People v. Mills

• Citation: 537 N.W.2d 909,450 Mich. 61
• Decision Date: 15 August 1995
• Docket Number: 100059,Docket Nos. 100058,No. 8,8
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Vester MILLS and James Camilli, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 909

537 N.W.2d 909

450 Mich. 61

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Vester MILLS and James Camilli, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket Nos. 100058, 100059.

Calendar No. 8.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued May 3, 1995.

Decided Aug. 15, 1995.

[450 Mich. 63] Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training, and Appeals, and Janet A. Napp, Detroit, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the People.

State Appellate Defender by Ronald E. Steinberg, Detroit, and Henry M. Scharg, Warren, MI, and Young & Kaluzny by Stuart L. Young, Bingham Farms, for defendants.

Before the entire bench.

OPINION

MALLETT, Justice.

We granted leave in this case ¹ to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the defendants, Vester Mills and James Camilli, a new trial on the basis that seventeen color slides shown to their juries, that depicted the victim's severe burn wounds over more than sixty percent of her body, were unfairly prejudicial. In addition, only with respect to defendant Mills, we granted leave to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting him a new trial on the ground that his jury should have been instructed on the defenses of "accident" and "intoxication."

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on both issues and reinstate the defendants' convictions.

I

On the night of June 23, 1989, defendants, Vester Mills and James Camilli, ² drove to a low-income housing project to locate Camilli's girlfriend, who he believed was visiting another man at the complex. While seated in their car at the complex, the defendants engaged in a heated debate with a group of men, reputed drug dealers, who apparently approached and stood outside the vehicle. Some exchanges were made and the men outside the vehicle smashed most of its windows with baseball bats. In an apparent attempt to seek retribution, the defendants drove to a service station where one of them filled an empty soda bottle with a few cents worth of gasoline.

On the defendants' drive back to the housing project, they encountered Kristen Grauman, a nineteen-year-old woman. Mr. Camilli asked her whether she knew where he could buy a rock of cocaine. Promising to provide directions, Ms. Grauman entered the back seat of the car, driven by Mr. Camilli with Mr. Mills occupying the front passenger seat. Grauman became frightened when Mr. Camilli ignored her directions and Mr. Mills encouraged him to "[k]eep going." Grauman panicked and tried to escape through the back window on the driver's side, but Mr. Mills grabbed her by the right leg and would not let her go.

Ms. Grauman then felt something cold and wet all over her body, and saw Mr. Mills dumping or throwing something toward her from the front passenger seat as he held her leg. The next thing Ms. Grauman saw was a small flame coming toward her and then suddenly, she realized that she was on fire.

She then fell or was pushed from the window of the car and landed on the street. Her attempt to extinguish herself by rolling on the ground was unsuccessful. She eventually ran toward a ditch and heard a loud "hiss." Fortunately, the ditch was filled with water, which extinguished the fire. She did not recall much more about the incident. Ms. Grauman suffered severe burns over sixty percent of her body, as well as severe inhalation injury.

Mills and Camilli were charged with assault with intent to commit murder in connection with the severe burning of Ms. Grauman. M.C.L. § 750.83; M.S.A. § 28.278. They were tried jointly, but with separate juries. Each defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit murder, and each was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.

The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of both defendants and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in admitting seventeen slides of the burned victim into evidence. "The probative value to be gained from projecting full-color slides of subsequent medical treatment, including extensive surgical intervention, was clearly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403." Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 9, 1994 (Docket Nos. 130332 and 130333), slip op at 1. The Court of Appeals felt that "[t]here was a clear danger that replicating so many grewsome slides would encourage the jury to abdicate its truth-finding function based on sympathy and passion." Id., citing People v. Coddington, 188 Mich.App. 584, 598, 470 N.W.2d 478 (1991).

Further, the Court of Appeals held, with respect to Mr. Mills, that the trial judge erred in not instructing the jury on the defenses of "accident" and "intoxication." The Court of Appeals opined that both instructions were adequately supported by circumstantial evidence. Id., citing People v. Hoskins, 403 Mich. 95, 100, 267 N.W.2d 417 (1978). ³

II

The first question we must answer is whether the seventeen slides depicting the burned victim were admissible at trial under the Michigan Rules of Evidence. We must first determine whether the evidence is relevant under MRE 401. Second, if the evidence is relevant, we next determine whether the evidence should be excluded under MRE 403, whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

A. RELEVANCY: MRE 401

Pursuant to MRE 401, " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the actions more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." (Emphasis provided.) There are two separate questions this Court must answer to determine whether the evidence was admissible under MRE 401. ⁴ First, we must determine the "materiality" of the evidence. In other words, we must determine whether the evidence was of consequence to the determination of the action. Second, we must determine the "probative force" of the evidence, or rather, whether the evidence makes a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 1 McCormick, Evidence (4th ed), § 185, p 773.

Materiality, under Rule 401, is the requirement that the proffered evidence be related to "any fact that is of consequence " to the action. "In other words, is the fact to be proven truly in issue?" Wade & Strom, Michigan Courtroom Evidence (rev ed), Rule 401, p 71. A fact that is "of consequence" to the action is a material fact. People v. McKinney, 410 Mich. 413, 418-419, 301 N.W.2d 824 (1981). "Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. If the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial." McCormick, supra, § 185, p 773.

However, materiality does not mean that the evidence must be directed at an element of a crime or an applicable defense. 1 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, pp 401 to 401, pp. 401-7 to 401-26. (See also comments to FRE 401, which is identical to MRE 401.) As stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in United States v.Dunn, 805 F.2d 1275 (C.A. 6, 1986), a material fact "need not be an element of a crime or cause of action or defense but it must, at least, be 'in issue' in the sense that it is within the range of litigated matters in controversy." Id. at 1281. See also Weinstein & Berger, supra, p 401, p 401-20.

In addition to determining the materiality of the evidence, we must also consider the principle of probative force. Probative force is the "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Further, "any" tendency is sufficient probative force. MRE 401. This definition is well established in Michigan jurisprudence. See Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459, 484 (1864), and Collins v. Beecher, 45 Mich. 436, 438, 8 N.W. 97 (1881).

Thus, in this case, we must determine if the debated evidence, the seventeen photographs of Ms. Grauman, were evidence of "any fact that is of consequence to the determination" of the defendant's guilt and whether the photographs made the existence of certain facts more or less probable. We hold that the photographs were proof of many facts that were of consequence to this case and had significant probative force in proving the defendants' guilt.

The assistant prosecutor delineated seven reasons for seeking admission of the seventeen photographs:

1. The nature and extent of the injuries were relevant to the charge of assault with intent to kill because they showed an intent to kill;

2. The photographs showed some splattering, which corroborated the fact that gasoline was thrown on Ms. Grauman;

3. The photograph showed that Ms. Grauman's right side was more seriously burned than her left side, which corroborated her expected testimony;

4. Each photograph showed a different part of her body so the jury could fully comprehend the nature of the injuries;

5. Dr. Garner testified that the photographic documentation was necessary to show how the injuries evolved and to allow the jury to appreciate the extent of the injuries because the initial photographs did not portray the true injuries to a lay person and would therefore be misleading;

6. The jury was entitled to a basis for Dr. Garner's opinion concerning the nature and extent of the burns because it did not have to believe the bare testimony; and

7. The photographs demonstrated Ms. Grauman's state of mind, which Mr. Baker expected to become relevant during cross-examination with regard to inconsistent statements.

We find that these reasons are more than sufficient to prove that the photographs were important to understanding facts that were "of consequence to the determination" of the defendants' guilt. Specifically, these reasons affect two...