People v. Messenger, 3–13–0581.
| Citation | 40 N.E.3d 417 |
| Decision Date | 01 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 3–13–0581.,3–13–0581. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Joshua E. MESSENGER, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier and Gavin J. Dow (argued), both of State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for appellant.
Trish Joyce, State's Attorney, Morrison (Mark A. Austill and Justin Nicolosi (argued), both of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 A Whiteside County jury convicted defendant, Joshua Messenger, of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12–3.05(c) (West 2012)). The trial court later sentenced him to 10 years in prison. Defendant does not dispute that the State's evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed a battery. The sole overarching issue before us is whether defendant was properly convicted of aggravated battery on the theory that the area inside the Whiteside County jail—where defendant committed the battery at issue—was “public property” within the meaning of section 12–3.05 (c) of the Criminal Code of 2012. Id.
¶ 2 Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated battery; (2) the trial court erred by taking judicial notice that a cell block in a county jail is public property; and (3) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury. We affirm the trial court's ruling.
¶ 4 In January 2013, the State charged defendant with aggravated battery. The State alleged that defendant's battery of another inmate, while they were both incarcerated at the Whiteside County jail, constituted aggravated battery because the jail is “public property” as contemplated by section 12–3.05(c) of the Criminal Code. Id. At trial, defendant argued: (1) the victim consented to the contact and therefore the battery was not insulting or provoking; and (2) the jail is inaccessible to the public and thus, not “public property” under the aggravated battery statute.
¶ 5 Before trial, the State filed a motion, requesting the trial court take judicial notice that the Whiteside County jail is public property. During trial, but outside the presence of the jury, the State presented evidence that Whiteside County owns the entire jail complex. Defendant objected, stating that judicial notice of this fact directed the jury to a “factual finding.” The court disagreed with defendant's position and granted the State's motion. In so doing, the trial court noted, “the plain and ordinary meaning of public property is property owned by the government.” At trial, the court informed the jury that it
¶ 6 Following the presentation of evidence, which included video footage of the defendant battering the victim inside a jail, a jury instructions conference was held. The State proposed a jury instruction stating:
Defendant renewed his objection that the jail was not public property for purposes of the aggravated battery statute. The trial court disagreed, allowing the instruction and subsequently informing the jury that judicially-noticed facts are not necessarily conclusive. Following closing arguments, the jury convicted defendant of aggravated battery. Id. The trial court later sentenced him to 10 years in prison.
¶ 7 This appeal followed.
¶ 8 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Defendant argues the trial court failed to prove him guilty of aggravated battery. Specifically, defendant asserts that a cellblock in a county jail, which is generally inaccessible to the public, is not “public property” under the statute. Defendant contends the trial court relied on an outlier case (People v. Hill ) when deciding to take judicial notice that the Whiteside County jail is public property. People v. Hill, 409 Ill.App.3d 451, 454, 351 Ill.Dec. 85, 949 N.E.2d 1180 (2011). In support of this argument, defendant further asserts that being open and accessible to the public is the pivotal factor in defining public property. Thus, concluding that any other criteria used to define public property is based on a rationale inherently at odds with the Illinois courts' long-held belief that the purpose of the aggravated battery statute is to protect the community.
¶ 12 When reviewing a question of statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review. In re Jerome S. , 2012 IL App (4th) 100862, ¶ 9, 360 Ill.Dec. 276, 968 N.E.2d 769.
¶ 14 Under Illinois's aggravated battery statute, the offense of battery can be aggravated based on the location of the incident:
“A person commits aggravated battery when, in committing a battery, other than by the discharge of a firearm, he or she is or the person battered is on or about a public way, public property, a public place of accommodation or amusement, a sports venue, or a domestic violence shelter.” 720 ILCS 5/12–3.05(c) (West 2012).
The term “public property” and the others that appear with it are not defined by the statute.
