People v. Minott

• Citation: 660 N.Y.S.2d 317,172 Misc.2d 916
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Hopeton MINOTT, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 08 May 1997
• Court: New York County Court

Page 317

660 N.Y.S.2d 317

172 Misc.2d 916

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Hopeton MINOTT, Defendant.

Westchester County Court.

May 8, 1997.

Jeanine Ferris Pirro, District Attorney of Westchester County, White Plains (Richard E. Weill, of counsel), for Plaintiff.

Addabbo & Greenberg, Forest Hills (Todd D. Greenberg, of counsel), for Defendant.

PETER M. LEAVITT, Judge.

On October 14, 1995, following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree. On February 5, 1996, this Court granted defendant's application to be adjudicated a youthful offender, vacated his conviction and sentenced defendant, as a youthful offender, to a term of probation for a period of five (5) years. During the sentence proceeding the People had advised the Court that, in the interim since the verdict had been rendered, defendant had been arrested and indicted for the alleged robbery of the employees of a restaurant in Brooklyn, New York. Citing the Court of Appeals decision in People v. Outley, 80 N.Y.2d 702, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683, 610 N.E.2d 356 (1993), the People argued that the fact that defendant had been indicted should be considered by this Court as an aggravating factor in its youthful offender and sentencing determinations.

Although he was neither requested by the Court, nor otherwise bound, to do so defendant's attorney responded to the People's comments. He indicated that he was representing defendant in, and was fully familiar with the facts and circumstances of, the Brooklyn matter. He represented that defendant had not been identified in a line-up, that defendant had an alibi and that another person had taken defendant's coat and perpetrated the robbery with others. [See Minutes of Sentence, People v. Hopeton Minott, Ind. No. 1778/94, February 5, 1996 (hereafter, "Minutes"), at pp. 40-41] Defendant personally said nothing about the Brooklyn matter or his attorney's representations concerning it. Since at that point defendant was still entitled to the presumption of innocence with respect to the Brooklyn matter, the Court declined the People's entreaty to consider the fact of indictment for that extraneous transaction as an aggravating factor. [See People v. Villanueva, 144 A.D.2d 285, 534 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1st Dept., 1988) ]

By letter dated October 11, 1996, Ms. Janice E. Taylor, General Counsel to the City of New York Department of Probation, advised the Court that defendant had entered a plea of guilty to a felony in the matter for which he had been indicted in Brooklyn. The Court considered that this development might constitute grounds to vacate the youthful offender and sentencing adjudications, and to resentence, because said judgments had been obtained by defendant's fraud upon the Court. Accordingly, when the People's time to seek such relief pursuant to Section 440.40(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law expired without any motion therefor having been interposed, the Court directed the parties to appear before it on March 3, 1997. At that time the parties were advised that the Court was contemplating vacatur and resentence as aforesaid, sua sponte, and invited them to submit memoranda of law on the issue. Defendant was also invited to submit his own affidavit concerning the substance of his plea of guilty in the Brooklyn matter as well as a certified transcript of said allocution. Memoranda of Law were submitted and have been considered. Defendant chose not to make any other submissions.

Initially, it must be noted that the People's citation of the Outley decision at the sentence proceeding was inapposite and based upon a misreading thereof which they apparently still labor under. In Outley the Court of Appeals determined the consolidated appeals of three (3) defendants who had been convicted upon negotiated pleas of guilty. In each instance the court which accepted the plea had expressly conditioned its sentence promise upon the defendant not being arrested for any other crime before the date on which sentence was to be imposed; and, in each instance the defendant had been arrested during such period and, consequently, received an enhanced sentence. (People v. Outley, 80 N.Y.2d, at 707-12, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683, 610 N.E.2d 356)

As the Court noted:

"The question before us concerns the minimum requirements of due process when, as in these appeals, the defendant has breached a no-arrest condition by being arrested before the sentence but denies any complicity in the underlying crime" (Id., at 712, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683, 610 N.E.2d 356).

In answer to this question, the Court concluded:

"The inquiry must be of sufficient depth ... so that the court can be satisfied--not of defendant's guilt of the new criminal charge but of the existence of a legitimate basis for the arrest on that charge" (Id., at 713, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683, 610 N.E.2d 356) (emphasis added).

