People v. Meyers
| Decision Date | 17 January 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 28921.,28921. |
| Citation | 64 N.E.2d 531,392 Ill. 355 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. MEYERS. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Frank M. Padden, Judge.
Louise Meyers was convicted of manslaughter, and she brings error.
Affirmed.
Maurice R. Marchello, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and William J. Tuohy, State's Atty., of Chicago (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, Melvin S. Rembe, Joseph A. Pope, and Richard B. Austin, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Plaintiff in error, Louise Meyers, hereafter referred to as defendant, was indicted for the crime of murder by abortion. A jury being waived, she was tried by the judge in the criminal court of Cook county, and found guilty of manslaughter, and sentenced to the women's reformatory at Dwight, for a term of not less than one nor more than three years. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were denied.
The errors assigned, although numerous, include no more than (1) the finding and judgment of the court are not supported by the evidence; and (2) the court received improper evidence on the part of the People and excluded proper evidence offered by the defendant.
March 9, 1944, the deceased and her husband called at the home of the defendant on Kenwood avenue, Chicago. The deceased told the defendant she was pregnant and wanted an abortion performed. To this defendant agreed, saying she had performed quite a number without trouble, and that the charge was $50, which was paid. She then took deceased into a bedroom, and within sight of the husband used a certain syringe, pump and other instruments designed to cause an abortion. He saw these instruments after they had been so used, and saw defendant clean and sterilize them. Defendant said the abortion might happen within a couple of hours, or possibly two or three days, and even after two weeks, but if nothing happened within three days to come back. The husband was on furlough and returned to the army March 13. Deceased died March 21.
The evidence also shows that on the afternoon of March 20, the deceased, after telephoning, came to the home of the defendant. About six P. M. the defendant called the father-in-law of the deceased, who came over and saw deceased lying on a bed. She was unable to talk, blood was coming from her mouth; her bed and clothes were stained from blood. She also had an abrasion on her cheek bone. She had been at the apartment of defendant for several hours, and at the insistence of the father-in-law was taken to the county hospital.
March 24, defendant gave a statement to the police. She said she had known the deceased several months; that deceased called her by phone March 20, and was invited over. When she came in about one P. M. she looked pale, ill and depressed, and did not feel well, and after a few moments deceased said she had to go to the bathroom, as she had taken medicine to get rid of something. In a very short time defendant heard a thump, and looking into the bathroom saw deceased lying on the floor, where she was unconscious or had fainted. Deceased was dragged from the bathroom and a doctor called, who arrived about four P. M. In a second statement signed by her, the defendant admitted performing the acts on March 9, described by the husband, and that she had thrown the instruments into the garbage after deceased died. At the hospital, deceased miscarried shortly before death. A spinal tap was taken, which showed the spinal fluid clear, and this, according to medical testimony, ruled out skull fracture or cerebral accident. An autopsy was performed, which did not include examination of the skull or brain. The lungs showed focal Hemorrhagic bronchopneumonia.
The doctor called as a court witness testified he noticed a bruise on the right temple of the deceased, but did not notice the other hemorrhages, and his opinion, based almost entirely upon the history as related by defendant, was deceased had a cerebral lesion of some kind, and possibly a brain hemorrhage.
A number of doctors testified as experts upon hypothetical questions propounded by both the People and the defendant. Those of the People were of the opinion the cause of death was the result of focal hemorrhagic bronchopneumonia, associated with a recent pregnant uterus. Further clarification by questioning indicates these experts were of the opinion an abortion was the direct cause of death. An expert testified on behalf of defendant that in his opinion the bruise on the head could also be associated with bronchopneumonia; that the death might have occurred by cerebral hemorrhage, and that he did not think there was any causal connection between the action on March 9 and the bronchopneumonia. Without going into the scientific details, the testimony of some doctors attributed the immediate cause of death to an abortion, and others to a fall causing a cerebral hemorrhage, and the abortion incident to the fall. The determination of the facts is primarily for the trial court.
In this case there is no denial of the testimony of the husband of the attempt at abortion on March 9. The defendant in her second statement admits such an attempt took place. She does not deny the facts testified to by the husband, the father-in-law, or the admissions made to the police. The evidence shows, without doubt, the defendant on March 9 attempted to bring about an abortion. Can we say, as a matter of law, a fall occurring a few days later, in the apartment of the defendant, producing a bruise upon the head, or even a cerebral hemorrhage was an independent cause of death, or was it one of the results which might mediately result from an abortion, or attempt at abortion?
We might dispose of the contention of defendant upon the proposition that the entire basis of the hypothesis propounded to her experts is founded upon the fact deceased had a fall on March 20. The only evidence of this is contained in the confession of ...
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People v. Mars
...unless it can be shown that the death was caused by a supervening act disconnected from any act of the accused. People v. Meyers, 392 Ill. 355, 359, 64 N.E.2d 531 (1945); People v. Robinson, 199 Ill.App.3d 494, 503, 145 Ill.Dec. 626, 557 N.E.2d 396 (1990). If death results indirectly from a......
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...intervening cause completely unrelated to the acts of the defendant does relieve a defendant of criminal liability. (People v. Meyers (1946), 392 Ill. 355, 64 N.E.2d 531; Cunningham v. People (1902), 195 Ill. 550, 63 N.E. 517; People v. Gulliford (1980), 86 Ill.App.3d 237, 41 Ill.Dec. 596, ......
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...from such act, unless it appears death was caused by a supervening act disconnected from any act of the defendant. (People v. Meyers (1945), 392 Ill. 355, 359, 64 N.E.2d 531; accord, People v. Dillon (1st Dist. 1975), 28 Ill.App.3d 11, 20, 327 N.E.2d 225; People v. Humble (5th Dist. 1974), ......
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...to have resulted from such act. People v. Domagala , 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 39, 370 Ill.Dec. 1, 987 N.E.2d 767 ; People v. Meyers , 392 Ill. 355, 359, 64 N.E.2d 531 (1945) ; see also People v. Mars , 2012 IL App (2d) 110695, ¶ 16, 368 Ill.Dec. 763, 985 N.E.2d 570. To relieve a defendant from cri......