People v. Miles

Citation183 P.3d 1236,77 Cal.Rptr.3d 270,43 Cal.4th 1074
Decision Date29 May 2008
Docket NumberNo. S140413.,S140413.
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard Alex MILES, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)

Scott Conklin, Redding, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and John Hardesty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson and Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Mathew K. Chan, Virna L. DePaul, Janet E. Neeley, Stephen G. Herndon and Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BAXTER, J.

After a jury convicted defendant of multiple felony offenses, a court trial was held on the allegation, for purposes of sentencing under the "Three Strikes" law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds.(d)-(e), 1170.12, subds. (b)-(c)), that he had suffered two prior "`serious felony'" convictions (id., § 1192.7, subd. (c)), including a 1976 federal conviction under 18 United States Code section 2113(a).1 One of the two distinct offenses set forth in section 2113(a), as in effect in 1976, was the taking, or attempted taking, of bank property from the person or presence of another by force, violence, or intimidation. Such acts constitute the California serious felony of bank robbery. (Pen.Code, § 1192,7, subds.(c)(19), (d).) The other offense set forth in section 2113(a) — entering, or attempting to enter, a bank with felonious or larcenous intent — includes many of the traditional elements of nonresidential burglary, and does not correspond to any California serious felony.

To prove the 1976 federal conviction, and its nature as a serious felony, the People presented certified documents from the record of that conviction, including a "Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order" signed by a federal judge (federal judgment form or 1976 federal judgment form). The federal judgment form recites that defendant pled guilty to "armed bank robbery" and "kidnapping" in violation of sections 2113(a), 2113(d), and 2113(e). On the basis of this evidence, the instant trial court found that the 1976 federal conviction was for the California serious felony of bank robbery. The court therefore used this prior conviction as a strike to enhance defendant's sentences for his current crimes. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

As below, defendant urges that the "bank robbery" notation on the federal judgment form, even as augmented by the references to "arm[ing]" and "kidnapping," was insufficient evidence his 1976 conviction occurred under the prong of section 2113(a) that qualified as a California serious felony. To resolve the issue, we apply principles discussed in People v. Delgado (May 29, 2008, S141282) ___ Cal.4th ___, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 259, 183 P.3d 1226, 2008 WL 2201773 (Delgado) to the more complicated facts of this case.

The increased complexity here arises from the structure and language of section 2113. This statute, in its entirety, includes a group of bank-related offenses under the title "Bank robbery and incidental crimes." However, nowhere in the body of the statute are the terms "robbery" or "bank robbery" used to describe any of the offenses set forth therein.

Thus, unlike in Delgado, there is no direct semantic link between the statute under which defendant was convicted, the words used by the convicting court to describe his crime, and one of the serious felony offenses enumerated in California law. Nonetheless, as we will explain, the evidence strongly supports the inference that the "armed bank robbery" and "kidnapping" notations on the 1976 federal judgment form were intended to describe a conviction for conduct which, under California law, constitutes the serious felony of bank robbery.

Accordingly, here, as in Delgado, there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the trial court's finding that the prior conviction at issue was for a serious felony. The Court of Appeal so concluded. We will therefore affirm the judgment of that court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On December 27, 2002, in the parking lot of a shopping mall, defendant approached several drivers, brandishing a gun, and demanded their car keys and personal belongings. Defendant ignored a responding police officer's order to drop the gun, instead raising his weapon in the officer's direction. The officer fired three times as defendant walked toward a store entrance, still holding the weapon. The officer's fourth bullet felled defendant, but he still refused to relinquish the gun, and he appeared to be trying to rise. The officer's fifth bullet knocked defendant flat, and a bystander kicked his gun away.

A jury found defendant guilty of assault with a firearm upon a police officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (d)(1)) (count 1), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (id., § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2), four counts of attempted carjacking (id., §§ 215, subds. (a), (b), 664) (counts 3, 5, 7, and 9), and five counts of assault with a firearm (id., § 245, subd. (a)(2)) (counts 4, 6, 8, 12, and 13). As to the count of firearm assault upon a police officer, and three of the attempted carjacking counts (counts 3, 5, and 7), the jury found true that defendant personally used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b). (See also id., subd. (a)(5), (7), (18).) As to each count of assault with a firearm, the jury found true that defendant personally used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a).2

The information also alleged, for purposes of sentence enhancement under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1) (five-year enhancement of current serious felony conviction for prior serious felony conviction) that defendant had suffered a 1976 federal conviction for "armed bank robbery and kidnaping," and, for purposes of the "Three Strikes" law (Pen.Code, §§ 667, subds.(c)-(e), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(c)), that he had suffered two prior serious felony convictions — the 1976 federal conviction and a 1972 California conviction for robbery. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on these allegations, and they were tried to the court.

As their sole evidence of the fact and nature of the 1976 federal conviction, the People introduced a package of documents certified by a records custodian of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. This package included a prison fingerprint card, and also the 1976 federal judgment form (i.e., the "Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order") as signed by Judge Philip C. Wilkins of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The federal judgment form recited that on November 30, 1976, defendant was convicted, on his guilty plea, of "violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a)(d)(e), armed bank robbery and[]kidnapping, as charged in the First Count of the Indictment," and that he received a 40-year sentence. The federal judgment form further indicated that "Count II of the Indictment," an unspecified charge, would be dismissed. The November 20, 1986, fingerprint card, from the Federal Correctional Institution at Lompoc, California, similarly described the offense as "ARMED BANK ROBBERY & KIDNAP."

The trial court found true that, as alleged, defendant had sustained two prior serious felony convictions.3 Accordingly, it imposed, on the current convictions, a third strike sentence of 219 years to life.4

Defendant appealed, urging only that the evidence was insufficient to prove his 1976 federal conviction was for a California serious felony. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Like the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded that the "armed bank robbery" notation on the 1976 federal judgment form was a clear reference to the prong of section 2113(a) which, in its 1976 version, conformed to the California serious felony of bank robbery. We granted review. We now conclude that the Court of Appeal's judgment must be affirmed.

DISCUSSION

Defendant urges, as he did below, that the federal judgment form's description of his 1976 conviction as for "armed bank robbery" and "kidnapping" does not constitute sufficient evidence the conviction was for the crime California deems the serious felony of bank robbery, because the form does not clearly and reliably specify which of the two forms of offense set forth in section 2113(a) was committed. Hence, he insists, the 1976 conviction could not be used to subject him to third strike sentences for his current offenses. (Pen.Code, § 667, subds.(d)-(e), 1170.12, subds. (b)-(c).) For several reasons, we disagree.

In 1976, when defendant was convicted under section 2113(a), this subsection provided a fine, or imprisonment up to 20 years, or both, for two distinct categories of offenders.

The first paragraph of section 2113(a) described a person who, "by force and violence, or by intimidation, [took], or attempt[ed] to take, from the person or presence of another, any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association." (Pub.L. No. 91-468 (Oct. 19, 1970) 84 Stat. 994, 1017.)

Then, as now, the second paragraph of section 2113(a) described a person who "enter[ed] or attempt[ed] to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larceny."

Then, as now, additional subsections of section 2113 listed further crimes against banks, credit unions, and savings and loan associations. These offenses included...

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