People v. Miller
Decision Date | 04 February 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 20374.,20374. |
Citation | 174 N.E. 414,342 Ill. 244 |
Parties | PEOPLE v. MILLER. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Commissioner's Opinion.
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Harry B. Miller, Judge.
Raymond Miller was convicted of larceny, and he brings error.
Affirmed.Harold L. Levy, of Chicago (Elwyn E. Long, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., John A. Swanson, State's Atty., of Chicago, and Carl I. Dietz, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Henry T. Chace, Jr., and Edward E. Wilson, both of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
On July 23, 1928, Philip Keller and plaintiff in error, Raymond Miller, were jointly indicted for larceny by the Cook county grand jury. Keller was convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary on May 17, 1929. On June 6, 1930, plaintiff in error was convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary for from one to ten years, and he seeks review of the record.
Gabriel F. Slaughter testified that he was vice president of the American Steel Foundry Company; that on April 4, 1928, he owned a Chrysler 70 sedan, with two extra tires mounted on extra wheels, one on each side of its front fenders; that he purchased it at the Riviera Motor Sales; that all the wheels of the car, including the two extra ones, were wire and were painted a special red color that witness had ordered; that the finish of the wheels was dull and not a varnish; that he changed the locks which were on the car when he bought it and the extra wheels were locked on with a special lock which was not a Johnson lock, and which was not put on at the Riviera Motor Sales but at a special place; that about 7 o'clock on the evening of April 4, 1928, witness parked the car on the south side of Sunnyside avenue, Chicago; that, when he next saw the car, about 9:35 that same evening, the wheel, tire and lock on the right-hand side of the car were gone; that witness thereupon went to the police station at Addison and Halsted streets, where he met Officer Bellack and reported the theft; that a few minutes later, at the station, in the presence of Bellack, he went into a vault where there were tires and saw his tire, which he identified by the special lock, and that he took his key out of his pocket and then and there unlocked it. Slaughter gave a detailed description of the special lock and indicated how it was sawed off when he got it back.
Gustave Bellack, a police officer, testified that he arrested plaintiff in error on the evening of April 4, 1928. The question was put to him, ‘Will you tell us the circumstances under which that arrest was made?’ Counsel for plaintiff in error interposed, ‘I object, if the court please.’ The objection was overruled. In answer to several questions which then followed, without further objection, Bellack testified that about 9:30 on the evening of April 4, 1928, in front of 3912 Pine Grove avenue, Chicago, he saw two cars parked double; that when he was fifteen or twenty feet away he saw a Chrysler car with bright lights on, facing south; that when he got in front of it he saw a man placing a tire in its rear seat, and that this man was plaintiff in error. In response to the direction, ‘Go ahead,’ Bellack then stated: Counsel for plaintiff in error then said, ‘I object and move that it be stricken from the record.’ The court overruled the objection. Bellack also testified that he put all the latter tires in the vault, that about fifteen or twenty minutes later Slaughter came in and reported his tire stolen, and that he took Slaughter to the vault, where the latter picked out his tire, took a key out of his pocket, and opened the lock. Bellack further testified that Slaughter's wheel was red, and without objection answered that the wheel and tire thus identified by Slaughter were the ones found by witness in the automobile of plaintiff in error. He was then asked, over objection, ‘Was that the tire, wheel and tube that you saw Miller putting in the car when you approached him?’ and his answer was, ‘No, sir.’
Ray Weirsing, a police officer, testified that he arrested plaintiff in error on May 5, 1930, at Victory, Ky., and brought him back to Chicago.
Plaintiff in error denied that he committed the theft with which he was charged. He testified that on April 4, 1928, he owned a Chrysler 72 automobile with red wire wheels which he had bought at the Park View Motor Sales; that two extra red wire wheels were on the sides of the car, locked with Johnson locks; that he and Keller had been at the Riviera Motor Sales for an hour and a half that evening to trade witness' car for an Imperial, called an ‘80,’ and that after leaving there, they drove to Pine Grove avenue. The following questions and answers then appear in sequence:
Plaintiff in error further testified that, when the car started, Bellack came running across the street with pistol in hand and shot Keller; that Bellack did not holler ‘Police officer!’ that, after the collison with the other car, Bellack told witness to get out and put his hands up, saying he thought he had shot witness and that he knew witness, that he was Ray Miller; that witness was taken to the station and locked up; that his keys were left in the automobile, sticking in the lock; that he got back only the ignition key; and that when he got out of the station both of his spare wheels were gone.
On cross-examination, plaintiff in error stated that, when the case was called on May 16, 1929, he was in Indianapolis; that he knew then that his bond had been forfeited; that on April 4, 1928, he did not live on the North Side; that he bought his car at Grand avenue and Sacramento from another motor sales but intended to trade it off at the Riviera Motor Sales; that after leaving the Riviera Motor Sales Keller drove from there, without stopping, to the spot on Pine Grove avenue where the car was parked; that it took about ten or fifteen minutes to get there; that he waited in the car five minutes for Keller to come out; and that he had not been out of the car at all. The record then shows the following:
‘Q. As a matter of fact, just before the officer came over weren't you carrying a tire and putting it in the back of your car at that time?
‘Mr. Levy: I object.
‘The Court: Overruled.
‘Mr. Levy; Exception.
‘A. No.
‘Mr. Brown: Wasn't that tire from a Nash car? A. No, sir.
‘Q. And wasn't that tire taken from the Nash car—the back of the car that was standing right next to the one where you were parked?
‘Mr. Levy: I object.
‘The Court: Sustained.
‘Mr. Levy: Exception to the question.
‘Mr. Brown: Where did you get the four tires that were in the back of the car?
‘Mr. Levy: I object.
‘A. Didn't have four tires.
‘Mr. Brown: Did you have any tires that were parked in the back of the car at that time?
‘Mr. Levy: I object.
‘The Court: He may answer.
‘Mr. Levy: Exception.
‘A. Yes, sir.
‘Mr. Brown: Did you have any tires in the back of the car at that time—anywhere in the car? Let's not be technical. A. Two I had on the sides.
‘Mr. Levy: I object, if the court please.
‘The Court: Strike out, ‘Let's not be technical.”
In the argument of plaintiff in error only two points are made. The first is that the trial court committed error in allowing the people to introduce in evidence incompetent and prejudicial testimony which showed the commission by plaintiff in error of other independant crimes. The second is that the evidence fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The argument on the second point is prefaced by the statement that the errors in permitting incompetent testimony were particularly prejudicial to the rights of plaintiff in error because the evidence in the case is ‘very close.’ The theory upon which the closeness of the evidence appears to be based is that (1) the extra wheels and tires alleged by plaintiff in error to have been on his car were stripped from it and taken to the vault of the police station before Slaughter got there; (2) that Slaughter in fact picked out, not his own tire, but one of the two belonging to plaintiff in error; and (3) that Slaughter's key fitted the lock on the tire belonging to plaintiff in error thus picked out. As a corollary to this theory it is strongly urged that ‘the only satisfactory identification’ of Slaughter's tire could have been made by producing its serial number from a ‘sales slip’ or ‘memorandum book.’ The difficulty with this theory is that there is no evidence whatever tending to show that the two tires alleged to belong to plaintiff in error were taken to the vault of the police station before Slaughter arrived there or at any other time, and there is, on the other hand, positive evidence tending to show that the locks on Slaughter's...
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