People v. Mireles
| Decision Date | 29 November 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-263,77-263 |
| Citation | 398 N.E.2d 150,34 Ill.Dec. 475,79 Ill.App.3d 173 |
| Parties | , 34 Ill.Dec. 475 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose MIRELES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Ralph Ruebner, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Chicago, Robert Agostinelli, Deputy State Appellate Defender, and Michael Filipovic, Ottawa, for defendant-appellant.
Bernard Carey, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger and Rimas F. Cernius, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
This is an appeal by Jose Mireles, the defendant, from his conviction for the murder of Marsha Keshick. Following his conviction by a jury the defendant was sentenced to fifteen to thirty years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. On appeal he contends:
(1) the trial court erred in failing to Sua sponte order a fitness hearing;
(2) defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to request a fitness hearing;
(3) incriminating statements made by the defendant should have been suppressed as involuntary because of defendant's mental condition when he made them;
(4) the trial court erred in excluding as hearsay testimony concerning defendant's irrational conduct and delusional thinking;
(5) defendant was denied due process when, in response to a defense request for discovery of a memorandum prepared by an assistant state's attorney, the trial court excised certain portions as a non-discoverable work product;
(6) the trial court erred in permitting hearsay testimony showing the intent or state of mind of the deceased;
(7) the trial court erred in permitting the State to use improper impeachment testimony as substantive evidence of defendant's sanity;
(8) the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted photographs of the deceased to be displayed to the jury;
(9) the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted a prejudicial display of electrical wires used to strangle the deceased, and when it permitted these wires to go to the jury;
(10) the jury was erroneously instructed that defendant had given a confession;
(11) the prosecution failed to establish defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt;
(12) defendant's sentence was excessive.
We affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial court.
Defendant's contentions necessitate a summary of pre-trial procedures as well as the evidence adduced at trial. Prior to trial, on April 11, 1975, at the request of the assistant public defender who then represented the defendant, Judge Maurice Pompey referred defendant to the Psychiatric Institute of the circuit court of Cook County for an examination concerning his fitness to stand trial. On April 22, 1975 Dr. Langner examined the defendant and found that he was not competent to stand trial.
On August 26, 1975 defendant was represented by private counsel before Judge Mackoff, who presided over all subsequent trial proceedings. Counsel informed the court that a defense of insanity was contemplated and requested a copy of the prior fitness report. The report could not be located at that time. Defense counsel told the court he did not wish to order another such examination, stating he had no basis for such a request. He also stated he had had "no problem with co-operation" with his client. However, when the court was informed by counsel that defendant had a "considerable history" of mental illness or emotional problems, it ordered a fitness examination. Defense counsel then joined in a request for such an examination, but asked that it be extended to the question of sanity as well. He again stated that he had no reason to question the fitness of the defendant.
On October 6, 1975 the court received the report of Dr. Robert Reifman, assistant director of the Psychiatric Institute. It was his opinion, based on an examination he conducted October 3, 1975, that the defendant was not mentally fit to stand trial. He had no opinion concerning defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. Defense counsel then obtained court permission for a private psychiatrist, Dr. Ilse Judas, to examine the defendant as to his fitness to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. The court was also advised that the first evaluation of the defendant had indicated he was not competent to stand trial.
On October 31, 1975, at defense counsel's request, a competency hearing was set for November 20. However, on November 11 defense counsel informed the court that he believed that defendant was not unfit. This was on the basis of his own experience with the defendant as well as the report of Dr. Judas, which he had received but did not yet have available for the court. The court ruled that because of the earlier finding of Dr. Reifman it would schedule a fitness hearing on its own motion.
On December 23, 1975, defense counsel presented to the court the report of Dr. Judas. In that report Dr. Judas, who examined defendant on November 12, concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial:
"At this point his thought processes are not sufficiently interfered with nor is his affect so far withdrawn that he cannot understand or cooperate in a trial. It seemed to me this was adequately demonstrated by how he was able to deal with me in the interview.
Specifically, he was able to tell me why I was here to examine him according to what I knew his lawyers had told him. In addition, he held up without disintegration to extensive investigation on my part into his personal history, his offense, and the nature and the functions of his lawyers, social worker, and his fitness hearing and trial.
I see no good purpose in continuing to postpone his trial. As a matter of fact there may be adverse consequences as he sits out his guilt and uncertainties. Under the circumstances of his present confinement, he is in as good shape as he is apt to be."