The Court found that the fact that an indictment had been returned charging one of the defendants (i.e., Maietta) with the criminal conduct for which he'd been arrested, in combination with other circumstances, ¹ was sufficient to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process for the sentencing court's determination that the defendant had violated the no-arrest condition of his plea agreement. (Id., at 714, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683, 610 N.E.2d 356) Thus, the Outley decision authorizes a sentencing court to impose a more severe sentence than that which it had promised a defendant who had entered a plea of guilty in reliance thereon, where such defendant has violated a no-arrest condition and the court determines that there was a legitimate basis for the arrest. Certainly, a sentencing court may always consider a defendant's intervening commission of another crime in reaching an appropriate sentence. [People v. Khan, 146 A.D.2d 806, 807, 537 N.Y.S.2d 284 (2nd Dept., 1989) ] Also--assuming that the fact of arrest for the alleged commission of another crime would be sufficient--it can be reasonably argued that the portion of the Outley decision which addresses the minimum due process requirements for a finding of a "legitimate basis" for such an arrest may be applied in the determination of an appropriate sentence upon a verdict after trial. ² However, this Court was, and remains, unaware of any existing judicial or statutory authority--and the People have cited none--sanctioning a sentencing court's use of the mere fact of an arrest for--as opposed to, "accurate, reliable evidence that defendant actually committed" (People v. Villanueva, supra)--an intervening extraneous crime as a basis for denial of youthful offender status or to enhance sentence.

Yet, despite their ardent beseechment that defendant's application for youthful offender adjudication should have been denied, and his sentence more severe, as a consequence of his involvement in the Brooklyn matter--a position which subsequent events have vindicated--the People appear curiously equivocal about the action which the Court is about to undertake; an action which would remedy the very inequity which they had so vociferously railed against. Defendant, of course, opposes such action on several grounds.

It is well-settled that courts possess the inherent power to vacate and correct their own judgments which have been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. [E.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132-33, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991); Levitin v. Homburger, 932 F.Supp. 508, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y., 1996) ] This inherent power is deeply rooted in the common law [Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244-45, 64 S.Ct. 997, 1000-01, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944) ], applies to judgments rendered in criminal, as well as civil, matters [e.g., Hogan v. Supreme Court of New York, Bronx County, 295 N.Y. 92, 65 N.E.2d 181 (1946); Matter of Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 25, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943) ], and is not circumscribed by any statutory time period [see People v. Wright, 56 N.Y.2d 613, 615, 450 N.Y.S.2d 473, 435 N.E.2d 1088 (1982) ]. Nor is said authority limited to the rectification of mere clerical errors [see, contra, Matter of Campbell v. Pesce, 60 N.Y.2d 165, 169, 468 N.Y.S.2d 865, 456 N.E.2d 806 (1983) ], or an illegal sentence inadvertently imposed [e.g., People v. Ford, 143 A.D.2d 522, 533 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dept., 1988) ]. [Matter of Lockett v. Juviler, 65 N.Y.2d 182, 490 N.Y.S.2d 764, 480 N.E.2d 378 (1985); see also, People v. Smalls, 162 A.D.2d 642, 643, 556 N.Y.S.2d 957 (2nd Dept., 1990) ] Rather, where a defendant in a criminal matter misrepresents a fact or set of circumstances upon which he knows the court will rely in its determination, and the court does accept and rely thereon, so that its judgment rendered in such reliance would have been otherwise but for said misrepresentation, the judgment so obtained is subject to vacatur. [See, e.g., People v. Calderon, 79 N.Y.2d 61, 65-67, 580 N.Y.S.2d 163, 588 N.E.2d 61 (1992) (youthful offender adjudication when obtained by defendant's fraud or misrepresentation); Matter of Lockett v. Juviler, supra (plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect); People v. Ryan, 168 Misc.2d 961, 640 N.Y.S.2d 978 (S.Ct., Kings Co., 1996) (illegal sentence); United States v. Gray, 708 F.Supp. 458 (D.Mass., 1989) (sentence modification) ]

Further, misrepresentations which may result in vacatur are not limited to a defendant's affirmative declarations addressed directly to the bench in open court. A defendant's false out of court statement to a third party has subsequently invalidated a judgment rendered in reliance thereon, where the defendant knew and intended that the court would rely upon the misrepresentation when it was made. [Matter of Lockett v. Juviler, supra (court accepted defendant's plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect in light of psychiatric experts' opinion that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome, which opinion was based upon defendant's false...