People v. Miles
| Decision Date | 21 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 350281 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEMARCUS ALLEN-TROY MILES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Oakland Circuit Court LC No. 2018-267165-FC
Before: Murray, C.J., and Jansen and Riordan, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and his sentence of 30 to 60 years' imprisonment. We affirm in all aspects.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the shooting and killing of Austin Reinhardt in the afternoon of May 3, 2018, at 249 High Street in Pontiac. The victim's girlfriend, Kae-Milee Serna testified that "there was some type of issue" between the victim and defendant. On the day of the shooting Serna and the victim were visiting a friend at 249 High Street when Serna spotted defendant approaching the home in his car. Fearing that an altercation was going to ensue Serna fled inside the home. She testified that, as she was doing so, the victim exited the home and the victim and defendant began to approach one another. Serna overheard the victim ask defendant "what's up," but at that point she was far enough into the home that she could hear but not see either defendant or the victim. Serna then heard "two or three" gunshots. When she exited the home, she observed the victim laying on the ground and called 911. When an officer arrived, Serna exclaimed to him that "it was Demarcus, and she didn't care if she was snitching."
Shortly thereafter, the victim was pronounced dead, with the cause of death being two gunshot wounds. One bullet was retrieved from the victim's body, and another was found near him on the ground. Additionally, two shell casings were found in the street in front of 249 High Street, and another shell casing was found in the windshield-wiper bed of defendant's vehicle. A brick was also recovered from the front pocket of a hooded sweatshirt that the victim was wearing.
Defendant admitted at trial that he was present at 249 High Street when the shooting occurred. He indicated that he had stopped at the house to speak with a friend, and that he had driven another friend, Justin Sumner, with him. Defendant noted that, when he arrived at 249 High Street and began to exit his vehicle, the victim approached defendant with his hand in his hoodie pocket. Although defendant indicated that he had no prior issues with the victim, the manner in which the victim was approaching him concerned him. According to defendant, before the victim reached him, Sumner fired off approximately 7 bullets. After a brief period of shock, defendant and Sumner got back into defendant's vehicle and fled the scene.
Defendant was charged with first-degree premediated murder and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm). A jury convicted defendant of aiding and abetting second-degree murder, and acquitted him of felony-firearm.
Defendant first contends that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of two out-of-court statements made by the victim that were admitted through the testimony of Serna. Defendant contends that the statements were inadmissible under MRE 803(3) because the state of mind of the victim was not at issue, and thus the statements were highly prejudicial against defendant. At trial, Serna testified that approximately 1 ½ months before the shooting the victim told her that the victim and defendant did not like each other, and that the victim told her the same thing when they encountered defendant at a Marathon gas station early in the morning on the day of the shooting. We conclude these statements were not properly admissible under MRE 803(3), but admission of the statements was not outcome-determinative and defendant is therefore not entitled to a new trial.
"The decision to admit evidence is within a trial court's discretion, which is reviewed for an abuse of that discretion." People v Bynum, 496 Mich. 610, 623; 852 N.W.2d 570 (2014). Whether a rule of evidence should have precluded admissibility is a preliminary question of law that we review de novo. People v Chelmicki, 305 Mich.App. 58, 62; 850 N.W.2d 612 (2014). Reversal is not warranted unless defendant can establish that it is more probable than not that the improper admission of evidence affected the outcome of the trial. People v Whittaker, 465 Mich. 422, 427; 635 N.W.2d 687 (2001).
"Hearsay is 'a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.'" Chelmicki, 305 Mich.App. at 62, quoting MRE 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless otherwise provided by the rules of evidence. Id. at 63. Neither party disputes that the out-of-court statements of the victim admitted through the testimony of Serna constituted hearsay; the issue is whether they were properly admitted under MRE 803(3). That rule provides certain statements involving a declarant's present sense impression are not barred by the general prohibition against hearsay:
(3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. [MRE 803(3).]
Evidence otherwise admissible under MRE 803(3) may nonetheless be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." MRE 403.
We have noted before that a victim's state of mind "is usually only an issue in a homicide case when self-defense, suicide, or accidental death are raised as defenses to the crime." People v Smelley, 285 Mich.App. 314, 316; 775 N.W.2d 350 (2009), vacated in part on other grounds 485 Mich. 1023 (2010), citing People v White, 401 Mich. 482, 504; 257 N.W.2d 912 (1977), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v Koonce, 466 Mich. 515, 520 (2002). "The general rule in Michigan is that statements indicative of the declarant's state of mind are admissible when that state is in issue in the case." White, 401 Mich. at 502-503. Otherwise, the victim's state of mind may be" 'only remotely and collaterally related to the real issues in the case.'" Smelley, 285 Mich.App. at 321, quoting White, 401 Mich. at 505. In those cases, there is an inherent danger "that the jury would accept [the victim's] statement as somehow reflecting on defendant's state of mind rather than the victim's . . . ." White, 401 Mich. at 505 (quotation marks and citation omitted). That is, the jury may inadvertently take the statements "as a true indication of the defendant's intentions, actions or culpability." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant relies upon Smelley and People v Moorer, 262 Mich.App. 64, 65; 683 N.W.2d 736 (2004), the prosecution refers us to People v King, 215 Mich.App. 301, 309; 544 N.W.2d 765 (1996), in support of their respective arguments on the applicability of MRE 803(3). Smelley, Moorer, and King all involve analysis of People v Fisher, 449 Mich. 441, 453; 537 N.W.2d 577 (1995) (Fisher II). In that case, the defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of his wife, and on an initial appeal, our Supreme Court determined that the defendant "had been denied a fair trial because of the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the victim-wife's state of mind," and, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, issued an order granting the defendant a new trial. People v Fisher, 439 Mich. 884, 889 (1991) (Fisher I). The Court noted that, although limiting instructions had been given, "there was such a great likelihood of prejudice that the evidence should have been excluded because the relevance of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudice." Id., citing MRE 403. The issue then came before the Supreme Court a second time prior to the defendant's next trial on the prosecution's motion to permit the introduction of "certain oral and written statements of the victim-wife that were relevant to the issue of motive and premeditation." Fisher II, 449 Mich. at 443.
The Fisher II Court's subsequent analysis of MRE 803(3) was short, as only a small number of the statements the prosecution sought to admit fell under the exception. Id. at 450-451. These included statements that the victim planned "to visit Germany to be with her love," and that she planned "to divorce the defendant upon her return." Id. at 450. The Court noted that these statements plainly fell under the exception prescribed by MRE 803(3) because they were statements of the declarant's then existing intent and plans. Id. at 450-451, citing MRE 803(3). However, the Court also noted in reference to its previous peremptory reversal that it had excluded in that order" 'hearsay evidence regarding the victim's state of mind' where its 'relevance . . . was substantially outweighed by the prejudice.'" Id. at 453-454, quoting Fisher I, 439 Mich. at 885. The Court noted that evidence that was admissible in Fisher II was not the same as the evidence held to be inadmissible in Fisher I because, in between the two appeals, the prosecution had "properly interpreted [the] order to mean that any of [the] decedent wife's statements that expressed fear of the defendant, or that depicted significant misconduct of the defendant tending to show him to be a 'bad person,' were inadmissible."
We first conclude that the suggestion from King that Fisher II somehow overruled White is inapt. Nothing about Fisher II purports to say that statements...
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