People v. Middleton

• Decision Date: 28 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. A106256.,A106256.
• Citation: 131 Cal.App.4th 732,31 Cal.Rptr.3d 813
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Robert MIDDLETON, Defendant and Appellant.

31 Cal.Rptr.3d 813

131 Cal.App.4th 732

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Robert MIDDLETON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. A106256.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3.

July 28, 2005.

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

Kieran D.C. Manjarrez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Moona Nandi, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sharon R. Wooden, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

POLLAK, J.

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant Michael Robert Middleton pleaded no contest to possession of cocaine base with a personal arming enhancement, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and receiving stolen property with a personal arming enhancement. He appeals the court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. In the published portion of this opinion, we address his contention that police officers' knowledge that an individual is on parole is not sufficient to inform the officers that the individual is subject to a search condition and is thus insufficient to justify a warrantless search of that person's premises. We find no merit in that or in any other of his contentions, and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are based on undisputed testimony given at the hearing on the motion to suppress. On November 11, 2002, at 11:30 p.m., Fairfield Officers Steven Trojanowski, Jennifer Clifton, Ross Hawkins and Joshua Cohen were conducting a security check at the Travel Lodge Motel on Auto Mall Parkway in Fairfield. Trojanowski testified that he and his fellow officers regularly patrolled the motel because the surrounding vicinity is considered a high drug area. As they were descending stairs from the second floor, the officers saw a Ms. Barker coming out of a first floor room and detected a strong odor of marijuana. From their vantage point the officers were unable to determine whether Barker had come out of room 111 or the adjacent room 126.

Trojanowski stopped and questioned Barker who acknowledged that she had come from room 126 where people had been smoking marijuana. A few minutes later, Melissa Biesecker emerged from room 126. Biesecker also admitted that she had been smoking marijuana there, but she initially gave Clifton a false name. After determining that the name given by Biesecker was false, Clifton placed Biesecker under arrest for providing false information to a police officer. Barker was arrested on a separate offense and both women were placed in nearby patrol cars.

The four officers then attempted to contact the occupants of room 126. Trojanowski first knocked softly on the door and then, receiving no response, knocked harder while announcing the presence of the Fairfield Police Department. Officers saw a man peek out of the curtain through the side window, look at the officers and abruptly close the drapes. They then heard "scurrying around inside the room, things slamming, people running." As the sounds in room 126 fell silent, the officers heard movement next door in room 111. The officers deduced that the occupants of room 126 had moved to room 111 through an adjoining door which they knew was there.

While the other officers remained outside of the rooms, Trojanowski went to the motel manager's office to determine the registrant of room 111. He learned that the room was registered to Maurice Hurth. The police dispatcher informed Trojanowski that Hurth was on the active parolee list. Trojanowski decided to execute a parole search of room 111. He obtained a pass key and bolt cutters from the motel manager and returned to room 111. By this time, Officer Darin Moody, Sergeant Shipp and Sergeant Mihelich had arrived on the scene. Trojanowski knocked on the door of room 111 but received no response. He knocked more loudly a second time and announced that he was from the Fairfield Police Department. When no one responded, Trojanowski used the pass key to unlock the door and the bolt cutters to free the safety latch. Trojanowski, Clifton, and five other officers entered the room with their weapons drawn. Five people were found inside room 111, including defendant who was standing in the bathroom with his hands and arms dripping wet. All the occupants were pat searched, handcuffed, led outside and seated on the ground.

While the officers were in the midst of securing and moving the subjects outside, Officer Moody, standing in the open doorway of room 111, saw the handle of a handgun protruding from behind an entertainment center inside the room. When the suspects were out of the room, Moody moved the entertainment center and pointed out the gun to Clifton, the investigating officer. Clifton went back outside and announced to the subjects "that they were being detained on investigation of a handgun." Defendant spontaneously exclaimed, "How can you put that gun on me when you found it back behind there." The officers, still unable to locate Hurth and concerned for officer safety, began to discuss the possibility that Hurth was in room 126. Defendant volunteered that Hurth was not in room 126 and said that the officers could use his card key to look into the room to check. As some officers entered room 126, defendant told Clifton that all items found there belonged to him and he did not want anyone else to get in trouble for what might be found.

Upon entering room 126, Officer Cohen saw seven Ziploc bags of marijuana on the floor and a small scale on the nightstand. In the bathroom, Cohen saw four small bags of marijuana and three small cocaine rocks floating in the toilet. In a box on the shelf above the toilet, Cohen discovered two more small bags of marijuana. A suitcase left beneath the shelf contained another scale, 18 cell phones, two semiautomatic pistols, and ammunition. Trojanowski also found $1,000 in small bills. Before defendant was transported to the police station, he asked Trojanowski to retrieve his sweat suit from the motel room. After defendant identified his sweat suit, Trojanowski searched the pockets and found a large wad of cash, credit cards, and identification. Both the credit cards and identification were in another person's name.

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351.5) with a personal arming enhancement (Pen.Code,¹ § 12022, subd. (c); count I); possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11359; count II); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count III); receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)) with a personal arming enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (c); count IV); and destruction of evidence (§ 135; count V). Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and moved to suppress the evidence pursuant to section 1538.5. After a pretrial hearing, the motion was denied. Defendant subsequently pleaded no contest to counts I, III, and IV in exchange for a four-year maximum prison term and dismissal of the remaining charges and charges in a separate pending case. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that his motion to suppress the evidence found in the two motel rooms was erroneously denied. He argues that the initial search of room 111 was not justified as a parole search because the officers did not verify that the terms of Hurth's parole included a search condition,² that the facts known to the officers when they entered room 111 did not justify his detention, and that his consent to search room 126 therefore was involuntary because it resulted from an unlawful detention. We find no merit in any of these contentions.

A. Validity of the Parole Search of Room 111

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court defers to the trial courts express or implied findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but must independently determine the relevant legal principles and apply those principles to the trial courts findings of facts to determine whether the search was constitutionally reasonable. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729; People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597, 174 Cal.Rptr. 867, 629 P.2d 961; People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160, 107 Cal.Rptr. 13, 507 P.2d 621.) "[T]he power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court." (People v. Lawler, supra, at p. 160, 107 Cal.Rptr. 13, 507 P.2d 621.) If factual findings are unclear, the appellate court must infer "a finding of fact favorable to the prevailing party on each ground or theory underlying the motion." (People v. Manning (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 586, 601-602, 109 Cal.Rptr. 531.) However, if the undisputed facts establish that the search or seizure was constitutionally unreasonable as a matter of law, the reviewing court is not bound by the lower courts ruling. (People v. Medina (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 809, 815, 103 Cal.Rptr. 337.)

The Fourth Amendment provides citizens protection against arbitrary and unreasonable searches and seizures in their residences, which have been held to include hotel rooms in which they are registered. (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1297, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221.) A search of a residence conducted without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within one of "`a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 337, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.); Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576; Flippo v. West Virginia (1999) 528 U.S. 11, 13, 120 S.Ct. 7, 145 L.Ed.2d 16.) As the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted by the California Supreme Court, police officers may make a...