People v. Miller
| Decision Date | 24 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 233018.,233018. |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHAREE PAULETTE MILLER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Appeal from Genesee Circuit Court, LC No. 00-006086-FC.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Saad and Wilder, JJ.
Defendant, Sharee Miller, conspired with her recently-acquired lover to kill her new husband. Miller's lover, former police officer Jerry Cassaday, killed Miller's husband and, months later, killed himself. Before his suicide, Cassaday memorialized in writing and on computer disks, his affair with Miller, his conspiracy with Miller to kill Miller's husband, his murder of Miller's husband and Miller's romantic betrayal of him.
Miller appeals her convictions and sentences for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, MCL 750.157a and MCL 750.316, and second-degree murder as an aider and abettor, MCL 750.317. Regarding the jury verdict, Miller says this Court should reverse her convictions and grant her a new trial based on the trial court's erroneous evidentiary rulings1 and its conduct of voir dire. Miller also avers that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence above the minimum sentencing guidelines range. Because the evidentiary and voir dire rulings were correct and, if erroneous in part, harmless, we affirm the jury's verdict. Furthermore, because the trial court articulated substantial and compelling reasons for sentencing Miller above the statutory guidelines range, we affirm Miller's sentence.
On November 9, 1999, defendant's husband was shot and killed at work. Three months later, Miller's lover, Cassaday, committed suicide. Cassaday left a suicide note that described how Miller and Cassaday had planned to kill the victim, and it also described how Cassaday followed through with the plan and killed Miller's husband. Cassaday also left a copy of America On Line ("AOL") "instant messages" he exchanged with Miller on November 7, 1999, and November 8, 1999, which detailed their scheme to kill Miller's husband. Also, numerous email communications between Miller and Cassaday were recovered from Cassaday's computer hard drive. Cassaday and Miller wrote the e-mails between August and November 1999 and they reveal the extent of their relationship, their future plans to marry, Miller's false claim that she was pregnant, and her desire to kill her husband.
At trial, Miller denied any involvement in her husband's murder. However, based on the above evidence, prosecutors argued that Miller manipulated Cassaday into killing her husband by claiming that her husband abused her. Prosecutors also presented evidence that, on two occasions, Miller falsely told Cassaday that she was pregnant with his children, but that the unborn babies died from her husband's abuse. The jury convicted Miller of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and second-degree murder. Miller appeals, and we affirm.
Defendant challenges several evidentiary rulings by the trial court. Three standards of review apply to the various evidentiary rulings at issue here. First, we review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 575; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). However, "[w]hen the decision regarding the admission of evidence involves a preliminary question of law, such as whether a statute or rule of evidence precludes admissibility of the evidence, the issue is reviewed de novo." People v Washington, 251 Mich App 520, 524; 650 NW2d 708 (2002). Similarly, where an evidentiary issue implicates the Confrontation Clause of the federal and state constitutions,2 we review the constitutional issue de novo. Id. at 524-525. Finally, we review for clear error a trial court's findings of fact regarding the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement. People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 268-269; 547 NW2d 280 (1996).
We hold that the trial court properly admitted the suicide note under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule, MRE 804(b)(7).3 The rule states that, if the declarant is unavailable:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
In interpreting the identical "catchall" exception, MRE 803(24), this Court explained that the requisite circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness must exist to satisfy a defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him or her. People v Lee, 243 Mich App 163, 171-173; 622 NW2d 71 (2000). In determining whether a statement possesses adequate indicia of reliability, the trial court must consider "the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement," including the following factors:
(1) the spontaneity of the statements; (2) the consistency of the statements; (3) lack of motive to fabricate or lack of bias; (4) the reason the declarant cannot testify; (5) the voluntariness of the statements, i.e. whether they were made in response to leading questions or made under undue influence; (6) personal knowledge of the declarant about the matter on which he spoke; (7) to whom the statements were made, e.g. a police officer who was likely to investigate further and (8) the time frame within which the statements were made. The court may not consider whether evidence produced at trial corroborates the statement. [Id. at 178 (citations omitted).]
Here, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the suicide note indicate that the statements possessed sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. See id. at 178-180; People v Welch, 226 Mich App 461, 467-468; 574 NW2d 682 (1997). As noted by the trial court, Cassaday's statements were (1) spontaneous and voluntary because he made them without prompting or inquiry, (2) consistent, (3) made fairly contemporaneously to his impending death, and (4) made from personal knowledge. In addition, Cassaday directed the statements to family members, i.e., his mother and father, people to whom Cassaday would likely speak the truth. Also, the reason Cassaday could not testify, because he had committed suicide, militates in favor of admissibility and supports a lack of motive to fabricate.
In addition, the suicide note was clearly relevant to prove conspiracy because it detailed both his and Miller's participation in the planning and execution of the victim's murder. MRE 804(b)(7)(A). Moreover, because Cassaday is dead, the statements were also more probative on the point for which they were offered than any other evidence the prosecution could have procured with reasonable effort. MRE 804(b)(7)(B). Finally, in our view, admission of the suicide note served the general purposes of the court rules and the interests of justice. MRE 804(b)(7)(C). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Cassaday's suicide note under MRE 804(b)(7).
With regard to the AOL instant messages, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the portions of the message attributable to defendant were not hearsay declarations. See MRE 801(d)(2); People v Kowalak, 215 Mich App 554, 556-557; 546 NW2d 681 (1996). We also agree with the trial court that Cassaday's statements in the AOL instant messages, although hearsay, were admissible as statements against penal interest under MRE 804(b)(3). Whether a statement is admissible under MRE 804(b)(3) depends on: "(1) whether the declarant was unavailable, (2) whether the statement was against penal interest, (3) whether a reasonable person in declarant's position would have believed the statement to be true, and (4) whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicated the trustworthiness of the statement." Barrera, supra; see also People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 715-716; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
A declarant's hearsay statement against penal interest that also implicates another person may also be admissible as substantive evidence against the other person (1) if the statement is admissible as a matter of the law of evidence, and, (2) if its admission would not violate the defendant's right of confrontation. People v Poole, 444 Mich 151, 162; 506 NW2d 505 (1993). The first inquiry focuses on the reliability of the hearsay statement and takes into consideration its content and the circumstances under which the statement was made. Id. at 160-161. With regard to the second inquiry, the statement must be examined (considering the totality of the circumstances), to determine whether it contains "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" to allow its admission as substantive evidence although the defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant. Schutte, supra at 717-718, quoting Poole, supra at 165. In this regard, our Supreme Court has stated:
The presence of the following factors would favor admission of such a statement: whether the statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made contemporaneously with the events referenced, (3) made to family, friends, colleagues, or confederates—that is, to someone whom the declarant would likely speak the truth, and (4) uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the declarant and without prompting or inquiry by the listener.
On the other hand, the presence of the following factors would favor a finding of inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) was made to law enforcement officers or at the prompting or...
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