People v. Meyers

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: People v. Meyers, 649 N.W.2d 123, 250 Mich. App. 637 (Mich. App. 2002)
• Decision Date: 30 July 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 231817.
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Marvin MEYERS, Defendant-Appellant.

649 N.W.2d 123

250 Mich. App. 637

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Marvin MEYERS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 231817.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 11, 2002, at Detroit.

Decided April 16, 2002, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication July 30, 2002.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Marilyn J. Day, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Gerarld R. Goulet, Davison, for the defendant.

Before WHITBECK, C.J., and WILDER and ZAHRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Ronald Meyers pleaded guilty of using the internet to communicate with a person for the purpose of attempting to commit conduct proscribed under M.C.L. § 750.145a, which violated M.C.L. § 750.145d(1)(b). The trial court initially sentenced Meyers to two years' probation. The trial court later amended the judgment of sentence to require Meyers to register as a sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), M.C.L. § 28.721 et seq. Meyers appeals by leave granted. We affirm.

I. Basic Facts And Procedural History

On May 11, 2000, Meyers logged onto the internet on a computer in his home in Berrien County and accessed a chat room. Meyers, age sixty-four, entered into a discussion with a person he believed to be a twelve-year-old girl named Jennie. Their two-hour discussion concerned oral sex, which Meyers hoped to obtain from the girl. In reality, however, Meyers was conversing with a West Bloomfield police detective, not a young girl.

The prosecutor charged Meyers with violating M.C.L. § 750.145d,¹ which, at the time Meyers committed the offense, provided in pertinent part:

(1) A person shall not use the internet or a computer, computer program, computer network, or computer system to communicate with any person for the purpose of doing any of the following:

* * *

(b) Committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting another person to commit conduct proscribed under section 145a, 157c, 350, 411h, or 411i.

The prosecutor's theory was that Meyers used the internet to attempt to commit an act in violation of M.C.L. § 750.145a, which provides:

Any person who shall accost, entice, or solicit a child under the age of 16 years with intent to induce or force said child to commit an immoral act, or to submit to an act of sexual intercourse, or an act of gross indecency, or any other act of depravity or delinquency, or shall suggest to such child any of the aforementioned acts, shall on conviction thereof be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 1 year.

Meyers pleaded guilty of this charge without negotiating a plea agreement. The trial court accepted Meyers' plea after it advised him of his rights and heard his testimony.

At the November 6, 2000, sentencing hearing, defense counsel objected to the recommendation in the presentence investigator's report that Meyers should register as a sex offender. Defense counsel contended that, because Meyers had not committed an offense "listed" under M.C.L. § 28.722(d), Meyers did not have to register. Evidently, defense counsel was arguing that Meyers did not have to comply with M.C.L. § 28.723(1)(a), which requires "[a]n individual who is convicted of a listed offense after October 1, 1995" to register under SORA. The prosecutor countered that Meyers' criminal conduct implicated M.C.L. § 750.145a, which M.C.L. § 28.722(d)(1) deems a listed offense subject to registration. Defense counsel replied that M.C.L. § 750.145a applied only to offenses committed directly against a child, not an internet chat with an adult police officer. Though defense counsel did not give this theory a name at the time, this was an impossibility argument. The trial court sentenced Meyers to two years' probation, as well as related conditions, but took the sex offender registration issue under advisement while the parties briefed the issue.

The parties filed their briefs and, on November 29, 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding Meyers' argument that he did not have to register as a sex offender. In addition to reiterating their positions on the issue, defense counsel briefly outlined SORA's history and recent amendments, noting that the Legislature had never amended SORA to include M.C.L. § 750.145d as a listed offense. Citing People v. Thousand (Thousand I),² defense counsel maintained that Meyers could not have accosted a child because he was conversing with an adult and, therefore, could not be found to have been convicted of violating M.C.L. § 750.145a as the listed offense. Noting the rules of statutory construction that militate against interpreting criminal statutes broadly, to the defendant's disadvantage, defense counsel argued that the trial court should apply SORA strictly and conclude that Meyers did not commit a listed offense in this case.