¶ 15 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature. People v. Amigon, 239 Ill.2d 71, 84, 346 Ill.Dec. 63, 940 N.E.2d 63 (2010). “The most reliable means of accomplishing that goal is to apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.” Id. at 84–85, 346 Ill.Dec. 63, 940 N.E.2d 63. “Where the language is plain and unambiguous we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction.” People v. Collins, 214 Ill.2d 206, 214, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262 (2005).
¶ 16 The defendant in this case battered a fellow inmate while they were in a common area for inmates. At the prosecution's request, the trial court deemed the county jail “public property” via judicial notice. Defense counsel objected, arguing that areas must be accessible to the public in order to be deemed public property. The trial court agreed with the State and took judicial notice.
¶ 17 We find that under section 12–3.05(c) of the Criminal Code, the place where a battery occurred can be a “public place of accommodation” or “public property.” The categories listed in the statute are not necessarily mutually exclusive. “The word ‘or’ is a disjunctive conjunction.” Central Mortgage Co. v. Kamarauli, 2012 IL App (1st) 112353, ¶ 18, 366 Ill.Dec. 652, 980 N.E.2d 745. Use of the word “or” in the statutory language indicates a list of alternatives, each of which requires separate treatment. In re E.B., 231 Ill.2d 459, 468, 326 Ill.Dec. 1, 899 N.E.2d 218 (2008).
¶ 18 Defendant relies on People v. Kamp, 131 Ill.App.3d 989, 87 Ill.Dec. 66, 476 N.E.2d 768 (1985), and People v. Ward, 95 Ill.App.3d 283, 50 Ill.Dec. 791, 419 N.E.2d 1240 (1981), in arguing otherwise. These cases do not persuade us. Initially, we note that Kamp is distinguishable from the case at bar on its face. The defendant's argument in Kamp is that the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated battery when it only proved the incident occurred in an area accessible to the public, a park. Kamp, 131 Ill.App.3d at 993, 87 Ill.Dec. 66, 476 N.E.2d 768. The defendant in this case is arguing the reverse: the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated battery when it only proved the incident occurred in an area owned by the government, a jail.
¶ 19 The Kamp court found public accessibility sufficient to support a charge of felony murder where the underlying felony—an aggravated battery—occurred in a public park. Id. The Kamp court's finding that a park is public property without evidence at trial of government ownership does not exclude courts from finding that an area is public property based solely on proof that it is government owned. The State in Kamp established at trial that the park where the defendant battered the victim was accessible to the public, proving the defendant guilty of aggravated battery. The trial and appellate courts did not find it necessary for the State to further prove the park was government owned in order to sustain the defendant's conviction. Kamp does not address the issue of whether the State can prove property is public in nature by establishing that it is government owned.
¶ 20 Defense counsel in this case claims that government ownership is irrelevant in determining whether property is “public” under the aggravated battery statute. This is based upon a misreading of applicable case law. In support of his argument, defendant focuses on the Ward court's use of the term irrelevant. Ward, 95 Ill.App.3d at 287–88, 50 Ill.Dec. 791, 419 N.E.2d 1240. The Kamp court further highlighted the Ward court's use of the term:
“Whether the property was actually publicly owned and, therefore, public property rather than a privately owned public place of accommodation is irrelevant; what is significant is that the alleged offense occurred in an area accessible to the public.” (Emphasis added.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kamp, 131 Ill.App.3d at 993, 87 Ill.Dec. 66, 476 N.E.2d 768 (quoting Ward, 95 Ill.App.3d at 287–88, 50 Ill.Dec. 791, 419 N.E.2d 1240 ).
¶ 21 The Ward court defined “public property” as government owned and then went on to declare that ownership was an extraneous matter to their case. This commentary was not a universal declaration. The State in Ward had initially argued the battery, which occurred in a hotel parking lot, had occurred “ ‘about public property.’ ” Ward, 95 Ill.App.3d at 286, 50 Ill.Dec. 791, 419 N.E.2d 1240. The trial court later declared the battery had actually occurred “ ‘about a public place of...
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