitting or denying the movant's allegations (see, CPL 710.60[1].
Based on these papers, the court must decide whether to summarily grant or deny the motion, or conduct a hearing. The motion must be summarily granted if defendant's papers satisfy the foregoing requirements and the People concede the material factual allegations, or if the People agree not to offer the evidence sought to be suppressed (CPL 710.60[2]. On the other hand, the motion may be summarily denied if defendant does not allege a proper legal basis for suppression, or (with two exceptions) if the "sworn allegations of fact do not as a matter of law support the ground alleged" (CPL 710.60[3][b].
If the motion is not determined summarily, the court must conduct a hearing and make the necessary findings of fact (CPL 710.60[4]. And whether or not a hearing was conducted, the court must upon determining the motion set forth its findings of fact, conclusions of law and the reasons for its determination (CPL 710.60[6].
The two exceptions to the court's authority to summarily deny suppression motions for lack of adequate factual allegations relate to motions to suppress statements as involuntarily made (Huntley motions) or an identification stemming from an improper procedure (Wade) (CPL 710.60[3][b]. Accordingly, the sufficiency of the movant's factual allegations most often arises on motions to suppress tangible evidence Mapp or other evidence as the fruit of an unlawful seizure Dunaway, as in the appeals before us.
Hearings are not automatic or generally available for the asking by boilerplate allegations. Rather, as will be discussed, we conclude that factual sufficiency should be determined with reference to the face of the pleadings, the context of the motion and defendant's access to information. We now turn to the facts of the present appeals.
Defendant was arrested and indicted for various crimes stemming from an alleged sale of drugs. In response to defendant's demand for a bill of particulars, the prosecutor averred that on October 21, 1990, at approximately 3:15 P.M. at a specified Bronx location, defendant sold cocaine to an undercover officer in exchange for prerecorded "buy money." Thereafter, according to the bill of particulars, the undercover left and radioed the field team, which responded to the scene about five minutes later. Defendant fled, grabbing and swinging an occupied baby stroller, and was finally arrested after a struggle. A search revealed the buy money and more cocaine, and defendant allegedly stated that he was using the baby as a shield because he feared being shot.
Defendant then filed an omnibus motion seeking, among other things, hearings to suppress the statement and physical evidence. In support of the Mapp branch of the motion, defense counsel affirmed, on information and belief:
Opposing the Mapp hearing, the People argued that defendant's motion was factually deficient as it focused on the "very moment" of arrest but failed to address his activities five minutes earlier, when he allegedly sold drugs. While granting a Huntley hearing, Supreme Court summarily denied the Mapp motion, explaining that the moving papers failed to set forth any factual issue requiring a hearing.
Defendant was convicted upon a guilty plea and a divided Appellate Division affirmed, holding that defendant's motion papers "consisted solely of legal conclusions and conclusory allegations" 187 A.D.2d 310, 310, 589 N.Y.S.2d 449. The dissenting Justice opined that defendant's papers alleged sufficient facts to require a hearing, and granted defendant leave to appeal to this Court. Matter of George J.
Respondent, a juvenile, was arrested on March 7, 1990 and charged with acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance. Annexed to the juvenile delinquency petition was a supporting deposition of an undercover officer, who stated that at 5:15 P.M. he purchased four vials of crack from respondent. A second supporting deposition, that of the arresting officer, stated that respondent was removed from a nearby community center at about 5:20 P.M. and identified by the undercover officer.
Respondent's counsel moved to suppress the show-up identification on two theories: that it was suggestive Wade and as the fruit of an unlawful seizure Dunaway. In connection with the Dunaway branch of the motion, the affirmation in support averred that
The presentment agency opposed suppression and Family Court entertained oral argument on the motion. After considering the parties' arguments, the court summarily denied the motion, concluding that "[i]nsufficient evidence has been presented by the respondent to require a suppression hearing on this issue." Respondent was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent after a fact-finding hearing.
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, holding that respondent's motion stated only conclusory legal grounds for relief which were not supported by sufficient factual allegations. This Court granted respondent leave to appeal.
Defendant was arrested on a Manhattan street and indicted for criminal possession of a loaded firearm. The People supplied defendant with a disclosure form indicating that $353 in cash and a gun were obtained from him, and that an identification took place at the scene; a postarrest written statement was annexed in which defendant denied any connection to the gun.
Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the statement, identification and tangible evidence. In support of the Mapp motion, defense counsel averred:
"Upon information and belief, based upon conversations with Mr. Coleman, the defendant was not engaged in any criminal activity on August 21, 1990. Nor had he given the police any probable cause to believe that he might be engaged in unlawful behavior. Nevertheless, at about 12:15 a.m., police arrived, threw him against a car, and began to search him. The police contend, and in conversations with affirmant, Mr. Coleman concedes, a quantity of over $300 in cash was seized from his person. The police additionally contend that Mr. Coleman was observed by them to throw down a loaded .22 caliber pistol upon their approach. Although Mr. Coleman denies this allegation, the allegation by the prosecution's witnesses that the defendant was seen in actual possession of the item is sufficient to confer standing on the defense to challenge the alleged seizure (People v. Sutton, 91 A.D.2d 522, 456 N.Y.S.2d 771 [1st Dept.1983]. Affirmant alleges that if the weapon was discarded by the defendant, this action only occurred as a result of illegal police conduct--that is, the detention and arrest of Mr. Coleman on less than reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime (See People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 408 N.E.2d 908). The...
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