Rather than engaging in lengthy oral argument, the prosecutor relied on her brief, which posited two different statutory theories for requiring Meyers to register under SORA. Under the first theory, the prosecutor noted the factual connection between Meyers' prohibited computer activities and the acts prohibited in M.C.L. § 750.145a, citing M.C.L. § 28.722(d)(1), which includes a violation of M.C.L. § 750.145a in the definition of a listed offense. Alternatively, the prosecutor suggested that one of SORA's catch-all provisions, M.C.L. § 28.722(d)(x), which states that "[a]ny other violation of a law of this state ... that by its nature constitutes a sexual offense against an individual who is less than 18 years of age" constitutes a listed offense, applied in this case. The prosecutor pointed out that, though Meyers had a sexual discussion with an adult, Meyers believed the person with whom he was having the discussion was a child under age eighteen. Thus, the prosecutor contended Meyers' crime was just the sort of sexual offense for which the Legislature intended individuals to register under SORA.

After considering these arguments, the trial court announced its ruling from the bench:

The Court has listened carefully to the arguments of counsel. Obviously, there's been a lot of argument and representations in you brief concerning the legislative intent, but it appears clear to the Court that in this case, what we're talking about is an individual who was in fact convicted of Computer Communication with Another for Purpose of Committing a Proscribed Conduct. This is under a specific subsection of the statute. But the Defendant was involved in requesting sexual acts from a perceived twelve-year-old female over the internet. The sexual requests and intercourse, including the Defendant attempting to make a date to meet the twelve-year-old or alleged twelve-year-old female.

Obviously, the Defendant in this matter being sixty-four years of age, with no prior record, finds the burden of registering with the Sex Registration Act probably onerous, but I believe that the entire legislative intent was specifically for crimes of this nature, and I believe that under the specific circumstances in this case, it should be viewed broadly to include same, and therefore the Defendant's motion is respectfully denied. The Defendant is to comply with the Court's order as set forth at sentencing.

Having failed to avoid registration, Meyers applied for leave to appeal to this Court. This Court granted his application and limited the issue on appeal to the issue he raised in the application for leave to appeal: whether a person convicted under M.C.L. § 750.145d must register as a sex offender pursuant to SORA. Meyers contends that the answer to this question is "no," arguing that the Legislature purposefully excluded M.C.L. § 750.145d as a listed offense and, relying on Thousand I, that it was factually impossible for him to violate M.C.L. § 750.145a with the conduct underlying his conviction.

II. Standard Of Review

The issue Meyers presents in this appeal requires us to construe and apply several statutes, a task we under take de novo, meaning that we analyze this issue without deferring to the trial court's decision.³

III. Statutory Construction

The lodestar principle of statutory construction is that courts must ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent in enacting a statute.⁴ "The task of discerning our Legislature's intent begins by examining the language of the statute itself."⁵ Using a dictionary if necessary,⁶ we construe "[a]ll words and phrases" "according to the common and approved usage of the language," but give terms of art and "technical words and phrases" any "peculiar and appropriate meaning" ascribed by the Legislature or acquired in common usage in the absence of legislative definition.⁷ If "the language of the statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning reflects the Legislature's intent and this Court applies the statute as written."⁸ Yet, "[w]hen reasonable minds may differ regarding the meaning of a statute, the courts must look to the object of the statute, the harm it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the purpose of the statute."⁹

IV. SORA's Listed Offenses

The factor that makes this case seem complex is the number of overlapping statutory provisions that affect whether Meyers' offense was subject to SORA's registration requirement. Had the Legislature drafted M.C.L. § 28.722(d) so that it listed M.C.L. § 750.145d as an offense subject to registration, this analysis would be much simpler. However, contrary to Meyers' contention, we do not think that the Legislature's omission of M.C.L. § 750.145d from the offenses listed in M.C.L. § 28.722(d) is dispositive of whether the Legislature intended him and offenders like him to register pursuant to SORA. Instead, we start our analysis with the relevant text of M.C.L. § 28.722(d) itself.

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