People v. Miranda
| Decision Date | 13 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–17–0218,1–17–0218 |
| Citation | 104 N.E.3d 473,2018 IL App (1st) 170218 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jonathan MIRANDA, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Dvorak Law Offices, LLC, of Willowbrook (Richard Dvorak and Christopher A. Tinsley, of counsel), for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Douglas P. Harvath, and Miles J. Keleher, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant Jonathan Miranda appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying him leave to file a successive petition under the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (Act) ( 725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2016) ). He contends that the circuit court erred in denying him leave because he presented a colorable claim of actual innocence, and he established cause and prejudice as to his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 3 In 2007, defendant and his cousins, Jason and Wellington Jaramillo,1 were charged by indictment with multiple counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm, home invasion, aggravated battery with a firearm, armed violence, aggravated battery, aggravated unlawful restraint, and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.
¶ 4 On March 10, 2009, defendant and his cousins entered negotiated pleas of guilty to aggravated discharge of a firearm in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges and agreed prison terms of 10 years for defendant and 15 years for his cousins with the express understanding they would be eligible to receive day-for-day good-conduct credit. Before entering judgments of conviction and imposing sentences, the trial court admonished defendant and his cousins of their appeal rights in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001). The trial court addressed defendant, commenting that he was "pretty lucky" because when his cousins "went into the house *** and shot that guy, they didn't kill him"; otherwise, he would be facing a minimum sentence of 35 years' imprisonment. The trial court then informed defendant and his cousins, inter alia , that before taking an appeal, and "within 30 days of today's date," they must each file a written motion asking that the judgment be vacated and for leave to withdraw the guilty plea stating the reasons for doing so. Defendant and his cousins acknowledged that they understood the trial court's admonishments.
¶ 5 Sometime thereafter, the trial court received a letter from defendant's mother saying that her son "was doing 85 percent" of his 10–year sentence to which he had agreed with the understanding that he would be eligible to receive day-for-day good-conduct credit. On June 4, 2009, 86 days after defendant and his cousins entered negotiated guilty pleas to aggravated discharge of a firearm, attorneys for defendant and his cousins appeared before the trial court and reformed the plea agreement so the parties, including the State, received the originally bargained-for benefits. Pursuant to this agreement, the trial court reduced defendant's sentence from "10 years contemplating he would do that 10 at 50 percent" to "70 months" at 85%. The trial court issued a corrected mittimus nunc pro tunc to March 10, 2009, the date of the negotiated guilty plea and the initial mittimus.
¶ 6 Twenty-eight days later, on July 2, 2009, defendant, represented by new attorneys, filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate judgment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, reinstated the charges previously dismissed, and remanded defendant to the custody of the Cook County jail without bond.
¶ 7 Defendant proceeded to a jury trial in 2010. The jury found defendant guilty of home invasion and aggravated battery with a firearm. The trial court then sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 21 and 6 years' imprisonment, respectively.
¶ 8 On direct appeal, we affirmed the judgment entered on defendant's convictions over his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the propriety of the State's rebuttal argument. People v. Miranda , 2012 IL App (1st) 103360–U. As to the sufficiency of the evidence, we found there was sufficient evidence allowing a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that defendant had knowledge of his cousins' criminal purpose and acted with intention to aid his cousins in the commission of their offenses against Froylan Lopez, a known narcotics dealer. Id. ¶ 51. Specifically, we found sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions under accountability principles despite defendant's trial testimony that he remained at home with his girlfriend, mother, and sister the night before the shooting, and his brother's testimony that he, and not defendant, drove the Oldsmobile that narcotics surveillance officers observed circle Lopez's house. Id. ¶¶ 51–53. Defendant's undisputed presence as a getaway driver outside Lopez's house on the date in question, his flight with his cousins after they shot Lopez, and circumstantial evidence of defendant's prior knowledge of his cousins' criminal design established defendant's accountability for the home invasion and aggravated battery of Lopez with a firearm. Id. We noted that, although defendant testified at trial that he believed he was driving his cousins to a job interview, there was circumstantial evidence otherwise. Id. ¶ 52. For instance, the night before the shooting, police intercepted a call wherein Jason Jaramillo told Luis Diaz, who owed the victim money for drugs seized by police, that he and Wellington were going to pay their cousin $1000 "just to drive," and Jason mentioned that his cousin drove a small expensive car. Id. Coincidentally, defendant testified at trial that he drove his cousins to Lopez's house in an Audi TT, which he described as a small sports coupe. Id. As to the propriety of the State's rebuttal argument, we noted that the prosecutor was entitled to comment on defendant's failure to call his girlfriend, mother, and sister to support an alibi defense because defendant injected their existence into the case, and we ultimately found the prosecutor's comments were reasonable inferences based on the evidence presented at trial and did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof onto defendant or deprive him of a fair trial and warrant reversal of his convictions. Id. ¶ 60.
¶ 9 In 2013, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition seeking to vacate his jury convictions and sentences for home invasion and aggravated battery with a firearm, or alternatively to reinstate his 10–year sentence for aggravated discharge of a firearm under the original plea agreement. Defendant alleged in his petition that he received ineffective assistance of plea counsel, who misinformed him that if he pled guilty to aggravated discharge of a firearm, he would be sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment to be served at 50% and that "after all of [his] good time was accumulated, [he] would only serve 2 ½ to 3 years in jail." Defendant also alleged that trial counsel2 was ineffective for failing to call "all of the witnesses who were available to testify" on his behalf, and "[t]his failure allowed the prosecution to argue to the jury in rebuttal that [he] had not presented witnesses to support [his] theory of the case."
¶ 10 The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit in a written order. In rejecting defendant's assertion that plea counsel's actions started a "chain of events" that ended with a 27–year prison sentence, the circuit court found that the actual chain of events that led to defendant's 27–year imprisonment started with the home invasion and shooting of Froylan Lopez and that he voluntarily chose to withdraw his plea of guilty and go to trial. In rejecting defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call all of the witnesses available to testify on his behalf, the circuit court found that defendant failed to attach any affidavits from those witnesses or indicate what the substance of their testimony would be. The circuit court further found that the issue was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it was previously decided against defendant on direct appeal.
¶ 11 We affirmed the summary dismissal of defendant's pro se petition, finding that the parties' conduct revested the trial court with jurisdiction to consider defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that defendant failed to present an arguable claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call his mother and sister as a witness to corroborate his defense where there were no supporting affidavits or an explanation for their absence. People v. Miranda , 2016 IL App (1st) 131551-U, ¶¶ 24–25, 27–29, 2016 WL 3442719.
¶ 12 In 2015, defendant filed a pro se "Complaint for Mandamus " alleging that the circuit court judge who granted defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate judgment, lacked jurisdiction to do so. The circuit court denied defendant leave to file the complaint for mandamus , and on appeal therefrom, we affirmed the denial of leave after granting appointed counsel leave to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley , 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). People v. Miranda , No. 1–15–2583 (2017) ().
¶ 13 On November 17, 2016, defendant, represented by attorney Richard Dvorak,3 filed the subject motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, along with the proposed petition. In his motion, defendant asserted he could establish cause and prejudice to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because his initial postconviction petition was defective "due to misrepresentations made to him by his appellate counsel and that appellate co...
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Morse v. Donati
...their opening brief (or at trial). Generally, arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are deemed forfeited. People v. Miranda , 2018 IL App (1st) 170218, ¶ 27, 422 Ill.Dec. 906, 104 N.E.3d 473. Forfeiture aside, our supreme court held in Valfer v. Evanston Northwestern Healthca......