Defense counsel again opposed holding a fitness hearing, basing this opposition on the report and on his experience with the defendant. However the matter was continued to January 21, 1976. On that date the court received the report of Dr. Reifman, who had examined the defendant a second time on January 16, 1976. He concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial "with medication." Upon inquiry by the court one of defendant's attorneys stated that to the best of her knowledge defendant was receiving medication. She also advised the court it was in the best interest of the defendant to have the trial as soon as possible. The court stated that based on the report of Dr. Judas and the revised opinion of Dr. Reifman indicating defendant's fitness for trial, no competency hearing was required.
Prior to trial defendant moved to suppress statements made by him following his arrest on the ground, Inter alia, that he did not have sufficient mental capacity or control to understand the Miranda warnings given him or to knowingly and voluntarily waive the rights communicated by those warnings.
The following facts were adduced at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress his statements. At about 6:45 p. m. on March 30, 1975 Officers Dale Whitmer and William Solke were sitting in a police car at 2648 West Haddon in Chicago when the defendant approached with his hands out in front of him. In response to their inquiry he identified himself and they arrested him. Defendant was upset and was sobbing at the time. Whitmer read him his Miranda rights and defendant said he understood them. He was then transported to the 13th District police station.
At the station Solke again advised defendant of his rights and defendant indicated that he understood them. He was sobbing as Solke spoke to him. Solke asked if he wanted coffee or cigarettes or whether he could do anything for him. Defendant responded "If I asked you to kill me, would you?" In response to Solke's questions defendant gave his date of birth, social security number, and address.
At about 8:00 p. m. defendant was driven to the office of Area 4 Homicide. In the car defendant asked if there was still a death penalty in Illinois. He was told no and when asked why this concerned him he responded that he had taken a life. At Area 4 Officer Ben Wieclawek advised defendant for a third time of his rights and defendant again indicated that he understood them. Defendant then gave a statement, lasting about thirty minutes. During the interview he was emotional, crying and sobbing.
At about 9:00 p. m. Officer Thomas O'Connor spoke with the defendant. He informed him of his rights and defendant said he understood them. In the presence of members of defendant's family, whose presence was requested by the defendant, O'Connor questioned defendant about the killing and he gave a second statement. He cried during part of the questioning, but O'Connor described him as very responsive to the questions posed.
Assistant State's Attorney Arthur Stefans met with the defendant about 9:30 p. m. He identified himself and advised defendant of his rights. Defendant said he understood those rights and wished to make a statement concerning the incident. Defendant then related what had occurred in a narrative form. On occasion Stefans would interrupt with specific questions and defendant would respond to them. Stefans described defendant as calm and unemotional during the session; he never changed his expression and spoke in a monotone. After the statement was given Stefans asked defendant if he wished to repeat it to a court reporter. Defendant asked to speak with his family, and after doing so he declined to repeat the statement to a court reporter.
Dr. Baker Howell, the chief psychiatrist at Cermak Memorial Hospital, was the sole witness testifying for the defendant at the hearing. He observed the defendant every day from April 2, 1975 to April 10, 1975. His diagnosis was that defendant was suffering from schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Jurczak
...of the crime may be properly utilized even though a defendant admits the crime but pleads insanity. People v. Mireles (1979), 79 Ill.App.3d 173, 199, 34 Ill.Dec. 475, 398 N.E.2d 150. The tape recording here was the most probative evidence available of the actual commission of the crime. Gru......
-
People v. Rachel
...v. Jeffrey (1981), 94 Ill.App.3d 455, 468, 49 Ill.Dec. 860, 418 N.E.2d 880, leave to appeal denied; People v. Mireles (1979), 79 Ill.App.3d 173, 199, 34 Ill.Dec. 475, 398 N.E.2d 150, cert. denied (1980), 449 U.S. 860, 101 S.Ct. 163, 66 L.Ed.2d 76; People v. Morgan (1976), 40 Ill.App.3d 711,......
-
People v. Keen
...clear what the witness will testify to, and it is not clear what purpose the testimony will serve. (See People v. Mireles (1979), 79 Ill.App.3d 173, 193, 34 Ill.Dec. 475, 398 N.E.2d 150; People v. Robinson (1977), 56 Ill.App.3d 832, 837, 14 Ill.Dec. 117, 371 N.E.2d 1170.) This court conclud......
-
People v. Moore
...entitled to an insanity instruction. People v. Haun (1966), 71 Ill.App.2d 262, 269, 217 N.E.2d 470; People v. Mireles (1979), 79 Ill.App.3d 173, 200-01, 34 Ill.Dec. 475, 398 N.E.2d 150, cert. denied (1980), 449 U.S. 860, 101 S.Ct. 163, 66 L.Ed.2d 76; People v. Rea (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 353,......