People v. Millspaugh
Decision Date | 12 May 1863 |
Citation | 11 Mich. 278 |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Parties | The People v. Daniel Millspaugh |
Heard April 11, 1863
On exceptions from the Recorder's Court of Detroit.The case is fully stated in the opinion of Justice Christiancy.
L Bishop, for defendant:
There can be no such thing as a criminal seduction in the last one of the two years during which the parties indulged in a free and unrestrained intercourse with each other.
To constitute the crime, the complainant must have been in the path of virtue when the alleged seduction in fact took place which, under the statute, must not have been over one year before the prosecution was instituted, and she must have been led aside from that path by the defendant.But after the first intercourse the complainant was not in such a condition of virtue that she could be seduced by defendant.Another man might, perhaps, have seduced her as to himself and others.A woman may be incontinent as to one man, and not so, perhaps as to another man; but she can not, in such a case, be seduced by her paramour.As to him there is no change in her course of life.As to him her life is uniformly vicious.In the case at bar it was such for nearly two years.That uniformity of vice in the complainant was not changed by the defendant.He may have been the original cause of it, but that question is not now in issue, and can not now be tried by reason of the lapse of time.
To constitute this offense "there must be actual illicit intercourse, and the female must be drawn aside from the path of virtue which she was honestly pursuing at the time the defendant approached her:" Whart.Cr. L., 762, note b. To seduce a female "is universally understood to mean an enticement of her on her part to a surrender of her chastity:" 27 Conn. 319;17 Penn. 608.A girl to be criminally seduced must be of good repute, and of virtuous life.She must be actually chaste and pure at the time of committing the offense: 8 Barb. 603.What path of virtue was this complainant in, and what chastity and purity had she, with regard to this defendant, for two years prior to this prosecution; and from what path of virtue, and from what chastity and purity did he seduce her in that time?If she had at any time reformed, and had become chaste, she might perhaps have been seduced over again; but nothing of the kind is claimed in this case: 8 Barb. 603.
H. M. & W. E. Cheever, for the people:
It is not necessary under our statutes, to constitute the crime of seduction, that the woman should have been from her infancy of pure and spotless character or reputation.The fallen, if reformed, is as much the subject of seduction, and her case as fully within the statute, as that of the purest girl living: 2 Bish. Cr. L., 1019;8 Barb. 603.Our statute is materially different from that of New York and Pennsylvania, in which the words are, "seduce and debauch any woman of previous chaste character;" while in our statutethey are, "seduce and debauch any unmarried woman."Yet in 8 Barb. 603, the court say "previous" in the connection there used must mean immediately previous, so that it would seem to be a question even under the statute of that State whether the character of the prosecutrix at any other time than immediately previous to the guilty conduct of defendant was in issue.
Christiancy J.:
The defendant was tried on an information filed October 3d, 1862, charging him with having, on the third day of March, 1862, seduced and debauched one Mary Taylor, an unmarried woman.The complaint on which the information was based was made July 11th, 1862.The statute--R.S. of 1846, Ch. 158, § 7;Comp. L., Ch. 185, § 7--provides that no prosecution shall be commenced after one year from the time of committing the offense.
The evidence (which was unimpeached and uncontradicted) tended to show that the first sexual intercourse between the parties took place on the eighth day of July, 1860, when the complainant was not over sixteen years of age; that he had frequently solicited such intercourse before, but she had always refused, and finally yielded only in consequence of, and relying upon, his promise to marry her the next New Year's, and his assurance that he would never think the less of her; that for the next three weeks this improper intercourse was repeated every two or three days, the defendant living at the house of her step-father where she resided with her mother; that after this she did not see the defendant again for some months, when he again renewed his visits, about once in two weeks, till the month of November, 1861; that at each of these interviews the like intercourse was repeated, that he then left again, and she did not see him till Christmas, when (or within the week after) the same intercourse was renewed, and continued till April, 1862; that she became pregnant from an intercourse which occurred on or about the third day of March, 1862.It appeared clearly from the evidence that at every act of intercourse the promise of marriage was renewed; that she placed full reliance upon it, and that it was on this account alone that she yielded to his desires.He had at first fixed the time for the marriage for the first of January, 1861, which he afterwards put off till the first of January, 1862; after which, though no time was fixed, he still assured her of his intention to marry her.He had given her his portrait and various presents, and twice gave her money which he said he gave her that she might not have to work out.About the first of April, 1862, she informed the defendant of her condition, when he said he did not think it could be so, and at once ceased to visit her.That two or three weeks after this she again informed him of the same, when he inquired why she did not tell her mother and get rid of it.That after the fourth of July, 1862, she again told him her condition, and asked him what she should do, to which he replied he did not know what she asked him for.
There is no pretense that she ever had sexual intercourse...
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