People v. Milbourn

Decision Date11 September 1990
Docket NumberDocket No. 80475
Citation461 N.W.2d 1,435 Mich. 630
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin Michael MILBOURN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

G. Michael Hocking, Pros. Atty., William M. Worden, Asst. Pros. Atty., Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellee.

State Appellate Defender Office by P.E. Bennett, Asst. Defender, Julie A. LaCost, Research Asst., Lansing, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

BRICKLEY, Justice.

I. Introduction
A

Before us today stands a defendant who alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessively severe sentence. Defendant Milbourn was convicted of breaking and entering a residence with the intent to maliciously destroy property worth over $100. 1 Mr. Milbourn had lived in the residence together with his girl friend, the complainant, until the relationship soured. Shortly after the breakup, Mr. Milbourn committed several hostile acts in an eight-day period. The acts for which Mr. Milbourn's ten- to fifteen-year sentence was imposed consisted of breaking into his former apartment when no one was home and destroying property belonging to the complainant.

In order to decide whether Mr. Milbourn's claim that his sentence embodies an abuse of the trial judge's sentencing discretion is justified, we find it necessary to reexamine the meaning of the term "abuse of discretion" in the sentencing context.

B

Central to our recent and unanimous decision in People v. Coles, 417 Mich. 523, 535, 339 N.W.2d 440 (1983), was our holding that sentencing decisions, no less than the myriad other discretionary judicial actions, should be subject to review by our state's appellate courts.

We find no sound reason for interpreting the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions as carving out an exception to the right of appeal regarding sentencing matters. None of those relevant provisions limit the particular issue subject to appellate review. We therefore conclude that the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority vests appellate courts with the jurisdiction to review all sentencing issues.

We continue to believe in the correctness of the central proposition set forth above. We conclude, however, that the mechanism we established in Coles for determining whether a particular sentence represents an abuse of discretion is beset with difficulties. Thus, we are persuaded that the propriety of a given exercise of sentencing discretion should no longer turn on whether the sentence "shocks the conscience of the appellate court." Id., at p. 550, 339 N.W.2d 440.

Our preeminent requirement in formulating an alternative is to respect the purpose the Legislature of our state has manifested with regard to sentencing. The Legislature in establishing differing sentence ranges for different offenses across the spectrum of criminal behavior has clearly expressed its value judgments concerning the relative seriousness and severity of individual criminal offenses. This statutory sentencing scheme embodies the "principle of proportionality" according to which sentences are proportionate to the seriousness of the matter for which punishment is imposed. In our judgment, it is appropriate--if not unavoidable--to conclude that, with regard to the judicial selection of an individual sentence within the statutory minimum and maximum for a given offense, the Legislature similarly intended more serious commissions of a given crime by persons with a history of criminal behavior to receive harsher sentences than relatively less serious breaches of the same penal statute by first-time offenders. We believe that the Legislature's purpose is best served by requiring judicial sentencing discretion to be exercised according to the same principle of proportionality that has guided the Legislature in its allocation of punishment over the entire spectrum of criminal behavior. Accordingly, a given sentence can be said to constitute an abuse of discretion if that sentence violates the principle of proportionality, which requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.

This rule is superior in several ways to the "shock the conscience" test in implementing our decision in Coles permitting appellate courts to provide relief where there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Most importantly, the proportionality test is better tailored to and in keeping with the sentencing scheme adopted by the Legislature. In addition, the proportionality standard is preferable because it is far less subjective than the "shock the conscience" inquiry. Finally, it is our hope and belief that the proportionality test will have the additional, incidental effect of fostering "sentencing equity," i.e., that it will provide better protection against unjustified sentence disparity between similarly situated offenders, 2 a phenomenon we condemned in Coles and which has been justly held up to criticism of the most vehement sort. 3

C

Section II of this opinion sets forth the facts and procedural history of the present case. Section III contains a discussion of Coles, followed by a critical evaluation and rejection of the "shock the conscience" test. Section IV discusses the principle of proportionality. Section V explores the abuse of discretion standard in light of the principle of proportionality and the sentencing guidelines. Section VI addresses the dissent's criticisms of our decision, focusing in particular on the dissent's contention that the trial judge should enjoy unfettered discretion in imposing sentencing. Section VII applies the rule to the sentence imposed on Mr. Milbourn and concludes that this sentence violates the principle of proportionality and therefore constitutes an abuse of sentencing discretion. Section VIII describes the applicability of this decision to other cases.

II. Facts and Procedural History
A

On October 22, 1984, two years after they had begun dating, the defendant and the complainant moved into an apartment with the lease in the name of the complainant. They lived there together, in a common household, until December 2, 1984. The defendant moved out because he and the complainant "broke up." Each reports blameworthy conduct on the part of the other, leading to the breakdown of the relationship.

The complainant testified that the relationship was clearly finished by the time of the events that gave rise to this prosecution. The defendant seems to have viewed the relationship as being in a "cooling-off" period, during which he was temporarily living apart from the complainant. The complainant testified that she had mentioned such a cooling-off period to the defendant and had suggested that they might move back together again.

After the defendant's belongings were removed from the apartment, complainant changed the locks on December 13. She next saw the defendant on December 18, when he came to her place of employment. He handed her a greeting card and spoke briefly with her. When she said she did not wish to speak further, the defendant left, telling the complainant as he went, "You've had it."

She saw him again, after midnight, when she left work. The defendant approached her and said, "Don't call the police on me." The complainant did not understand this request. When she returned to her apartment, she found considerable damage. As described by the complainant and by a police officer, the scene included damage to clothes, a lamp, a television set, the walls, the furniture, bedding, drapes, and the phone cord. An appraiser who later saw much of the damage estimated that $330 worth of furniture had been damaged.

The defendant testified at trial of the resulting charge of breaking and entering that he had been drinking that evening and that he went to the apartment to retrieve his remaining belongings. (The complainant testified, however, that Mr. Milbourn's property had already been removed.) Mr. Milbourn said that when he discovered, to his surprise, that the locks had been changed, he cut a screen with a rock, slid open an unlocked window, and entered the apartment. Asked whether he had caused the damage, he said he did not remember doing such acts.

In addition to the prosecution for breaking and entering that gives rise to this appeal, two other criminal charges were lodged against the defendant. Each resulted from conduct arising out of the relationship between the defendant and the complainant. One was a felonious assault complaint filed after a confrontation between the defendant and a male friend of the complainant. This charge was later dismissed.

The defendant also had a confrontation with the complainant on the evening of January 3, 1985. He broke a window of her car and flattened a tire. It is disputed whether he reached into the car and grabbed the complainant. For this, the defendant pled guilty of attempted malicious destruction of property over $100. 4 The defendant made numerous attempts to contact the complainant following these events, and he testified at trial that he still loved her.

There was also testimony of threats made by the defendant against the complainant, orally, in writing, and by gesture. The defendant generally denied these threats. 5

When he committed the offense that gives rise to this appeal, the defendant had no prior criminal record. 6

B

At the conclusion of a two-day jury trial, the defendant was convicted, as charged, of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with the intent to commit malicious destruction of property worth more than $100. 7

Although the sentencing guidelines recommended a minimum sentence between twelve and thirty months in prison, 8 the trial court imposed the maximum possible sentence: a minimum term of ten years. The sentencing judge explained the departure on the sentencing information report 9 and also explained on...

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  • People v. Knapp
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • March 22, 2001
    ...if it is disproportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. People v. Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630, 635, 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990). Specifically, defendant claims that he should not be sentenced more severely than the maximum allowed for manslaughter bec......
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